硕士学位论文
基于混改背景的战略投资者与
资本配置效率研究
学科专业：财务管理
研究方向：公司财务与国有资产管理
作者姓名：刘蕊
学号：1930601115
指导教师：鲁昱副教授
所在学院：商学院
二〇二二年五月
Research on Strategic Investors and Capital Allocation
Efficiency based on the Background of Mixed Ownership
Reform
Dissertation Submitted to
Beijing Technology and Business University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement
for the Degree of
Master of Management
By
Liu Rui
（Financial Management）
Dissertation Supervisor：Associate Professor Lu Yu
May 2022
摘要
自我国提出国有企业混合所有制改革方案距今已经30年，随着混改程度和进程
的不断推进，整体上已经取得显著成效。已有研究证实了混合所有制改革中非国有资
本的引进对于改善国企经营效率具有积极影响。但是随着国企混合所有制改革不断深
化，单纯的股份多元化已经不能满足国企实现市场经济体制改革的目标，选择一批具
有治理意愿的异质性战略投资者加入国企公司治理以解决国企存在的“所有者缺失”、
“内部人控制”等问题，成为当下混改的新目标。因此战略投资者的类型在混改中发
挥的异质性作用应该得到充分重视。同时，由于国有企业性质的特殊性，受到政策性
负担的影响，资本配置非效率问题严重。在此基础上，通过委派董事进驻董事会增加
话语权可以充分发挥战略投资者的积极性和主动性，促进其参与公司治理，为优化国
企资本配置注入活力。因此，本文研究混合所有制改革以及战略投资者类型对于国企
资本配置效率的影响，为“国企改革三年行动”中强调要“突出抓好深化混合所有制
改革”提供参考借鉴。
本文将战略投资者类型进行境内/境外、境内金融机构/境内非金融机构的划分，
选取2008-2020年沪深A 股主板国有上市公司为研究样本，手工搜集年报和数据库
披露的战略投资者持股和委派人员数据，从股权结构和高层治理两个层面衡量混改程
度，研究战略投资者类型对于国企资本配置效率的异质性作用。运用固定效应的面板
回归模型进行实证检验，结果表明：第一，战略投资者可以通过形成股权制衡和委派
人员参与高层治理改善国企资本配置效率；第二，境内战略投资者的股权制衡作用和
境外战略投资者的高层治理作用对于国企资本配置效率的提升作用更加突出；第三，
境内金融机构战略投资者对于国企资本配置效率的提升作用优于境内非金融机构战
略投资者，且在股权制衡和高层治理两个层面均有所体现。以上结论在经过稳健性检
验后仍然成立。进一步研究发现，在市场化发展水平较低地区，战略投资者对于国企
资本配置效率的提升作用更加显著。有关机制分析的研究发现，战略投资者主要通过
降低代理成本和改善国企公司治理水平提高资本配置效率。本文不仅丰富了混合所有
制改革中有关战略投资者异质性作用的研究，同时为不同类型的战略投资者在国企改
革中发挥的作用提供经验证据，为推进新一轮国企改革有一定的启示意义。
关键词：混合所有制改革；战略投资者；资本配置效率
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Abstract
It has been 30years since the introduction of mixed ownership reform programs for
SOEs in China,and significant results have been achieved overall as the extent and process
of mixed reform continues to advance.Studies have confirmed that the introduction of non-
state capital in mixed ownership reform has a positive impact on improving the operational
efficiency of SOEs.However,with the deepening of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs,
the simple share diversification can no longer meet the goal of SOEs to achieve the reform
of market economy system,and the selection of a group of heterogeneous strategic investors
with governance will to join the corporate governance of SOEs to solve the problems of
"owner deficiency"and "insider control"of SOEs has become the new goal of the current
mixed reform.Therefore,the heterogeneous role played by the type of strategic investors in
the mixed reform should be given due attention.Meanwhile,due to the special nature of
SOEs,they are affected by the policy burden and have serious problems of non-efficiency
in capital allocation.On this basis,increasing the voice through appointing directors to the
board of directors can give full play to the enthusiasm and initiative of strategic investors,
promote their participation in corporate governance,and inject vitality into optimizing the
capital allocation of SOEs.Therefore,this thesis studies the impact of strategic investors on
the efficiency of capital allocation of SOEs in the context of mixed ownership reform,and
provides reference for the "three-year action of SOE reform",which emphasizes the need to
"focus on deepening mixed ownership reform".
This thesis divides strategic investors into domestic or foreign and domestic financial
institutions or domestic non-financial institutions,selects state-owned listed companies on
the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2008to 2020as the research
sample,manually collects data on strategic investors'shareholdings and appointees disclosed
in annual reports and databases,and measures the degree of hybridization at both the equity
structure and top governance levels to study the heterogeneous role of strategic investor
types on the efficiency of capital allocation of SOEs.The results of the empirical tests using
fixed-effect panel regression models show that,first,strategic investors can improve SOEs'
capital allocation efficiency by forming equity checks and balances and appointing personnel
to participate in high-level governance;second,the equity checks and balances of domestic
strategic investors and the high-level governance of foreign strategic investors contribute
significantly to improving SOEs'capital allocation efficiency;third,the effect of strategic
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investors from domestic financial institutions on the efficiency of capital allocation in SOEs
is better than that of strategic investors from domestic non-financial institutions,and it is
reflected at both the equity checks and balances and top governance levels.The above
findings still hold after robustness tests.The above findings still hold after robustness test.
Further research finds that the role of strategic investors in improving the capital allocation
efficiency of SOEs is more significant in regions with lower levels of market development.
Studies on mechanism analysis find that strategic investors improve capital allocation
efficiency mainly by reducing agency costs and improving corporate governance in SOEs.
This thesis not only enriches the research on the heterogeneous role of strategic investors in
mixed ownership reform,but also provides empirical evidence on the role played by different
types of strategic investors in SOE reform,which has some implications for promoting the
new round of SOE reform.
Key words:Mixed Ownership Reform,Strategic Investors,Capital Allocation
Efficiency
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