分类号密级
U.D.C
监督型机构大股东对企业金融资产投资的影响研究
Research on the Influence of Motivated Monitoring Institutional
Blockholders on Corporate Financial Investment
学位申请人：黄紫薇
学号：2201202Z6014
学科专业：财务管理科硕
研究方向：公司财务理论与实务
指导教师：冯源
定稿时间：2023.05
摘要当前我国经济发展进入新常态的背景下，实体经济增长相对疲软，实体
行业面临着产能过剩、主业投资利润率日趋下滑等问题，而金融投资收益率
保持高位，且二者之间的差距不断扩大，这导致越来越多资本流向金融投资
领域，加大了实体企业的融资难度。实务中，许多非金融类上市公司为获得金
融投资的高额利润，将资金从实体产业抽离而投入金融、房地产等虚拟经济
领域，忽视了主业发展。学术研究表明，实体企业大规模的金融资产投资行为
挤占了原本用于主业投资的资金，造成实体产业投资不足，削弱了实体经济
的发展能力。针对我国实体行业“脱实向虚”的问题，党的十九大报告强调，
要“深化金融体制改革，增强金融服务实体经济的能力”。而要寻找适当的政
策抑制企业盲目的金融投资行为、防范经济脱实向虚的风险，必须先搞清楚
企业进行金融资产投资的原因，这对理论创新和政策实践都具有重要意义。
根据有限注意理论和投资组合理论，机构投资者为了分散投资风险会采
取投资组合策略，即同时持有多家公司股票。而由于他们的精力有限，并不会
对其投资组合中所有公司“一视同仁”，会重点关注投资组合中持股价值更大、
相对重要的公司，并投入更多监督资源。基于此，本文以2007-2021年我国A
股非金融类上市公司为样本，在借鉴Fich et al.（2015）界定监督型机构投资
者的基础上，筛选出其中持股比例大于5%的监督型机构并定义其为监督型机
构大股东，从企业微观层面的治理视角研究监督型机构大股东能否影响以及
如何影响实体企业金融资产投资活动。研究发现，监督型机构大股东能够有
效约束实体企业金融资产投资行为，主要表现在对企业长期金融资产投资规
模的抑制作用，而对短期金融资产投资规模没有产生明显的影响。并且随着
监督型机构大股东持股比例提高，所持股公司的金融资产投资规模显著减少。
异质性分析表明，在非国际四大审计、股权结构更分散以及非国有控股的上
市公司中，监督型机构大股东持股对企业（长期）金融资产投资规模的抑制效
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监督型机构大股东对企业金融资产投资的影响研究
应更强。机制检验表明，提升企业主业业绩是监督型机构大股东降低企业金
融投资规模的作用路径之一。进一步研究发现，监督型机构大股东能够弱化
长期金融资产对企业未来实体投资和研发投入的“挤占”效应，证实了监督型
机构大股东能够发挥积极的公司治理作用。
本文立足于投资组合这一新视角，同时考虑机构投资者参与公司治理的
意愿和能力，通过定义监督型机构大股东来衡量机构投资者的治理效果，从
理论上丰富了机构投资者在促进企业资源合理配置方面的经济后果，为缓解
实体行业“脱实向虚”、促进我国经济高质量发展提供了经验证据。
关键词：监督型机构大股东；金融资产投资；代理冲突
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Abstract
Abstract
In the context of China's economic development entering a new normal,the
growth of the real economy is weak and the return on real investment is declining,
while the return on financial investment remains high,and the gap between the two
is widening,which leads to more capital flowing to the financial investment field.
Non-financial enterprises pull their capital out of the real industry and invest in the
virtual economy such as finance and real estate for seeking financial returns.At the
same time,the financialization of real enterprises has become an extensive topic in
academic research,and it is crucial to study what factors can curb the tendency of
financialization of real enterprises to promote the high-quality development of
Chinese economy.
According to limited attention theory and portfolio theory,institutional
investors often adopt a "one-to-many"portfolio strategy in order to diversify risk.
Due to their limited energy,they do not treat all companies equally in the portfolio
but focus on companies with greater value and relative importance of holdings in
the portfolio and invest more resources in supervision.Based on this,this paper
takes a sample of A-share non-financial listed companies in China from 2007to
2021.And based on the definition of motivated monitoring institutions by Fich et al.
(2015),this paper screens out monitoring institutions with shareholdings of more
than 5%and defines them as monitoring institutional blockholders,and studies
whether and how monitoring institutional blockholders can influence corporate
financial investment from the perspective of corporate micro-level governance.The
study finds that monitoring institutional blockholders can effectively inhibit the
investment behavior of corporate financial assets,mainly in the form of long-term
financial assets,and the corporate financial assets decreases significantly as the
shareholding of monitoring institutional blockholders increases.The heterogeneity
analysis shows that the inhibitory effect of monitoring institutional blockholders
shareholding on corporate financial assets is stronger in non-international Big Four
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Research on the Influence of Motivated Monitoring Institutional Blockholders on Corporate Financial I
nvestment
audited,more decentralized shareholding structure and non-state-controlled listed
companies.Mechanistic test shows that monitoring institutional blockholders
reduce corporate financial assets through the path of enhancing the performance of
the firm's main business.Further,this paper finds that monitoring institutional
blockholders can weaken the "crowding out"effect of long-term financial assets on
main business investments.
Based on a new perspective of portfolio investment,this paper theoretically
expands the economic consequences of institutional investors in optimizing
corporate resource allocation and provides empirical evidence about mitigating the
trend of financialization of the real economy and promoting the high-quality
development of our economy.
Key words：Motivated monitoring institutional blockholders；Financial Investment；
Agency conflict
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