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MBA毕业论文_策意图对国有股权投资企业投资决策影响的研究PDF

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国有股权投资企业在投资时不仅仅是考虑风险和收益,其所投项目的经济价 值以国家利益为主,需要综合考虑社会价值、公共责任、宏观调控等影响。政府 设立国有股权投资企业的重要目的,就是引导产业的布局和发展。国有股权投资 企业相较于其他企业,国有股权投资企业承担着更大的社会责任,其经营目标并 不只是关注资本的盈利性。跟着政府的政策意图进行投资的优势是可以“集中资 源办大事”,跟随政府的政策倾斜享受红利。但随着经济规模增加、地方投资出 现“你追我赶”模式、市场流动性过剩等,使得近年企业的投资效率急剧下滑, 特别是国有股权投资企业,其投资效率低下和国有资产流失的问题颇受关注。 为此,国家亦加强了对国有股权投资企业的监督和管理,制定了严格的绩效 考核制度,绩效考核指标也能体现政府政策意图,如政府需提高固定资产投资, 则会制定相关的投资和融资指标等。 本文的研究目标是政府政策意图通过绩效考核指标传导后,对国有股权投资 企业决策的影响。本文研究的理论基础是信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、融资 约束理论。当前政府政策意图的干预路径和影响效果是通过直接下达行政命令影 响投资决策、制定政策影响投资方向、通过制定绩效考核指标影响投资金额和决 策流程,本文论述的重点就是政策意图如何通过绩效考核指标来干预和影响投资 决策。通过查阅文献后,发现国有股权投资企业因为有政府的隐性背书,能获得 更多的信贷支持且资金使用灵活度较高,这就使得非效率投资的倾向性变大,同 时国资监管下对内部控制要求的提升,又在一定程度上缓解了非效率投资现象。 政府政策意图的干预路径和效果涉及多个方面,无法一一量化,政府对国有股权 投资企业的监督管理,主要是通过量化的绩效考核来完成,故此次实证分析主要 研究政府政策意图通过绩效考核的传导如何影响国有股权投资企业的投资决策, 给国有股权投资企业制定目标责任中投资和融资任务最为重要,会更多的影响国 有企业的现金持有水平和资产规模,所以本文提出了关于现金持有水平、资产规 模对投资效率影响的研究假设,在借鉴了Richardson(2006)效率投资模型的 基础上,构建模型验证了研究假设。通过案例展示了国有股权投资企业K公司在 IV 2015年对J公司进行投资时的决策依据,分析了在政府政策意图影响下K公司 在对J公司做投资决策时对行业选择、股权比例选择、财务管理、追逐考核目标 四个方面的考虑,通过数据分析5年来J公司及行业的发展情况,评判股权投资 是否达到政府预期效果,进一步分析了结论。 主要结论如下:政府的政策意图,通过绩效考核传导后主要会影响被投资企 业的现金持有水平和资产规模,现金持有水平高易导致过度投资现象,现金持有 水平低易导致投资不足现象,资产规模大易导致内部控制能力加强,进而能减少 非效率投资。从宏观层面来看,政府政策意图对行业整体有明显的提升作用,行 业内的从业者也是相关红利的受益者。从微观层面来看,具体到每一个被投资的 企业,既有政策红利受益的方面,也有可能出现政策和现实不匹配的问题,导致 企业受到政府考核的影响和偏离既定的发展路线,出现非效率投资现象。被投企 业借助政策和资金快速发展,较高的现金持有水平导致扩张过快出现明显的过度 投资,导致资金和人才无法跟进使企业陷入困境;被投企业资产规模增大后,受 到国有企业管理体系影响能提升内部控制能力,使得企业的内部决策更加科学, 信息不对称理论和委托代理理论的带来的限制有所缓解,但也要付出经营效率下 降的代价。 本文针对国有股权投资企业和监管部门提出了相关建议:国有股权投资企业 在投资决策时,应该充分考虑自身的实际情况和市场的发展情况,在与政府的博 弈中要尽量运用市场化的经营规律,平衡好政策意图与投资决策的利益关系,减 少直接的行政干预对投资决策产生的负面影响,运用好政策红利,在承担社会责 任的同时也要落实风险控制,做好科学合理的投资决策,规避非效率投资,并在 投后管理中落实科学管理,促进企业的发展壮大。国有股权投资企业的监管部门 要充分发挥宏观职能,营造良好的股权投资环境,尽量通过税收优惠、政策补贴 等形式来替代直接的行政干预,使得政府政策意图的落实能具有可持续性。监管 部门应该引导国有股权投资企业做出科学的投资决策,帮助国有股权投资企业建 立符合市场化运作规律的风险管理体系,避免出现非效率投资现象。 关键词:国有股权投资企业;政府政策意图;绩效考核;投资效率;投资决 策 V ABSTRACT As investing, state-owned equity investment enterprises not only consider risks and returns, but also the economic value of the projects they invest is mainly based on national interests, the impact of social value, public responsibility and macro-control should be considered comprehensively. The important purpose for the government to establish state-owned equity investment enterprises is to guide the layout and development of the industry. Compared with other enterprises, state-owned equity investment enterprises bear greater social responsibility, and their operating goal is not only to focus on the profitability of capital. The advantage of investing in line with the government's policy intention is that you can "concentrate resources to accomplish big things" and enjoy dividends in line with the government's policy preference. However, with the increase of economic scale, the emergence of "chasing each other" mode of local investment and excess market liquidity, etc., the investment efficiency of enterprises has declined sharply in recent years, especially state-owned equity investment enterprises, whose investment efficiency is low and the loss