摘要
摘要
近年来股权质押作为一种高效且方便的融资手段，在资本市场的青睐下得以迅速发
展，其质押规模也得以快速扩张。然而股权质押也存在风险，如若控制不当，在股价大
幅波动的情况下将及其危险，会给大股东，上市公司造成严重危害。作为非国企性质的
家族企业其融资资源往往有限，因此股权质押也成为了家族企业控股股东特别倾向的融
资手段。结合股权质押隐含的风险及以往关于股权质押经济后果的研究，可以推定股权
质押行为也会给家族企业经营决策，发展管理带来影响。然而，家族企业作为市场经济
中富有特色的经营群体，在企业经营目标，股东追求，管理模式等方面与非家族企业是
存在本质区别的，那么股权质押对家族企业产生的影响可能也不一样。基于此，本文将
从投资效率的视角研究股权质押可能给家族企业带来的影响。
本文主体部分首先对股权质押研究的现状做了总结，认为现有股权质押方面的研究
主要分为股权质押动机及股权质押对企业经济后果的影响两方面。接着对造成企业非投
资效率的原因进行了分析，并就股权质押与非效率投资及家族企业非效率投资相关的文
献做了综述，对当前非效率投资，股权质押及家族企业投资效率三方面的研究现状有了
清晰的梳理后，发现当前主流研究认为股权质押会加剧企业的非效率投资。但是本文认
为家族企业作为特征明显的市场经营组织体，股权质押对其投资决策的影响可能存在不
同影响，且当前还未有学者对家族企业股权质押行为进行专门的研究。因此本文基于家
族企业中的委托代理理论和社会情感财富理论探究了控股股东股权质押对家族企业投
资效率的影响，完善了股权质押行为对企业经济后果方面的研究。
本文以 2010-2018年度 A股上市家族企业为研究对象，就股权质押对家族企业非
效率投资的影响进行了实证检验。研究发现：（1）股权质押能够对家族企业的非效率
投资产生抑制作用，社会情感财富因素弱化了控股股东股权质押对企业的侵占效应，并
表现出一定的治理效应；（2）进一步研究发现，股权质押对家族企业非效率投资的抑
制作用仅在过度投资方面显著。究其原因是过度投资的侵占行为更可能诱发控股股东的
控制权转移风险，这是具有浓厚社会情感财富追求的家族企业控股股东所不愿见到的。
且家族企业相比国有企业本身面临更大的融资约束，可能需要挪用企业内部资金，因此
控股股东股权质押对家族企业过度投资的抑制动机更强；（3）控股股东股权质押抑制
家族非效率投资在家族企业采用内部晋升方式聘用总经理时更为有效。另外，当家族企
业由一代控制经营时，由于其对家族企业有更强的社会情感财富也能增强这种抑制作用。
关键词：股权质押；非效率投资；家族企业；社会情感财富
I

Abstract
Abstract
In recent years, equity pledge, as an efficient and convenient financing method, has
developed rapidly under the favor of the capital market, and its pledge scale has also expanded
rapidly. However, equity pledge also has risks. If improperly controlled, it is extremely
dangerous in the case of sharp fluctuations in stock prices, which will cause serious
consequences to major shareholders and listed companies. As a non-state-owned family
business, its financing resources are often limited. Therefore, equity pledge has also become a
financing method especially favored by the controlling shareholder of family business.
Combining the hidden risks of equity pledges and previous research on the economic
consequences of equity pledges, it can be presumed that equity pledges will also have an impact
on family business management decisions and development. However, as a characteristic
business group in the market economy, family businesses are fundamentally different from
non-family businesses in terms of business objectives, shareholder pursuits, and management
models. So the impact of equity pledges on family businesses may be different. Based on this,
this article will study the impact of equity pledges on family businesses from the perspective
of investment efficiency.
The main part of this article summarizes the current situation of equity pledge research
first, and believes that the existing research on equity pledge is mainly divided into the
motivation of equity pledge and the impact of equity pledge on the economic consequences of
enterprises. Then it analyzes the reasons for the non-investment efficiency of enterprises, and
summarizes the literature related to equity pledge, inefficient investment and family business
inefficient investment, and discusses the current inefficient investment, equity pledge and
family business investment efficiency. After a clear analysis of the research status, it is found
that the current mainstream research believes that equity pledges will aggravate the inefficient
investment of enterprises. However, this article believes that family business, as a market
management organization with obvious characteristics, may have different conclusions on the
impact of equity pledge on its investment decisions. At present, there are no scholars have done
special research on family business equity pledge behavior. Therefore, this article explores the
influence of controlling shareholder's equity pledge on family business investment efficiency
based on the principal-agent theory and social emotional wealth theory in the family business.
Improved the research on the economic consequences of the equity pledge behavior on the
enterprise
This paper takes the listed family companies in all A shares from 2010 to 2018 as the
research sample, and conducts an empirical test on the impact of equity pledge on the
inefficiency investment of family business.The research found that: (1) The controlling
II

Abstract
shareholder's equity pledge can inhibit the inefficient investment of the family business, and
the social emotional wealth factor weakens the controlling shareholder's encroachment effect
of equity pledge, and shows a certain governance effect; (2) Further, the study found that the
controlling shareholder's equity pledge has a significant inhibitory effect on the inefficient
investment of family businesses only in terms of overinvestment. The reason is that the
embezzlement of overinvestment is more likely to induce the risk of control transfer of
controlling shareholders than underinvestment. Which is family shareholders with strong social
emotional wealth pursuit unwilling to see. And family businesses face greater financing
constraints than state-owned enterprises themselves, and may need to embezzle internal
corporate funds. (3) The controlling shareholder's equity pledge is more effective in
suppressing the family's inefficient investment effect when the family business employs the
internal promotion method to hire the general manager. In addition, when the family business
is controlled and operated by one generation, it can also enhance this inhibitory effect because
of its stronger social and emotional wealth for the family business.
Keywords:
Equity pledge; Inefficient investment; Family business; Social emotional wealth
III
。。。以下略