目前我国经济正处于转型升级的关键期，多数企业已步入多元化发展阶段， 规模的扩大也催促着企业的融资需求增加。与此同时，经济下行压力导致融资环 境逐渐紧缩，企业的融资渠道也逐渐减少，近几年违约负面事件明显增多，主要 表现为企业融资端受限，债务滚动不畅。伴随着我国证券市场体系的逐渐成熟和 完善，拥有融资成本低、时间快、灵活性好等特点的股权质押出现在公众的视野 中，它能将静态的股权转换成流动资金，可以有效缓解企业或个人资金缺乏的问 题，成为我国企业尤其是中小型企业的一种新的、理想的融资渠道。众所周知， 目前企业融资普遍较难，为了获取充分的现金流，控股股东进行股权质押的现象 也越来越常见。与此同时，随着控股股东质押比例的不断上升，导致的控制权转 移风险也逐渐显现。由于控股股东拥有着对上市公司的控制权，一旦发生控制权 的非正常转移，便会对公司经营的连续性及稳定性带来负面影响，损害其他投资 者的利益。因此，研究如何缓解股权质押带来的风险具有重要的理论和实践意义。 学术界对于股权质押的研究相对较少，大部分学者在研究股权质押对公司 业绩的影响时，都是从股权质押加剧两权分离度、加大控股股东掏空动机这两个 角度去影响公司业绩水平。本文将从控制权转移风险和代理问题的角度出发，以 发生控股股东股权质押的上市公司为研究对象，结合公司治理机制，以控股股东 股权质押对上市公司业绩的影响为核心展开讨论。在此基础上，为了丰富和完善 公司治理对控股股东的股权质押与公司业绩关系的理论研究，本文特别引入外 部治理机制—机构投资者和政府干预。 基于以上考虑，本文选择在 2014-2016 年控股股东发生股权质押行为的沪深 A 股上市公司为研究样本，探讨控股股东股权质押与公司业绩的关系，并且从股 权性质、股权集中度、机构投资者以及政府干预五个方面，来研究公司治理对控 股股东股权质押与公司业绩关系的影响。实证结果显示： （1）控股股东股权质押比例与公司业绩呈显著负相关关系；（2）相较于国 有控股企业，控股股东股权质押比例对公司业绩的负面影响在非国有企业中表 现的更为显著；（3）控股股东股权质押比例对公司业绩的负面影响在股权集中度 较低时表现不明显；（4）机构投资者持股对控股股东股权质押比例与公司业绩关II 系不具有负向调节作用，与假设 3 相悖。原因可能是：一是我国上市公司机构投 资者持股比例较低，对公司管理层的制衡效果有限；二是国内证券市场中长期稳 定型机构投资者比较缺乏，而短期的、交易型机构投资者主要集中在信息收集和 短期交易利润上，不关注公司的治理情况；（5）政府干预程度能够抑制控股股东 股权质押比例对公司业绩的影响。 最后，根据实证结果分析，从完善股权质押融资方案、政府引导民营企业融 资以及培养长期稳定型机构投资者等方面提出相关建议，对上市公司控股股东 股权质押进行管控具有一定的参考和实践意义。 关键词：控股股东 股权质押 公司治理 公司业绩III Abstract Atpresent,China'seconomyisinacriticalperiodoftransformationandupgrading. Most enterprises have entered a stage of diversified development, and the expansion of scale has also urged the increase in financing needs of enterprises. At the same time, the downward pressure on the economy has led to a gradual tightening of the financing environment, and the financing channels of enterprises have gradually decreased. In recent years, the number of negative events in default has increased significantly, mainly due to limited corporate financing and poor debt rolling.Along with the gradual maturity and improvement of China's securities market system, equity pledges with low financing costs, fast time and good flexibility appear in the public's view. It can convert static equity into liquidity, which can alleviate enterprises or The problem of lack of personal funds has become a new and ideal financing channel for Chinese enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises. As we all know, corporate financing is generally difficult. In order to obtain sufficient cash flow, the phenomenon of controlling shareholders' equity pledge is becoming more and more common.At the same time, as the proportion of pledge of controlling shareholders continues to rise, the risk of transfer of control rights has gradually emerged. Since the controlling shareholder has control over the listed company, once the abnormal transfer of control rights occurs, it will have a negative impact on the continuity and stability of the company's operations and damage the interests of other investors. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study how to mitigate the risks brought by equity pledge. There are relatively few studies on equity pledge in the academic circles. Most scholars study the impact of equity pledge on the company's performance, both from the perspective of the pledge of equity pledge exacerbate separation of ownership and control and the increase of controlling shareholders' tunneling motivation. From the perspective of control transfer risk and agency problem, this paper takes the listed company with the controlling shareholder's equity pledge as the research object, and combines the corporate governance mechanism to discuss the impact of the controllingIV shareholder's equity pledge on the performance of the listed company. On this basis, in order to enrich and improve the theoretical research on the relationship between corporate governance and the shareholding pledge of controlling shareholders and corporate performance, this paper especially introduces external governance mechanisms—institutional investors and government intervention. Based on the above considerations, this paper selects the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-sharelistedcompanieswhoseshareholdingpledgeoccursin2014-2016asaresearch sample, discusses the relationship between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and the company's performance, and from the nature of equity, equity concentration, institutional investment And the government intervention in five aspects, to study the impact of corporate governance on the relationship between controlling shareholders' equity pledge and company performance. The empirical results show that: (1) The shareholding pledge ratio of the controlling shareholder has a significant negative correlation with the company's performance; (2) Compared with state-owned holding companies, the negative impact of the shareholding pledge ratio of the controlling shareholder on the company's performance is more significant in non-state- owned enterprises; (3) The negative impact of the shareholding pledge of the controlling shareholder on the company's performance is not obvious when the equity concentration is low; (4) Institutional investors' shareholdings have no negative adjustment effect on the relationship between the controlling shareholder's equity pledge ratio and the company's performance, which is contrary to Hypothesis 3. The reasons may be: First, the institutional investors in China's listed companies have a low shareholding ratio, and the checks and balances on the company's management are limited; second, the long-term stable institutional investors in the domestic securities market are relatively lacking, and short-term, trading institutional investors Mainly focused on information collection and short-term trading profits, not paying attention to the company's governance; (5) The degree of government intervention can restrain the influence of the shareholding pledge of the controlling shareholder on the company's performance.. Finally, based on the empirical results of the analysis, it puts forward relevant suggestions from the aspects of improving the equity pledge financing scheme, theV government guiding private enterprise financing and cultivating long-term stable institutional investors, and has certain reference and practical significance for the management and control of the holding company's holding shareholder pledge. Key words: Holding shareholder Equity pledge Corporate governance Corporate performanceVII 目录 第 1 章 绪论...............................................................................................................1 1.1 研究背景及意义...............................................................................................1 1.1.1 研究背景....................................................................................................1 1.1.2 研究意义.....