控股股东股权质押对公司商业信用的影响研
究
重庆大学硕士学位论文
（学术学位）
学生姓名：黄自淇
指导教师：魏锋魏教授
学科门类：经济学
学科名称：应用经济学
研究方向：公司金融
答辩委员会主席：陈其安
授位时间：2023年6月
Research on the Influence of Controlling
Shareholder’s Equity Pledge on Corporate
Trade Credit
A Thesis Submitted to Chongqing University
in Partial Fulfillment of the requirement for the
Master’s Degree of Economics
By
Ziqi Huang
Supervised by
2023
重庆大学硕士学位论文中文摘要我国资本市场迅猛发展，股权质押成为我国资本市场上的普遍现象。作为一种
融资工具，股权质押具有融资成本低，高效便捷的特点，备受市场青睐，但其潜在
风险受到各方利益相关者的关注。控股股东作为企业的控制者，能够影响企业的重
大经营决策。在进行股权质押后，控股股东可能存在“掏空”动机，以及为了避免
控制权丧失而进行的市值管理行为，这些行为动机背后都是潜在的经营风险。供应
商作为企业的密切交易伙伴，考虑到控股股东股权质押后企业存在的风险，供应商
可能会调整其商业信用的供给规模以减少坏账损失。并且，股权质押后，控股股东
很可能只顾个人利益，不顾企业的资金约束问题，而盲目选择扩大企业对外提供的
商业信用以刺激销售，向外部传递企业经营状况良好的信号，以稳定公司股价，降
低控制权转移风险。
考虑到控股股东股权质押后公司可能面临的风险，以及商业信用对公司经营活
动的重要意义，本文选取2010-2020年我国A 股上市公司数据作为研究样本，从理
论和实证角度分析控股股东股权质押对公司商业信用的影响。本文的实证研究结果
显示控股股东股权质押显著减少了公司的商业信用水平；在机制分析上，本文从企
业社会责任和机构投资者持股的角度，研究了其对控股股东股权质押与商业信用影
响的调节效应，发现更好的社会责任表现和更高的机构投资者持股比例能显著抑制
控股股东股权质押对商业信用的负面影响。并且在进行稳健性检验后，文章的基本
结论保持不变。最后通过异质性分析，本文发现公司在不同产权性质、审计质量、
上市年限以及银行信贷规模下，控股股东股权质押对商业信用的影响存在差异。
本文引入企业社会责任和机构投资者持股进行机制分析，丰富了控股股东股权
质押与商业信用的研究，有助于清晰认识控股股东股权质押行为的影响、并为政府
监管部门提出相关建议。一方面要健全股权质押法律法规，完善监督体系，并为机
构投资者提供更好的制度土壤；另一方面也需加强审计监管、拓宽非国有企业的融
资渠道、给予新兴企业更多的信贷支持。
关键词：股权质押；商业信用；企业社会责任；机构投资者持股
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重庆大学硕士学位论文英文摘要
Abstract
With the rapid development of Chinese capital market,equity pledge has become a
common phenomenon.As a financing tool,equity pledge has the characteristics of low
financing cost,high efficiency and convenience,which is favored by the market,but its
potential risks are concerned by all stakeholders.As the controller of the enterprise,the
controlling shareholder can influence the major operational decisions of the enterprise.
After equity pledge,the controlling shareholder may have the motivation of "hollowing
out",as well as the behavior of market value management to avoid loss of control right,
behind which are potential business risks.As a close trading partner of the enterprise,the
supplier may adjust its trade credit supply scale to reduce bad debt losses,considering the
risk of the enterprise after the equity pledge of the controlling shareholder.In addition,
after equity pledge,the controlling shareholder is likely to blindly choose to expand the
trade credit provided by the enterprise to stimulate sales regardless of the financial
constraints of the enterprise,so as to stabilize the company's stock price and reduce the
risk of control transfer.
Considering the risks that controlling shareholders may face after equity pledge,as
well as the significance of trade credit to company's business activities,this paper selects
the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010to 2020as research samples to
analyze the influence of the pledge of the controlling shareholder's equity on the
company's trade credit from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.The empirical
results of this paper show that the equity pledge of controlling shareholders significantly
reduces the level of corporate trade credit;In terms of mechanism analysis,from the
perspective of corporate social responsibility and institutional investors'shareholding,this
paper studies its moderating effect on controlling shareholders'equity pledge and trade
credit,and finds that better social responsibility performance and higher institutional
investors'shareholding ratio can significantly inhibit the negative impact of controlling
shareholders'equity pledge on trade credit.After the robustness test,the basic conclusion
of the paper remains unchanged.Finally,through heterogeneity analysis,we finds that the
controlling shareholder's equity pledge has different impacts on business credit under
different property rights,audit quality,listing years and bank credit scale.
This paper introduces corporate social responsibility and institutional investor
shareholding for mechanism analysis,enriching the research of controlling shareholder
II
重庆大学硕士学位论文英文摘要
equity pledge and trade credit,helping to clearly understand the influence of controlling
shareholder equity pledge behavior,and put forward relevant suggestions for government
supervision departments.On the one hand,it is necessary to improve the laws and
regulations on equity pledge as to improve the supervision system,and provide better
institutional soil for institutional investors.On the other hand,audit supervision should be
strengthened,financing channels for non-state-owned enterprises should be expanded,
and more credit support should be given to new enterprises.
Keywords：Equity pledge;Trade credit;Corporate social responsibility;Institutional
investor holdings
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