摘要
现代公司的一个主要特征就是所有者与经营者的两权分离，这一特征使上市
公司的代理成本增加。为了降低委托代理成本，公司的所有者不断学习和更新公
司的内部治理方法--管理层激励机制，将管理层的自身利益与公司利益结合起
来。管理层激励能否提高上市公司业绩一直是该领域研究的热点。我国学者对管
理层激励理论领域的文献研究起步较晚，管理层激励机制现在还很不健全，尤其
是在股权激励机制方面。最近几年，公司治理理念的不断更新以及资本市场的蓬
勃发展，为完善我国管理层激励机制提供了良好的契机。关于管理层激励的研究
也逐渐增多，我国学者对管理层激励理论有了更加深入的认识。本文是立足于前
人研究的基础对管理层激励与公司经营业绩之间的关系进行研究，期望为完善我
国管理层激励机制理论献上微薄之力

本文在对管理层激励、上市公司业绩的影响因素和二者的关系进行文献梳理
的基础上，根据文献的研究成果和理论基础，提出了四个研究假设。文章以我国
上市公司 2010-2014 年的数据作为研究样本，分别从管理层货币薪酬激励、股权
激励这两个方面研究其与上市公司业绩之间的关系。在选择上市公司的公司规
模、股权结构以及财务杠杆为控制变量的基础上，通过构建多元回归模型对管理
层货币薪酬激励与上市公司业绩之间的关系进行实证研究；运用 PSM 分析法来分
析管理层股权激励与上市公司业绩之间的关系。通过实证研究发现，对管理层进
行货币薪酬激励和股权激励都能提高公司的经营业绩。关于产权性质的研究，国
有控股公司的管理层货币薪酬激励的效果好于民营；而民营控股公司的管理层股
权激励的效果好于国有。对不同股权激励方式进行对比，发现限制性股票激励的
效果要好于股票期权激励。考虑股权集中度的影响，发现股权集中度越高，股权
激励效果越差。文章的实证结果在一定程度上可以为上市公司选择合适的管理层
激励机制提供借鉴，使上市公司将管理层的自身利益与公司的长期利益结合起
来，以提高公司的经营业绩

关键词：货币薪酬激励；股权激励；股票期权激励；限制性股票激励；上市
公司业绩II
Abstract
One of the main characteristics of modern companies is the separation of the two rights
between owners and managers, which makes the agency costs of listed companies increase.In
order to reduce the cost of principal-agent, the company&39;s owners constantly learn and update the
company&39;s internal governance methods---management incentive mechanism, combining
management&39;s own interests and company&39;s interests.Whether the management incentive can
improve the performance of listed companies has been a hot research in this field. Chinese
scholars have a late start in the research on the field of management incentive theory, and the
management incentive mechanism is still not perfect, especially in the equity incentive mechanism.
In recent years, the continuous updating of corporate governance concept and the booming capital
market have provided a good opportunity for perfecting our management incentive
mechanism.The research on the management incentive is gradually increasing, and Chinese
scholars have a more in-depth understanding of the management incentive theory. This article is
based on the previous research and studies the relationship between management incentives and
corporate performance, and expects to make modest efforts to improve our management incentive
mechanism theory.
Based on the literature review of management incentive,the influencing factors of the
performance of listed companies and the relationship between them,according to the literature
research and theoretical basis of this article,four research assumptions are put forward in this paper.
Based on data from 2010-2014 listed companies in China as the research sample, respectively
from the monetary compensation incentive, equity incentive management studies these two
aspects with the relationship between the performance of listed companies.On the basis of
selecting the size of the company&39;s company, the ownership structure and the financial leverage as
the control variables, this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between the
management incentive and the performance of the listed companies through the construction of
the multiple regression model; using the PSM analysis method to analyze the relationship between
management incentive equity and performance of listed companies. Through the empirical
research found that the management of monetary compensation incentive and equity incentives
can improve the company&39;s operating performance.Research on property rights, the state-owned
holding company&39;s management of monetary compensation incentive effect is better than private;
And private holding company management equity incentive effect is better than the state. By
comparing different stock options,it is found that the effect of restricted stock incentive is betterIII
than stock option incentive.Considering the influence of equity concentration, the higher the
shareholding concentration, the poorer the incentive effect of equity.The empirical results in this
paper can be used to provide reference for the listed companies to select the appropriate
management incentive mechanism, so that the listed companies will combine the management&39;s
own interests with the company&39;s long-term interests to improve the company&39;s operating
performance.
Key words: Monetary compensation; Equity incentive; Stock option incentive; Restricted
stock incentive; The listed company performanceIV
目 录
摘要...Ⅰ
Abstract.Ⅱ
目 录..Ⅳ
第一章 绪论.....1
第一节 研究背景及意义......1
第二节 研究思路与研究方法..........2
第三节 研究内容及重点难点..........4
第四节 可能创新之处.........5
第二章 国内外文献综述.........6
第一节 管理层激励研究.....6
第二节 公司业绩主要影响因素的研究.......8
第三节 管理层激励与上市公司业绩关系的研究..10
第四节 研究述评...13
第三章 相关概念与理论基础.15
第一节 相关概念的界定.....15
第二节 相关理论基础........16
第四章 研究设计 .....20
第一节 研究假设 ..20
第二节 样本和变量的选取.23
第三节 模型的构建25
第五章 分析与检验....28
第一节 描述性统计分析.....28
第二节 相关性分析30
第三节 回归分析与检验...........
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