摘要
股权质押是一种比较流行的融资工具，其具有融资灵活、快捷、高效、融资
成本低等特点，在众多融资方式中成功成为各大控股股东的首选。股权质押既能
激活股权上所附有的资金流解决融资问题，又能使控股股东继续保留对上市公司
的控制权，所以在面临资金需求时，各大控股股东会选择股权质押获取融资。同
理一些上市公司当面临较为严格的融资约束时，控股股东会选择避开严格融资约
束，通过股权质押有效降低融资成本来获取融资。然而股权质押有效解决融资问
题的同时也会给上市公司或市场投资者带来不利影响，例如造成股价崩盘、更高
的财务风险和经营风险、中小股东利益受损和更高的道德风险等，这会给公司发
展带来不利影响，也会阻碍股票市场稳健发展。基于此本文为探索股权质押相关
行为如何影响公司股价波动，希望从中找到解决股权质押融资带来负面问题的办
法或对策建议。
本文阅读和整理相关文献，根据信息不对称理论等进行理论分析，先后提出
本文的五个研究假设，使用搜集整理的 A股上市公司 2346只股票 2014-2020年
7年间非平衡面板数据 8127个样本，通过双向固定效应回归模型分析控股股东
股权质押、股权质押比例、股权质押频数、剩余股权质押比例和股权质押资金投
向对公司股票价格波动的影响。实证结果表明控股股东股权质押行为会造成公司
股票价格剧烈波动，同时股权质押相关变量数值越大，就越容易加剧上市公司股
价波动。异质性分析发现，股权质押融得资金投向影响着公司股票股价的波动，
当资金投向控股股东自身或公司之外的第三方时，明显加快公司股价波动，而投
向上市公司则无明显影响。为避免实证结果受到内生性的影响而导致估计失真，
文章通过倾向得分匹配的方法降低内生性影响因素后研究结论仍然成立。最后，
分析文章的实证结果，并根据原因分析针对股权质押的相关经济主体提出对策建
议。
关键词：上市公司；控股股东；股权质押；股价波动
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Abstracts
Equity pledge is a popular financing tool, which has the characteristics of
flexible, fast, efficient and low financing cost. It has successfully become the first
choice of major controlling shareholders among many financing methods. Equity
pledge can not only activate the capital flow attached to the equity to solve the
financing problem, but also enable the controlling shareholders to continue to retain
the control of the listed company, so when facing the capital demand, the major
controlling shareholders will choose equity pledge to obtain financing. Similarly,
when some listed companies face relatively strict financing constraints, controlling
shareholders will choose to avoid strict financing constraints and obtain financing by
effectively reducing financing costs through equity pledge. Yet effective solution to
the problem of financing pledge shares at the same time also can give the listed
company or the market investors bring adverse effects, such as the stock crash, higher
financial risk and operating risk, jeopardizing the interests of minority shareholders
and the higher the risk of moral hazard, etc., it will bring adverse effect to the
development of the company, will also hinder the stock market healthy development.
Based on this, this paper aims to explore how equity pledge related behaviors affect
the stock price fluctuations of the company, hoping to find solutions or
countermeasures to solve the negative problems caused by equity pledge financing.
This paper read and sorted out relevant literature, conducted theoretical analysis
based on information asymmetry theory and put forward five research hypotheses
successively, and collected 8,127 samples of unbalanced panel data of 2,346 a-share
listed companies from 2014 to 2020. The influence of controlling shareholder's equity
pledge, equity pledge proportion, equity pledge frequency, remaining equity pledge
proportion and equity pledge capital investment on the stock price fluctuation of the
company is analyzed by two-way fixed effect regression model. The empirical results
show that the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior will cause the drastic
fluctuation of the company's stock price, and the larger the equity pledge related
variable value is, the more likely it will aggravate the fluctuation of the stock price of
the listed company. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the investment of equity pledge
financing influences the fluctuation of the company's stock price. When the capital is
invested in the controlling shareholder or a third party other than the company, the
fluctuation of the company's stock price is significantly accelerated, but the
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investment in the listed company has no obvious influence. In order to avoid the
distortion of the empirical results caused by endogeneity, this paper adopts the method
of propensity score matching to reduce the influencing factors of endogeneity. Finally,
the empirical results of the paper are analyzed, and countermeasures and suggestions
are put forward for related economic subjects of equity pledge according to the
reasons.
Key words: listed company, Controlling shareholder,Equity pledge,Share price
volatility
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