ii 中文摘要 金融危机引起了世界金融市场的震动，引发了全球金融监管变革，我国虽然 当前金融资本市场还不够成熟完善，但金融高管天价薪酬问题已经日渐往严重的 方向发展，使我国商业银行的风险漏洞暴露日益严重。如何遏制这种趋势，同时 提高银行风险效率，还值得深思。基于此，本文通过对我国14家商业银行经营 数据及高管薪酬进行统计，并评价了商业银行高管薪酬粘性及商业银行风险管理 效率并检验高管薪酬粘性与银行风险效率及其影响因素的因果关系，并提出基于 高管薪酬粘性的提升我国商业银行风险效率的机制和策略。并完善了研究我国商 业银行风险效率的影响因素研究，丰富了我国商业银行高管薪酬粘性和风险效率 的评价领域，同时提高银行风险效率，提升我国商业银行风险管理能力。 本文依托委托代理理论、最优契约理论、管理者权力理论、激励理论等基本 理论基础，从商业银行高管薪酬粘性释义出发，用模型计算法测度我国上市商业 银行高管薪酬粘性；用超效率SBM模型测得我国上市商业银行风险效率，再通 过比较研究分别对我国商业银行高管薪酬粘性和风险效率进行分析；最后利用实 证研究法探究商业银行高管薪酬粘性与商业银行风险效率及其影响因素的影响 关系，从数量上证明了二者之间存在影响关系。研究可知，商业银行高管薪酬粘 性与商业银行风险效率的互为因果关系，即商业银行高管薪酬粘性与商业银行风 险效率短期内有影响关系，并且从长期视角来看，商业银行高管薪酬粘性和商业 银行风险效率是负相关，商业银行高管薪酬粘性和商业银行不良贷款是正相关， 商业银行高管薪酬粘性和劳动力规模是负相关，商业银行高管薪酬粘性和存款规 模是负相关，商业银行高管薪酬粘性和营业成本是正相关。并基于此研究结果， 提出了基于高管薪酬粘性的商业银行风险管理能力提升机制及外部提高对策，从 而实现了商业银行高管薪酬粘性的管控、商业银行风险效率的提升。 关键词：商业银行；高管薪酬粘性；风险效率 ABSTRACT iii ABSTRACT Thefinancialcrisishascausedshocksintheworld'sfinancialmarketsand triggeredglobalfinancialregulatorychanges.AlthoughChina'scurrentfinancial capitalmarketisnotmatureenough,theproblemofsky-highcompensationfor financialexecutiveshasgraduallydeveloped,whichhascausedriskloopholesin China'scommercialbanks.Theexposureisgettingworse.Howtocurbthistrendand improvetheriskefficiencyofbanksatthesametimeisworthpondering.Basedon this,thispaperanalyzestheoperatingdataandexecutivecompensationof14 commercialbanksinChina,evaluatesthestickinessofexecutivecompensationand theefficiencyofriskmanagementofcommercialbanks,andteststhestickinessof executivecompensationandtheriskefficiencyofbanksandtheirinfluencingfactors. Causality,andputforwardmechanismsandstrategiestoimprovetheriskefficiency ofChina'scommercialbanksbasedonthestickinessofexecutivecompensation.It alsoimprovestheresearchontheinfluencingfactorsoftheriskefficiencyofChina's commercialbanks,enrichestheevaluationareasofthestickinessandriskefficiency ofexecutivecompensationinChina'scommercialbanks,andimprovestherisk efficiencyofbanksandtheriskmanagementcapabilitiesofChina'scommercial banks. Relyingonthebasictheoreticalfoundationssuchasprincipal-agenttheory, optimalcontracttheory,managerpowertheory,andincentivetheory,thispaperuses themodelcalculationmethodtomeasurethesalarystickinessofexecutivesoflisted commercialbanksinChina.TheSBMmodelmeasurestheriskefficiencyoflisted commercialbanksinChina,andthenanalyzesthestickinessandriskefficiencyof executivecompensationofChinesecommercialbanksthroughcomparativestudies. Finally,theempiricalresearchmethodisusedtoexplorethestickinessofexecutive compensationandtheriskefficiencyofcommercialbanksandtheirimpact.The influencerelationshipofthefactorsprovesthatthereisaninfluencerelationship betweenthetwo.Itcanbeseenfromtheresearchthatthestickinessofremuneration ofexecutivesofcommercialbanksandtheriskefficiencyofcommercialbankshavea causalrelationship,thatis,thestickinessofremunerationofexecutivesofcommercial bankshasashort-termimpactontheriskefficiencyofcommercialbanks,andfroma long-termperspectiveStickinessisnegativelyrelatedtotheriskefficiencyof commercialbanks.Thestickinessofthepayofcommercialbankexecutivesis negativelycorrelatedwiththenon-performingloansofcommercialbanks.The stickinessofthepayofcommercialbankexecutivesisnegativelycorrelatedwiththe sizeofthelaborforcemercialbankexecutives'salarystickinessandoperating costsarepositivelycorrelated.Basedontheresultsofthisresearch,arisk managementcapabilityimprovementmechanismandexternalimprovementmeasures forcommercialbanksbasedonthestickinessofexecutivecompensationareproposed, therebyrealizingthemanagementandcontrolofthestickinessofexecutive compensationofcommercialbanksandtheimprovementofriskefficiencyof commercialbanks. ABSTRACT iv KeyWords:CommercialBanks，StickinessofExecutive Compensation，RiskEfficiency 目录 v 目录 独创性声明..................................................................................................................................I 关于论文使用授权的说明.........................................................................................................I 中文摘要..............................................................................................................................II ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................III 1绪论.........................................................................................................................................1 1.1选题背景.........................................................................................................................1 1.2研究目的及意义.............................................................................................................2 1.2.1研究目的.................................................................................................................2 1.2.2研究意义.................................................................................................................2 1.3国内外研究现状.............................................................................................................3 1.3.1国外研究现状.........................................................................................................3 1.3.2国内研究现状.........................................................................................................5 1.3.3文献评述.................................................................................................................8 1.4研究内容与方法.............................................................................................................9 1.4.1研究内容.................................................................................................................9 1.4.2研究方法.................................................................................................................9 1.4.3技术路线图...........................................................................................................10 1.5创新点......................................................................................................................11 2相关概念及理论基础...........................................................................................................12 2.1相关概念界定...............................................................................................................12 2.1.1商业银行高管薪酬粘性......................................................................................12 2.1.2商业银行风险及风险效率..................................................................................13 2.2理论基础.......................................................................................................................14 2.2.1委托代理理论.......................................................................................................14 2.2.2最优契约理论.......................................................................................................15 2.2.3管理层权力理论...................................................................................................15 2.2.4激励理论...............................................................................................................16 3商业银行高