非国有股东治理对竞争性国企经营绩效的影响研究
摘要
十八届三中全会开启了我国国企全面深化改革的新阶段，而分类混改是其
中的一条主线，竞争性国企是分类混改中的排头兵。引入非国有股东是混改的
重要途径之一，非国有股东治理能否提升竞争性国企绩效？在不同行政层级、
地区的竞争性国企中，该效应是否存在显著差异？地方政府干预又会对该机制
产生怎样的影响？这些问题都是国企改革新阶段的重难点问题，本文将对此展
开研究。
竞争性国企面对的行业竞争更激烈，同时与垄断性国企相比其承担的社会
责任相对较小，因此其更适合引入非国有股东，构建市场化的治理机制，以提
升综合竞争力。本文从股权架构和高层治理两个维度出发，探究了非国有股东
治理对竞争性国企经营绩效的影响效果。本文采用案例研究法与实证研究法。
首先通过文献综述构建理论基础，其次选取非国有股东治理较好的竞争性国企
格力电器，将其与行业内非国有股东治理较弱的国企进行对比分析。然后以
2014-2021年A股中的竞争性国企为研究对象，从非国有股东治理的股权架构
与高层治理角度，构建双向固定效应模型展开实证研究。最后针对竞争性国企
的异质性与地方政府干预度的影响展开进一步研究。
本文得出以下结论：（1）在股权结构与高层治理维度，非国有股东治理可
提升竞争性国企的经营绩效。（2）非国有股东通过股权制衡方式，对地方国企
经营有更好的促进效果，高层治理方式对央企更有效。（3）对市场化程度低地
区的竞争性国企而言，非国有股东治理对其经营绩效提升作用显著。（4）地方
政府干预对非国有股东治理产生抑制作用。
关键词：非国有股东治理；竞争性国企；国企经营绩效
I
非国有股东治理对竞争性国企经营绩效的影响研究
Abstract
The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee proposed to
develop mixed reform, with classification mixed reform as the focus, and competitive
state-owned enterprises as the pacesetter. Introducing non-state-owned shareholders is
one of the ways of mixed reform.Can non-state-owned shareholder governance
improve the performance ofcompetitive state-owned enterprises? Is there abig
difference between competing state-owned companies at different levels and regions?
What is the impact of local government intervention? These are the problems in the
new phase of reform of state-owned enterprises. This paper examines these issues.
As the industry competition faced by competitive state-owned enterprises is
more intense, and their social responsibilities are relatively light, the best way to
improve the their competitiveness is introduce non-state-owned shareholders. This
paper discussestheimpact ofnon-state-owned shareholdergovernance onthe
operating performance of such enterprises from the two dimensions of property right
structure and high-level governance. Firstly, this paper lays a theoretical foundation.
Secondly, this paper analyzes with the company, whose non-state owned shareholder
governance is better. Then, taking the competitive state-owned enterprises as the
research object, this paper studiesthrough the fixed effect model. Finally, the effect
of internal and external heterogeneity is further investigated.
This paper draws the following conclusions: (1) non-state-owned shareholder
governanceimprovestheoperatingperformanceofcompetitivestate-owned
enterprises through ownershipstructure and high-level governance. (2)The two
dimensions of non-state-owned shareholder governance have different effectiveness
for competitivestate-owned enterprises atdifferent levels.(3) Non-state-owned
shareholders governanceplaysan importantrole inimprovingthe operational
performance of competitive state-owned enterprises in regions with a low level of
marketing. (4) local government intervention may curb the influence of non-state-
owned shareholders in governance.
Keywords:non-stateownedshareholdergovernance;competitivestate-owned
enterprises; operating performance of state-owned enterprises
II
目录
中文摘要................I
英文摘要..................... II
第一章绪论..............1
第一节研究背景............1
第二节研究目的与意义..............2
第三节研究内容与框架..............3
第四节论文创新点与局限..........4
第二章文献综述与研究基础..............5
第一节文献综述............5
第二节理论基础............9
第三节概念界定.................11
第三章研究设计..................14
第一节案例研究法.............14
第二节实证研究法.............14
第四章非国有股东参与竞争性国企治理的案例分析.......21
第一节案例选择的依据............21
第二节案例基本情况................22
第三节非国有股东治理的效果分析.............26
第四节案例小结.................37
第五章非国有股东治理对竞争性国企绩效的实证分析..........39
第一节实证结果与分析............39
第二节企业异质性对非国有股东治理作用的影响检验.........47
第三节地方政府干预对非国有股东治理作用的影响检验.....50
第六章研究结论与启示.............52
第一节研究结论.................52
第二节启示..................53
参考文献....................55
致谢.....................61
独创性说明和论文使用授权说明...............62