多个大股东对会计信息质量的影响研究
——基于代理成本的中介效应
研究生姓名：王春莉
导师姓名：苏毓敏
学科：工商管理
研究方向：会计学
年级：2019级
中文摘要
党的十九大报告指出，中国经济已由“高速增长”向“高质量发展”阶段发展。中
国企业高质量发展，离不开微观企业会计信息的高质量供给。企业内部人作为会计信息
披露的执行主体对会计信息质量的影响不言而喻。管理层或控股股东会基于自利目标而
实施逆向选择行为，这使得其机会主义地进行信息披露，降低会计信息质量。有效的公
司治理结构能够约束和制衡内部人的私利动机，缓解代理冲突，进而提升公司的信息披
露质量。股权结构作为公司治理的逻辑起点，对企业的会计信息质量产生重要影响，然
而目前国内外学者对于股权结构的关注主要在于集中型或是分散型的股权结构，对于多
个大股东的股权结构关注较少，随着混合所有制改革进程的进一步加速，多个大股东的
股权结构普遍存在。多个大股东的股权结构一方面能够起到“监督效应”，有效制衡控
股股东的私利行为、抑制管理层的道德风险倾向，缓解大小股东之间、股东与管理层之
间的两类代理问题，从而提升企业的会计信息质量，另一方面也可能会起到“合谋效应”，
共同掏空上市公司的利益，恶化两类代理问题，进而降低企业的会计信息质量。因此，
当企业存在多个大股东的股权结构时，各大股东之间究竟是发挥“监督效应”还是“合
谋效应”，以及通过何种机制影响会计信息质量，这就需要根据实证研究进行分析和判
断。
基于此，本文采用 2004-2020年中国沪深 A股上市公司的面板数据，实证检验了多
个大股东对会计信息质量的影响，并分析了代理成本（第一类代理成本和第二类代理成
本）在多个大股东影响会计信息质量过程中发挥的中介作用。通过进一步分析，考察了
公司内外部治理环境下多个大股东对会计信息质量影响的差异。研究表明：（1）多个大
股东的股权结构对会计信息产生正向显著影响，当公司内非控股大股东的数量越多时，
企业的会计信息质量水平越高：（2）多个大股东的股权结构对代理成本产生负向显著影
响，当公司内非控股大股东的数量越多时，企业的第一类代理成本和第二类代理成本越
低；（3）较低的代理成本有助于提升企业的会计信息质量，多个大股东的股权结构可以
通过降低企业的代理成本从而提升企业的会计信息质量，即代理成本（第一类代理成本
和第二类代理成本）在多个大股东对会计信息质量的影响中发挥了部分中介作用；（4）
进一步分析表明，公司内外部治理能够对多个大股东与会计信息质量之间的关系产生显
著影响，即在公司董事会独立性较弱的情况下，多个大股东的股权结构对会计信息质量
I
的正向促进作用更加明显，在外部审计质量较差的情况下，多个大股东的股权结构对会
计信息质量的正向促进作用更加显著。公司内外部治理与多个大股东的股权结构治理效
应存在一定的替代效应。
关键词：多个大股东；会计信息质量；代理成本；中介效应；监督
II
The Influence of Multiple Major Shareholders on the Quality
of Accounting Information
——Mediation effect based on agency cost
Graduate student: Wang Chunli
Supervisor: Su Yumin
Major：Business management
Research direction: Accounting
Grate:2019
Abstract
The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out
that China's economy has developed from "high-speed growth" to "high-quality development".
The high-quality development of Chinese enterprises is inseparable from the high-quality
supply of micro-enterprise accounting information. It is self-evident that enterprise insiders,
as the executive body of accounting information disclosure, have influence on the quality of
accounting information. Management or controlling shareholders will implement adverse
selection behavior based on self-interested goals, which makes them opportunistic to disclose
information andreduce thequality ofaccounting information.Aneffective corporate
governance structure can restrain and balance the self-interest motives of insiders, alleviate
agency conflicts, and then improve the quality of information disclosure of the company.
Ownership structure, as the logical starting point of corporate governance, has an important
impact on the quality of accounting information of enterprises. However, at present, domestic
and foreign scholars focus on the ownership structure mainly on centralized or decentralized
ownership structures, and on the ownership structure of multiple major shareholders. Less,
with the furtheracceleration of the mixedownership reform process, theshareholding
structure of multiple major shareholders is common. On the one hand, the ownership structure
of multiple major shareholders can play a "supervision effect", effectively check and balance
the private interestsof controlling shareholders,restrain the moral hazardtendency of
management, and alleviate thetwo types of agency problems betweenlarge and small
shareholders and between shareholders and management. , so as to improve the quality of
accounting information of enterprises, on the other hand, it may also play a "collusive effect",
hollowing out the interests of listed companies together, worsening the two types of agency
problems, and then reducing the quality of accounting information of enterprises. Therefore,
when an enterprise has a shareholding structure of multiple major shareholders, whether the
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