股权质押、经济不确定性与企业金融化——基于股权质押
新规的准自然实验
Equity Pledge,Economic Uncertainty,and Corporate
Financialization:Based on the New Equity Pledge
Regulations
何碧
He Bi
分类号密级
U D C 编号
硕士学位论文
学位论文题目：股权质押、经济不确定性与企业金融化——
基于股权质押新规的准自然实验
姓名何碧
学号2020212515
学院中国公共财政与政策研究院
学位类别：学术硕士□专业硕士□同等学力
学科专业区域经济学
指导教师江政（副教授）
第二导师
提交论文日期：2023年5月21日
摘要
实业公司的融资渠道常受到多方限制，股权质押因其固有的一些便利和优势，逐渐
成为中国资本市场中实体企业热衷的融资手段；然而，在其广受欢迎的同时，质权人有
权强制平仓的机制也使其蕴含着较大的风险。此外，近年来实体经济发展低迷，而金融
资产的盈利能力呈现出逆周期的上升趋势，导致经济整体出现了企业“金融化”的趋势。
同时，不少实体企业确实将质押融资资金投入金融资产加大二级市场杠杆，不仅提升了
企业自身的运营风险，同时也加剧了二级市场整体风险；股权质押个股“爆仓”的事件
也接连发生。因此，为了防范大规模股权质押的潜在风险，沪深交易所以及中证登联合
颁布了股权质押《新规》。
本文从股权质押角度出发，选取2015-2020年A 股全部上市公司年度数据为样本，
研究大股东股权质押如何影响企业金融化，以及经济政策不确定性在两者之间的调节作
用。文章利用2018年颁布的股权质押《新规》这一准自然实验进行了实证检验。研究
发现：（1）《新规》降低股权质押率、限制质押融资用途确实能够有效抑制企业金融
化，该结论在考虑政策效应、改变股权质押比例门槛后进行稳健性检验依然成立。（2）
再考虑经济政策不确定性的调节效应后发现，《新规》对企业金融化的抑制作用会受到
经济政策不确定性的影响。具体来说，《新规》对企业金融化程度的负向作用会随着经
济政策不确定性的升高而逐渐增强。（3）进一步研究发现，《新规》主要是通过抑制
融资约束较小，具有较强“套利”动机的股权质押行为从而抑制企业金融化的。（4）
异质性分析表明，股权质押《新规》对于企业金融化的抑制作用在民营企业中显著性明
显差异于国有企业；区分股权集中度后发现，股权质押《新规》会更显著地抑制股权集
中度较低企业的金融资产配置比例。（5）为了避免样本选择偏误对本文研究结论的影
响，文章进行了近邻PSM-DID，结果依旧论证了《新规》确实会显著抑制企业金融化
趋势的假设。
本文基于股权质押内在风险所引起的政策关注以及企业脱实向虚的现实背景，选取
股权质押《新规》作为切入点，从企业投资决策的微观层面以及政府政策监管的宏观层
面出发，以《新规》作准自然实验，丰富了股权质押经济后果相关研究，同时也扩充了
股权质押《新规》政策效果的探讨，为探究企业金融化原因以及如何抑制企业”脱实
就虚”拓宽了新思路。
关键词：股权质押公司治理企业金融化经济政策不确定性
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ABSTRACT
Equity pledges have gradually become a popular means of financing for real companies
in China's capital market due to some of their inherent convenience and advantages;however,
the popularity of equity pledge financing is accompanied by a mechanism that gives the
pledgee the right to compulsorily close out positions,making it a risky proposition.In
addition,the real economy has been in the doldrums in recent years,while the profitability of
financial assets has shown a counter-cyclical upward trend,leading to a trend of corporate
"financialisation"of the economy as a whole.At the same time,many real enterprises do
invest their pledged financing funds in financial assets to increase secondary market leverage,
which not only enhances the operational risk of the enterprises themselves,but also
exacerbates the overall risk of the secondary market;incidents of "blow-out"of individual
shares of equity pledges have also occurred one after another.Therefore,in order to prevent
the potential risk of large-scale equity pledges,the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
and the CSRC jointly promulgated the New Rules on Equity Pledges.
This article examines how large shareholder equity pledges affect corporate
financialisation and the moderating role of economic policy uncertainty between the two from
the perspective of equity pledges by selecting annual data of all listed A-share companies
from 2015to 2020as a sample.The article conducts an empirical test using a natural
experiment,the New Regulation on Equity Pledges,which was promulgated in 2018.It finds
that (1)the New Regulation can indeed effectively curb corporate financialisation by reducing
the equity pledge rate and limiting the use of pledge financing,and this finding still holds
when robustness tests are conducted after considering the policy effect and changing the
equity pledge ratio threshold.(2)After considering the moderating effect of economic policy
uncertainty,it is found that the inhibiting effect of the New Regulation on corporate
financialisation is influenced by economic policy uncertainty.Specifically,the negative effect
of the New Regulation on the degree of financialisation of firms increases gradually with the
increase in economic policy uncertainty.(3)Further study reveals that the New Regulation
inhibits the financialisation of enterprises mainly by discouraging equity pledges with less
financing constraints and a strong incentive to "arbitrage".(4)Heterogeneity analysis shows
that the inhibitory effect of the New Regulation on the financialisation of enterprises is
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significantly different among private enterprises than state-owned enterprises;after
differentiating equity concentration,it is found that the New Regulation on equity pledges
more significantly inhibits the financial asset allocation of enterprises with low equity
concentration.(5)In order to avoid the impact of sample selection bias on the findings of this
paper,the article conducts a nearest-neighbour PSM-DID,and the results still argue for the
hypothesis that the New Regulation will indeed significantly inhibit the trend of
financialisation of enterprises.
Based on the policy concerns arising from the inherent risks of equity pledges and the
realistic background of corporate de-financialisation,this article selects the New Regulation
on equity pledges as an entry point to enrich the research related to the economic
consequences of equity pledges from the micro level of corporate investment decisions and
the macro level of government policy regulation,using the New Regulation as a natural
experiment,and also expands the exploration of the policy effects of the New Regulation on
equity pledges,in order to explore the It also expands the discussion of the effects of the New
Regulation on equity pledges and opens up new ideas on the causes of corporate
financialisation and how to discourage corporate "de-realisation".
Key Words:Share Pledging;Corporation Management;Corporation Financialization;
Economic Policy Uncertainty
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