摘要
摘要
近年来，随着我国融资要求的提高和融资渠道的持续收窄，股权质押以其门
槛低、变现快等自身融资优势，在我国资本市场上迅猛发展。同时，股权质押所
带来的风险也日益凸显，成为资本市场亟待解决和加强管控的问题。大股东隐藏
在股权质押后的掏空行为，以及所引发的经济后果成为了众多研究者关心和研究
的热点。
本文选取*ST新光作为研究案例。首先通过文献研究法，对国内外关于股权
质押以及大股东掏空等文献做了大量的研究和思考，在前人研究的理论基础之上
结合自己的想法，梳理出了本文的研究思路。然后，以案例分析法对*ST新光公
司内部治理结构，大股东股权质押动因等做出分析，并探究了大股东股权质押后
诱发其掏空行为的影响因素以及二者之间的内在联系。同时，分析了大股东股权
质押下的掏空行为及引发的经济后果，并基于公司治理视角剖析了大股东掏空实
现的原因。通过案例研究发现*ST新光大股东股权质押主要是为了融资需求、提
前回笼资本和规避限售约束，但是面对大股东近年来面临的债务危机情况，靠股
权质押获得的融资远远无法满足大股东的资金需求，大股东更已无法抑制股权质
押后控制权和现金流权相分离这一刺激下增强的获取更多控制权私利的欲望，掏
空成本的降低使得大股东更愿意付诸掏空行为，是诱发大股东后期掏空行为产生
的主要因素。非经营性资金占用、违规担保以及违规信息披露是案例中大股东实
施利益侵占的主要手段，大股东股权质押下的掏空行为使得*ST新光的财务风险
增加，财务指标急剧下滑，以及短期市场出现了消极反应，公司价值一落千丈。
通过进一步研究发现，大股东掏空实现的原因主要在于上市公司“一股独大“的
股权结构，内部控制的不足以及法律和监管机制的缺失。
基于此，上市公司中小股东、外部投资者和监管机构应该对大股东股权质押
“信号”增加敏锐度和警惕性。同时，上市公司要重视和进一步完善公司内部的
治理，优化股权结构，完善内部控制，提升相关职能管理部门的治理效率，规避
风险，防范于未然。外部监管机构也要加大监管和处罚的力度，强化上市公司的
信息披露，同时应加速股权质押相关法律法规的出台。
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摘要
关键词：股权质押；大股东；掏空；公司治理
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Abstract
Abstract
In recent years, with the improvement of China's financing requirements and the
continuous narrowing of financing channels, equity pledge has developed rapidly in
China's capital market with its own financing advantages such as low threshold and
fast realization.At the same time, the risks brought by equity pledge are also
increasingly prominent, which has become an urgent problem to be solved and
strengthened in the capital market.The hollowing out behavior of major shareholders
hidden after the equity pledge and the economic consequences have become the hot
spot of concern and research of many researchers.
In this paper, * ST Xinguang is selected as a research case. First of all, through
the literature research method, 1 did a lot of research and thinking on the domestic
and foreign equity pledge and major shareholder hollowing and other documents,
combined with the theoretical basis of previous research, and sorted out the rese arch
ideas of this paper. Then, by the case analysis method, the internal governance
structure of * ST Xinguang Company's equity pledge is analyzed, and the influencing
factors inducing the hollowing behavior of major shareholders after the equity pledge
and the intermal connection between the two are explored. At the same time, the
hollowing behavior of the equity pledge of major shareholders and the economic
consequences are analyzed from the perspective of corporate governance. Through
case study found that * ST Xinguang shareholders equity pledge is mainly for
financing demand, early capital and avoid constraints, but in the face of debt It mainly
lies in the "dominant" ownership structure of listed companies, the lack of internal
control and the lack of legal and regulatory mechanism.
Based on this, minority shareholders, external investors and regulators of listed
companies should increase their acuity and vigilance to the "signal" of equity pledge
of major shareholders. At the same time, listed companies should pay attention to and
further improve the internal governance, optimize the shareholding structure, improve
the internal control, improve the governance efficiency of relevant functional
management departments, avoid risks, and prevent in the bud. External regulatory
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