of state-owned assets attracts considerable attention. Taking the influence of government policy intention on the decision-making of state-owned equity investment enterprises as the research objective, this paper firstly expounds the theoretical basis of the research from the aspects of information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory and financing constraint theory. Then it analyzes that the intervention path of the current government policy intention is through the influence of the policy, the direct issuance of administrative orders, and the influence of the performance appraisal indicators. Then it analyzes the effect of policy intention, which includes the investment choice guided by assessment indicators, the one-sided pursuit of industry hot spots, the blind pursuit of equity control, the self-interested behavior of management, and the incomplete decision-making process. Through the literature, found that the state-owned equity investment enterprises because of the implicit endorsement of the government, in VI order to gain more credit support and funds use flexibility is higher, this makes the excessive investment propensity to change, at the same time, to the promotion of the internal control requirements under the state-owned assets supervision and to a certain extent, ease the phenomenon of inefficient investment. The intervention path and effect of government policy intentions involves multiple aspects, unable to quantify, the government supervision and management of state-owned equity investment enterprise, is mainly done through quantitative performance evaluation, therefore, the empirical analysis mainly studies the government policy intentions through the performance appraisal of conduction affect how state-owned equity investment business investment decisions, set goals to state-owned equity investment enterprise responsibility in investment and financing is the most important task, will more influence the level of cash holdings of state-owned enterprises and assets, so this paper put forward about the level of cash holdings, asset scale research hypotheses for the impact on investment efficiency, Based on Richardson's (2006) model of efficient investment, the model is constructed to verify the research hypothesis. By example demonstrates the state-owned equity investment enterprises in 2015 K company to investment decision basis of J company, analyzes the influence on government policy intention under the company K for J company when making investment decisions on the choice of industry, equity ratio, financial management, chasing objective has four reasons, J company in five years through data analysis and the development of the industry, to judge whether equity investment the desired effect, and further analyzes the conclusion. Main conclusions are as follows: the government's policy intentions, by conduction after mainly affects the cash holdings of the invested enterprise level and asset scale, the higher the level of cash holdings, the more prone to excessive investment, the lower the level of cash holdings, the more vulnerable to inadequate investment, the more the greater the assets of the internal