摘要

家族企业在推动经济发展和稳定社会秩序中的地位日益重要,为满足资金

需求,很多家族企业试图通过上市在证券市场募集发展资金,随着相关法律法

规对家族企业上市的限制日渐放宽,越来越多的家族企业成功上市,近两年成

功上市的数量更有井喷之势。然而家族上市公司也不可避免地出现了诸多问题,

有些是上市公司共同存在的问题,例如终极股东的掏空行为,有的则是家族上

市公司的特性,例如家族成员在董事会和管理层担任要职。本文认为造成这些

问题的根源在于家族上市公司实际控制人过高的控制权,使得家族上市公司现

金流权和控制权分离,为实际控制人掏空创造条件,并导致公司内部制衡机制

失灵、人才引进困难、管理层激励不足等问题。然而实际控制人拥有较高控制

权也表现出积极的一面,比如提高决策效率。

理论分析表明,实际控制人控制权比例过高导致公司内部权力配置失衡,

所以股权过度集中不利于内部制衡机制的形成;家族上市公司实际控制人同时

拥有高控制权和较强控制欲望,直接削弱了控制权市场对公司的外部监督作用,

同时也可能造成实际控制人通过派发现金股利掏空上市公司的可能;由于实际

控制人直接管理公司,家族成员也在董事会或管理层担任要职,公司运营主要

依赖控制家族,此时职业经理人很难获得充分的激励和家族的信任,其工作积

极性也收到较大影响。

对家族上市公司治理模式的研究表明,所有权与经营权高度统一、家长式

领导、权力在家族内部传递以及发展资金不足是家族上市公司治理的主要特点;

经营目标明确且统一、经营者代理成本低、较强的领导力和执行力是家族治理

模式的优势;而家族控制权比例过高导致高度集权、内部制衡机制不健全、经

营风险较大和任人唯亲则会降低家族治理模式的效率。

对家族上市公司关联交易和资金占用的统计结果表明,随着实际控制人控

制权比例的提高,其掏空上市公司的动机不断减弱,公司的财务业绩和股东获

利能力也随之提高,然而代表公司价值的TUobin’Q值却呈现出下降趋势。

关键词:家族上市公司;股权结构;公司业绩;公司治理

Abstract

Abstract

Family enterprise has played an increasingly important role in developing

economic and stabilizing social order. Most family enterprises plan to go public or

have been listed for financing. More and more family enterprises have been

successfully listed while restriction about family firm going public from laws and

regulations is no longer strict. There are so many deficiencies in corporate

governance of family firm, some of them are generality, others are speciality. The

writer believes that it is the ultimate controller of listed companies owns exorbitant

control power that causes all those deficiencies. The control power of ultimate

controller of listed companies is so strong that it could separate the cash flow right

and vote right to create conditions to get private benefit. Meanwhile the internal

restrictive mechanism will be out of order, talent introduction will be hard, the

management layer will not be motivated enough. The ultimate controller has strong

power shows some positive aspects as well, such as improving the efficiency of

decision making.

Theoretical analysis shows that the power of ultimate controller is too strong to

unbalance the internal power configuration; therefore equity concentration goes

against of formation mechanism of checks and balances. The strong power and desire

of ultimate controller supervisory of takeover market, the ultimate controller may

distribute too much cash dividends. The company operation relies on the controlling

family because the ultimate controller manages the firm by himself and family

members hold positions of management layer and board of directors. It is difficult for

professional agents outside of the controlling family to gain the trust, and their

working enthusiasm will be affected.

Study on corporate governance pattern of family listed firm indicate that unity of

ownership and management, paternalistic leadership, control power transmission is

confined in the family and shortage of fund are the main characters of family listed

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