分类号F8密级
U D C 005编号
硕士学位论文
独立董事强制轮换后返聘能有效监督吗？
——来自大股东“掏空”的证据
研究生姓名：鲍镕江
指导教师姓名、职称：全怡副教授
申请者类别：非专项计划
申请者学习方式：全日制
学科门类：管理学
专业名称：财务管理
研究方向：公司财务
入学时间：二〇二〇年九月
二〇二三年六月
Could Rehired Independent Director After
Mandatory Rotation Effectively Monitor?:
Evidence From Major Shareholders
Tunneling Activities
By Bao Rongjiang
2023.06
独立董事强制轮换后返聘能有效监督吗？——来自大股东“掏空”的证据
摘要
我国上市公司中普遍存在“一股独大”的现象，公司的话语权被控股股东掌握，
大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突是我国上市公司中的主要代理问题。2001年我国
引入独立董事制度旨在保护中小股东利益，缓解第二类代理问题。制度实施二十多
年来，独立董事是否发挥了应有的监督作用一直受到监管层和学术界的广泛关注，
相关研究提供的证据逐渐表明我国独立董事存在弱化监督而强化咨询的特征。康美
药业造假案对独立董事处以巨额罚款更是将独立董事制度再次推向了讨论的中心，
如何提升独立董事监督职能，规范独立董事的行为，使独立董事职能回归制度设计
的初衷对我国资本市场的健康发展至关重要。
为了保证独立董事的独立性水平，我国独立董事制度规定独立董事任期最长不
得超过6年，而其他主要国家和地区对独立董事的任期并未限制或者限制的最长任
期比6年要更长。同时我国的独立董事资源相对较为匮乏，这也就造成了现实中不
少独立董事在6年任期届满后，经过一段“冷却期”被重新返聘回公司任职。那么
这些强制轮换后复返的独立董事在返聘后的监督有效性是否会降低？返聘间隔期的
长短是否会影响独立董事返聘后的监督有效性呢？为了更好地排除任期不同和离职
原因等干扰因素，本文主要关注6年任期届满后返聘的独立董事群体，从大股东掏
空的视角切入，对比独立董事返聘前后的治理效果，进一步分析返聘间隔期长短对
独立董事返聘后治理效果的影响。
本文以2004-2020年沪深A 股主板上市公司为研究样本，探讨了独立董事在强
制轮换返聘前后的个人治理行为和对大股东的监督效果。研究发现：第一，就个人
治理行为而言，相比于返聘前，独立董事在强制轮换返聘后表现得更加友好，投出
了更少的非赞成票。就公司层面大股东的监督效果而言，返聘后公司大股东的关联
交易行为相比于独立董事返聘前显著增加；第二，进一步分析发现，相比于初次聘
任，返聘时公司的累计异常收益率显著更低，投资者对独立董事返聘的市场反应更
差。相比于间隔长时间后返聘的独立董事，间隔较短时间就返聘的独立董事返聘后
对大股东的监督效果更差；第三，异质性分析发现，当返聘独立董事的监督能力更
差、公司内外部治理环境越差时，独立董事返聘后对公司大股东的监督效果相比于
返聘前更差；第四，独立董事返聘后加剧了公司的第一类代理问题，具体表现为公
司高管的薪酬业绩敏感性和CEO 离职业绩敏感性相比于返聘前显著更低。就返聘后
的咨询效果而言，返聘后的咨询效果也更差，公司的创新产出相比于返聘前更少。
以上结果说明，独立董事在强制轮换后的独立性水平更低，在返聘公司中的治理有
效性降低，证实了本文提出的“独立性效应”假说。本文的研究不仅从更加严谨的
视角证明了独立董事返聘行为对公司可能会产生的不利影响，丰富了独立董事相关
1
摘要
的研究，而且能够为监管层修订独立董事制度中有关独立董事返聘行为和间隔期的
相关规定提供经验证据。
关键词：独立董事；强制轮换；返聘；关联交易；冷却期
2
独立董事强制轮换后返聘能有效监督吗？——来自大股东“掏空”的证据
Abstract
There is a widespread phenomenon of "one share dominates exclusively"in China's
listed companies,the majority shareholder holds the power of the company,so the conflict
of interests between major shareholders and small shareholders is the main agency problem
in China's listed companies.The introduction of the independent director system in China
in 2001was aimed at protecting the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and
alleviating the class II agency problem.Over the past twenty years since the
implementation of the system,whether independent directors have played their proper
supervisory role has been widely concerned by regulators and academics,and evidence
from relevant studies has gradually shown that independent directors in China have
weakened supervision and strengthened consultation.The fines imposed on independent
directors in the fraud case of Kangmei Pharmaceuticals have brought the system of
independent directors to the center of discussion again.It is crucial for the healthy
development of China's capital market to enhance the supervisory function of independent
directors,regulate the behavior of independent directors,and return the function of
independent directors to the original purpose of the system design.
In order to ensure the level of independence of independent directors,China's
independent director system stipulates that the maximum term of independent directors
shall not exceed 6years,while other major countries and regions do not limit the term of
independent directors or limit the maximum term of independent directors to longer than 6
years.At the same time,China's independent director resources are relatively scarce,which
has resulted in the reality that many independent directors are rehired to serve in new
companies after a "cooling-off period"after their six-year terms expire.Will the
effectiveness of the supervision of these independent directors who return after mandatory
rotation be reduced after their reappointment?Does the length of the re-employment
interval affect the effectiveness of the post-employment supervision of independent
directors?In order to better understand the different tenure and reasons for leaving,this
thesis focuses on the group of independent directors who return after their six-year tenure
expires,in order to compare the governance effectiveness of independent directors before
and after their return from the perspective of hollowing out by major shareholders,and
further analyze the impact of the length of the return interval on the governance
effectiveness after their return.
This thesis explores the personal governance behaviors of independent directors and
their monitoring effects on major shareholders after mandatory rotation reappointment,
using the main board listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2004to
2020as the research sample.The study finds that,first,in terms of personal governance
behavior,independent directors show more obedience and cast fewer non-affirmative votes
I