分类号F8密级
U D C 005编号
硕士学位论文
非控股大股东退出威胁与高管超额
在职消费
研究生姓名：庞诗琪
指导教师姓名、职称：黄洁莉副教授
申请者类别：非专项计划
申请者学习方式：全日制
学科门类：管理学
专业名称：财务管理
研究方向：公司财务
入学时间：二〇二〇年九月
二〇二三年六月
Non-controlling Large Shareholders’Exit
Threats and Executive Excess Perks
By Pang Shiqi
2023.06
非控股大股东退出威胁与高管超额在职消费
摘要
习近平总书记在十九届中央纪委三次全会上指出“对享乐主义、奢靡之风等歪风
陋习要露头就打”，要坚持不懈落实中央八项规定精神，深入纠正“四风”。近年来，
许多高级管理人员被曝出存在花费大量企业资金来进行私人消费的高管在职消费行
为，如利用公务之便享受高消费娱乐活动、公款旅游、虚报业务招待费等。合理范围
内的在职消费能够激励管理层提高企业绩效，但不合理的超额部分是对企业资源的浪
费，会侵害股东的利益。从媒体曝光再到国家颁布政策，高管超额在职消费一直是引
发社会高度关注和学术界持续研究的一个重要话题，而非控股大股东作为企业重要的
利益相关者，其对高管超额在职消费的影响还未得到充分重视。
非控股大股东是指持股比例位于控股股东与中小股东之间的群体，其持股比例虽
不具有控制权，但相较中小股东具有一定话语权，因而其在彻底退出企业之前有积极
监督和退出威胁两种参与企业治理的方式。在我国上市企业“一股独大”的股权结构
特征环境下，非控股大股东由于控股股东控制权过大，其积极监督的企业治理方式效
果被削弱，因此退出威胁便成为其维护自身利益的另一有效参与治理途径。退出威胁
最早起源于西方学者发现股票流动性的提高可以使外部大股东们能及时地抛售股票，
我国资本市场股票流动性在股权分置改革及融资融券制度推行后大大增强，使得我国
非控股大股东可以通过潜在的退出威胁去参与治理，而不是真正地退出。
因此，从非控股大股东参与公司治理途径的角度出发，探究其能否通过退出威胁
发挥治理效应，抑制高管超额在职消费。这不仅拓展了非控股大股东参与公司治理的
方式，将心理学“威胁”的概念拓展到经济管理领域，也为抑制高管私利行为提供了
一条新的思路。本文基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、信号传递理论和博弈理论，
以2007-2021年我国A 股上市公司数据为研究样本，对非控股大股东退出威胁与高管
超额在职消费之间的关系进行考察，并加入内部影响因素作为调节变量对两者关系进
行进一步探讨，分别是退出威胁可信性即控股股东与非控股大股东持股比例差和退出
威胁强度即管理层是否持股。同时探究了非控股大股东退出威胁在不同分析师关注度、
行业竞争度程度、市场化进程的外部环境下和不同产权性质下的治理效果。
本文研究发现：（1）非控股大股东退出威胁能够显著抑制高管超额在职消费。
（2）控股股东和非控股大股东的持股比例差越大，非控股大股东退出威胁越可信；
管理层持股时，退出威胁强度越大，均对高管超额在职消费的抑制作用越强。（3）
非控股大股东退出威胁在分析师关注度高、行业竞争程度高和低市场化程度地区的企
业和非国有企业中，对高管超额在职消费的治理效力更大，抑制作用更强。
1
摘要
根据研究所得结论，本文从投资者、企业、政府三个层面提出相关建议。作为企
业重要的股份持有者，非控股大股东应当充分认识到自身参与公司治理的途径并重视
自身对企业的治理效应；企业应意识到并重视非控股大股东在公司治理方面的重要作
用并优化股权结构；政府应进一步提高股票流动性，完善非控股大股东参与公司治理
的路径，完善在职消费披露水平与薪酬体系设计。最后，本文的创新点在于从新的角
度提供了抑制高管机会主义行为如高管超额在职消费的途径和从新的角度拓展了退
出威胁治理效应的研究范畴，为非控股大股东选择参与公司治理的方式提供了新的启
发。
关键词：非控股大股东；退出威胁；高管超额在职消费
2
非控股大股东退出威胁与高管超额在职消费
Abstract
General Secretary Xi pointed out at the Third Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection that "we must fight against hedonism,extravagance
and other unhealthy habits",and we must make unremitting efforts to implement the spirit
of the Central Committee's eight-point Regulation and thoroughly correct the "four winds".
In recent years,many senior managers have been exposed to spend a large amount of
corporate funds for private consumption,such as enjoying high-consumption entertainment
activities on official business,traveling with public funds,falsely reporting business
entertainment expenses,etc.Executive perks within a reasonable range can motivate
management to improve corporate performance,but unreasonable excess is a waste of
corporate resources and will harm the interests of shareholders.From media exposure to
national promulgation of policies,executive excess perks has been an important topic that
has aroused great concern in society and continued research in academia,while the
influence of non-controlling large shareholders,as important stakeholders of enterprises,
on executive excess perks has not been fully paid attention to.
Non-controlling large shareholders refer to the group whose shareholding ratio is
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.Although their shareholding
ratio does not have the right of control,they have certain voice compared with minority
shareholders.Therefore,they have two ways to participate in corporate governance before
completely withdrawing from the enterprise,namely active supervision and exit threat.In
the context of "one share dominates"shareholding structure of Chinese listed enterprises,
the non-controlling large shareholder's active supervision of corporate governance is
weakened by the excessive control of the controlling shareholders,so the exit threat has
become another effective means to protect their own interests.The exit threats originated
from the discovery by western scholars that the improvement of stock liquidity could
enable external large shareholders to sell their stocks in a timely manner.The stock
liquidity of Chinese capital market was greatly enhanced after the reform of
non-controlling share structure in 2005,so that Chinese non-controlling large shareholders
could participate in governance through the potential exit threat rather than actually exit.
Therefore,from the perspective of non-controlling large shareholders'participation in
corporate governance,this thesis explores whether they can exert governance effect
I