摘
要
摘要
我国自 1998年起施行半强制业绩预告政策，至今已有近 20年的历史。监
管部门实施该政策的目的在于督促上市公司及时、准确地披露相关业绩，以保
护中小投资者。而事实上，上市公司业绩预告修正频繁，业绩“变脸”事件时
有发生，引起了中小投资者的不满。虽然公司同时披露了修正原因，但批评认
为这些修正原因毫无价值，甚至存在误导投资人的嫌疑。那么，诸如业绩预告
修正原因这类软信息，到底是改善信息披露、提升公司透明度；还是毫无作用，
甚至误导投资人？本文将研究业绩预告修正时原因选择的影响因素及这些原因
对资本市场的影响，以期更加全面地评价我国的半强制业绩预告政策。
本文手工收集了上市公司 2002年至 2012年业绩预告修正公告中披露的业
绩变动原因，并对其进行归类整理。在上述数据的基础上，本文首先以修正公
告中的业绩归因为研究对象，以管理层解聘风险作为管理层动机，考察了管理
层动机对原因选择策略的影响。结果发现：当业绩修正消息为坏消息时，管理
层更加倾向于将业绩变动归咎于不受其控制的外部因素；当管理层的解聘与公
司业绩相关性较小时，上述现象得以缓解。这些结果表明管理层企图以业绩修
正原因扰人视听，影响股东对他们的评价。进一步的研究还发现，股东在一定
程度上受到了业绩预告修正原因的干扰：当业绩预告修正原因为外部因素时，
管理层更不容易因业绩表现不佳而被解聘。
本文在上述结果的基础上，进一步以分析师预测和股票市场反应为研究对
象，研究了不同业绩修正原因对投资者的影响。本文的结果表明，业绩预告修
正原因为外因时，分析师更加倾向于发布新的业绩预测；分析师预测准确度提
升幅度较小；同时分歧度减小幅度更大。同时本文的结果还发现，在不同消息
性质的情况下，投资者对业绩修正原因的反应也显著不同。综上，可以认为业
绩预告修正原因并非陈词滥调、千篇一律。它既能为业绩预告中的定量信息提
供验证功能，也能向市场投资者传递价值相关的信息。
本研究不仅有助于监管层更加全面地了解我国半强制业绩预告政策实施的
效果和不足；也补充了相关领域研究的不足之处，对已有文献有所贡献。
关键词：业绩预告；修正原因；管理层动机；分析师预测
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Abstract
Abstract
China starts her mandatory management forecast policy since 1998. The primary
intention of this policy is to urge firms to correctly and timely disclose decision useful
news. However, the policy turns out to be un-satisfactory. Firms frequently revise
their early forecasts with untruthful attributions. Sometimes firms’ earnings could be
totally different betweent two adjacent forecasts. Obviously investors are not suitable
with what the firms explained. Critcs say that the attributions combined with the
management forecast revisions are useless or even misleading. I try to figure out what
affects managers’ choices in disclosing attributions in management forecasts and how
do these attributions affect the capital market participants. I believe we could better
assess the effect of our mandatory forecast policy through answering these questions.
I read all management forecast revisions released during 2002 to 2012 and
manually code the attributions into different categories. Based on this sample, I study
the relation between management dismissal risk and the attribution type. The
empirical results show that when the management forecast revision news is bad,
mangers tend to attribute it to uncontrollable external factors. Moreover, the above
finding is weaker when managers are less likely to be fired for poor performance.
Further investigations show that the shareholders may be misled by managers’
selective disclosure of attributions.
I further examine how management forecast revision attributions affect analyst
forecasts and the stock market reaction. Overall, the empirical results demonstrate
that the attributions are not boilerplate disclosures. According to the specific situation,
the attributions could either increase the credibility of other quantative information in
management foecast revision (e.g. earnings numbers) or release value relevant
information to investors by themselves.
The empirical evidence provided in this paper could help the policy maker better
assess the effect of mandatory forecast policy, and is also contributing to related
literature.
Key words: Management Forecast; Attribution; Dismissal Risk; Analyst Forecast
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目录
目录
第1章引言 .................................................................................................................1
1.1研究动机和研究意义.........................................................................................1
1.1.1研究动机和问题............................................................................................1
1.1.2研究意义........................................................................................................2
1.2研究样本、数据来源和研究方法.....................................................................4
1.3研究内容和结构安排.........................................................................................4
第2章制度背景分析 .................................................................................................7
2.1业绩预告政策变迁..............................................................................................7
2.1.1业绩预告政策变迁历程.................................................................................7
2.1.2简析我国业绩预告政策...............................................................................14
第3章国内外相关研究综述 ...................................................................................15
3.1管理层业绩预告的理论研究...........................................................................15
3.1.1劝说型博弈（Persuation Game）...............................................................15
3.1.2廉价交谈博弈（Cheap-talk Game）..........................................................16
3.1.3本节小结......................................................................................................17
3.2管理层业绩有关的实证研究...........................................................................18
3.2.1先行条件与管理层业绩预告......................................................................18
3.2.2管理层业绩预告特征..................................................................................21
3.2.3管理层业绩预告的影响..............................................................................24
3.2.4本节小结......................................................................................................25
3.3财务软信息及业绩归因的相关研究...............................................................26
3.3.1财务报告软信息的价值相关性..................................................................26
3.3.2财务报告软信息与公司信息环境..............................................................28
3.3.3业绩归因的相关研究...................................................................................30
3.3.4本节小结......................................................................................................31
第4章管理层归因行为研究 ...................................................................................32
4.1概述...................................................................................................................32
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