自有品牌（Store Brands）是指由零售商自己创造、控制以及销售的产品品牌。近年来， 随着市场竞争加剧，零售商，如沃尔玛、麦德龙、永辉等，选择引入自有品牌以面对这一挑 战。尽管大量学者对自有品牌做了研究，但是均未考虑股权战略联盟这一重要现实背景。因 此，本文基于强势零售商背景下，研究了制造商持股零售商、零售商持股制造商以及交叉持 股等三种情形对零售商自有品牌策略的影响。 首先研究了制造商持股强势零售商对零售商自有品牌策略的影响。通过对比引入前后均 衡值，发现（1）制造商纵向持股比例较大时，零售商引入自有品牌有利于增加制造商利润。 零售商引入自有品牌始终有利于增加零售商和供应链总利润；（2）对制造商全国品牌链而言， 引入自有品牌会导致制造商利润受损，少数情形下制造商全国品牌链利润受损。且制造商全 国品牌链利润受损时，零售商也不一定遭受损失；（3）制造商全国品牌和自有品牌产品零售 价格均与纵向持股比例无关。 其次研究了强势零售商持股制造商对零售商自有品牌策略的影响。通过对比引入前后均 衡值，发现（1）引入自有品牌使得制造商利润亏损，零售商利润增加，供应链总利润增加， 制造商和零售商间存在协调的可能性；（2）持股比例会增强零售商在全国品牌中与制造商的 谈判地位，持股比例越小，引入自有品牌对零售商越有利；（3）自有品牌的引入能有效缓解 全国品牌中的双重边际效应，制造商降低批发价格是这一现象的原因。 最后研究了强势零售商与制造商交叉持股对零售商自有品牌策略的影响。通过对比引入 前后均衡值，发现（1）自有品牌的引入总是侵蚀制造商通过批发获得的利润；（2）交叉持 股比例恰当时，引入自有品牌有利于增加制造商分配后利润（3）自有品牌的引入总有利于 零售商和整个供应链利润，制造商和零售商间存在协调的可能性。 关键词：自有品牌；持股；强势零售商；供应链 西南交通大学硕士研究生学位论文 第 2 页 Abstract Store brands are product brands created, controlled and sold by the retailer itself. In recent years, as competition in the market has intensified, retailers such as Wal-mart, metro and Yonghui have chosen to introduce their own brands to face this challenge. Although a large number of scholars have done researches on private brands, they have not considered the shareholding status of members in the supply chain. Therefore, based on the background of strong retailers, this paper studies the influence of three situations, namely, manufacturer-owned retailers, retailer-owned manufacturers and cross-owned retailers, on retailers' private brand strategies. Firstly, the paper studies the influence of manufacturer's holding of strong retailer on retailer's private brand strategy. By comparing the equilibrium value before and after the introduction, it is found that (1) when the vertical shareholding ratio of manufacturers is large, the introduction of private brands by retailers is beneficial to increase the profits of manufacturers. The introduction of private brand by retailers is always beneficial to increase the total profit of retailers and the supply chain. (2) for manufacturers' national brand chain, the introduction of private brand will lead to the loss of manufacturers' profits, and in a few cases, the loss of manufacturers' national brand chain profits. And when the profit of manufacturer's national brand chain is damaged, the retailer does not necessarily suffer loss. (3) the retail price of the manufacturer's national brand and private brand products has nothing to do with the vertical shareholding ratio. Secondly, the paper studies the influence of strong retailer holding manufacturer on retailer's private brand strategy. By comparing the equilibrium value before and after the introduction of private brand, it is found that (1) the introduction of private brand makes the profit loss of manufacturers, increase the profit of retailers, increase the total profit of the supply chain, and there is the possibility of coordination between manufacturers and retailers.(2) the shareholding ratio will enhance retailers' negotiating position with manufacturers in national brands. The smaller the shareholding ratio is, the more beneficial it will be for retailers to introduce private brands;(3) the introduction of private brands can effectively alleviate the dual marginal effect of national brands, which is caused by manufacturers' lowering of wholesale prices. Finally, the paper studies the influence of cross-shareholdings between strong retailers and manufacturers on retailer's private brand strategy. By comparing the equilibrium value before and 西南交通大学硕士研究生学位论文 第 3 页 after the introduction, it is found that (1) the introduction of private brand always erodes the profit gained by manufacturers through wholesale;(2) when the cross-shareholding ratio is appropriate, the introduction of private brand is beneficial to increase the profit after distribution by manufacturers. (3) the introduction of private brand is always beneficial to the profits of retailers and the whole supply chain, and there is the possibility of coordination between manufacturers and retailers. Keywords: Store brand; equity holding; power retailer; supply chain 西南交通大学硕士研究生学位论文 第 4 页 目录 摘要 .............................................................................................................................................. 1 Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. 2 第1章 绪论 ..................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 研究背景和意义 ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1.1 研究背景 ................................................................................................................. 1 1.1.2 研究意义 ................................................................................................................. 3 1.2 研究内容 ............................................................................................................................ 3 1.3 研究方法 ............................................................................................................................ 4 1.4 技术路线图 ........................................................................................................................ 4 第2章 文献综述 ............................................................................................................................. 5 2.1 自有品牌 ............................................................................................................................ 5 2.2 战略联盟 ............................................................................................................................ 6 2.3 文献评述 ............................................................................................................................ 6 第3章 制造商持股强势零售商对零售商自有品牌策略的影响 ................................................. 8 3.1 引言 .................................................................................................................................... 8 3.2 问题描述 ............................................................................................................................ 9 3.2.1 需求函数 ............................................................................................................... 10 3.2.2 模型假设 ............................................................................................................... 10 3.3 模型 .................................................................................................................................. 11 3.3.1 无自有品牌模型 ................................................................................................... 11 3.3.2 自有品牌模型 ....................................................................................................... 12 3.4 均衡分析 .......................................................................................................................... 14 3.5 本章小结 .........