当今我国的市场环境不断变化，企业的经营和管理模式也处在不断的变化调整之中。目前企业 普遍的经营模式是所有权和经营权相分离，采用委托管理制度。但是，这种管理制度会产生很大的 弊端，由于代理人获得的信息较多，他们会利用自身的信息优势为自己谋求利益。最优契约理论认 为，薪酬激励是解决委托代理问题的好方法，其指导思想在于将高管薪酬与公司绩效最大程度地联 系起来，用高额的薪酬来激励与调动管理层的积极性，减少代理成本。在这种薪酬制度的持续作用 下，管理层的薪资不断上涨，严重加大了公司内部的薪酬差距。持续扩大的薪酬差距引起了学者的 关注与研究，并提出了锦标赛理论与行为理论。那么，在我国现行的政治背景与经济环境下，我国 上市公司内部的薪酬差距与公司绩效的关系更符合哪种理论呢？ 设置薪酬差距的初衷是提高公司绩效，然而不断被爆出的“天价薪酬”“薪酬业绩倒挂”现象却让 人们开始质疑薪酬差距对公司绩效激励效应的有效性。管理层权力理论认为，基于理性经济人的假 设，公司管理层完全有能力且可能会运用其权力进行“寻租”，以影响甚至是操纵其薪酬契约的制定。 这种情况下，锦标赛理论所设想的薪酬差距的运行机制就会被破坏。因此，管理层理论为解释这些 薪酬乱象提供了一个新视角。 基于上述分析，本文选取我国 2012-2017 年沪深 A 股上市公司作为研究对象，立足于我国上市 公司内部薪酬制度和现实状况，提出研究假设，采用多元回归分析两种类型的薪酬差距对公司绩效 的影响作用。此外，本文在文献回顾的基础上，以管理层作为联结股东与员工的桥梁，将管理层权 力划分为董事长与总经理是否兼任、董事会规模、高管持股比例和独立董事比例四个权力维度。深 入剖析各个权力维度在两种类型薪酬差距与公司绩效间的关系中所发挥的调节作用。 通过研究发现：(1)公司内部两类薪酬差距与公司绩效的关系更符合锦标赛理论，即薪酬差距与 公司绩效正相关。(2)总的来看，管理层权力对薪酬差距与公司绩效的关系有明显的影响，但不同的 权力维度对这种关系的影响效果及作用程度不同。具体而言，两职兼任、董事会规模越大均会削弱 薪酬差距对公司绩效的正向激励作用；高管持股比例对这种正向关系没有明显的影响；独立董事比 例越高，薪酬差距与公司绩效间的正向关系越显著。 根据以上结论，本文结合现实问题提出了以下的管理启示：(1)采用科学的方法确定薪酬差距， 最大限度发挥其激励效果。(2)完善薪酬制度的公开度与透明度。(3)完善公司治理结构，优化管理层 权力的配置，避免权力过度集中。(4)建立健全的公司外部监督机制，有效监督管理层的权力。 关键词：薪酬差距；管理层权力；公司绩效；调节作用II Abstract Today's market environment in China is constantly changing, and the business management and management model is also undergoing constant changes and adjustments. At present, the common business model of enterprises is the separation of ownership and management rights, and the entrusted management system is adopted. However, this kind of management system will have great drawbacks. Because agents get more information, they will use their own information advantages to seek benefits for themselves. The optimal contract theory holds that salary incentives are a good way to solve the principal-agent problem. The guiding ideology is to maximize the relationship between executive compensation and company performance, and use high compensation to motivate and mobilize management's enthusiasm and reduce agency cost. Under the continuous effect of this compensation system, the management's salary has been rising, which has seriously increased the internal salary gap. The continuous widening salary gap has attracted the attention and research of scholars, and has proposed the behavior theory and theory of tournaments. Then, under the current political background and economic environment in China, what kind of theory is more relevant to the relationship between the salary gap and the company's performance in China's listed companiesThe original intention of setting the salary gap is to improve the company's performance. However, the phenomenon of “high price compensation” and “pay performance upside down” that has been repeatedly exposed has made people question the effectiveness of the compensation gap on the company's performance incentive effect. According to the management power theory, based on the assumptions of rational economic people, the management of the company is fully capable and may use its power to “seek rent” to influence or even manipulate the formulation of its compensation contract. In this case, the operating mechanism of the pay gap envisaged by the tournament theory will be destroyed. Therefore, management theory provides a new perspective for explaining these pay chaos. Based on the above analysis, this paper selects China's 2012-2017 Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company as the research object, based on the internal compensation system and reality of listed companies in China, proposes research hypotheses, and uses multiple regression analysis to analyze the impact of two types of salary gaps on corporate performance. In addition, based on the literature review, this paper uses management as a bridge between shareholders and employees, and divides management power into four power dimensionalities: Chairman and General Manager of the two level-one, board size, executive shareholding ratio and independent director ratio. In-depth analysis of the role of each power dimension in the relationship between the two types of pay gaps and corporate performance. Through research, it is found that: (1) The relationship between the two types of salary gaps and company performance is more in line with the tournament theory, that is, the salary gap is positively related to company performance. (2) In general, management power has a significant impact on the relationship between salary gap and company performance, but different power dimensions have different effects andIII degree of influence on this relationship. Specifically, CEO duality and the larger board of directors will weaken the positive incentive effect of the salary gap on the company performance; the shareholding ratio of the executives has no obvious influence on this positive relationship; the higher proportion of independent directors, the positive relationship is more pronounced. Based on the above conclusions, this paper proposes the following management inspirations based on practical issues: (1) Using scientific methods to determine the pay gap and maximize its incentive effect. (2) Improve the openness and transparency of the compensation system. (3) Improve the corporate governance structure, optimize the allocation of management power, and avoid excessive concentration of power. (4) Establish a sound external supervision mechanism for the company and effectively supervise the power of the management. Key words: Pay gap; Management power; Company performance; Moderating roleIV 目 录 摘要..................................................................................................................................................................I Abstract...........................................................................................................................................................II 第一章 绪论.................................................................................................................................................1 1.1 研究背景...........................................................................................................................................1 1.2 研究意义...........................................................................................................................................2 1.2.1 理论意义................................................................................................................................2 1.2.2 现实意义................................................................................................................................2 1.3 研究内容...........................................................................................................................................3 1.4 研究方法与技术路线.......................................................................................................................4 1.4.1 研究方法...............................................................................................................................4 1.4.2 技术路线................................................................................................................................5 1.5 创新点...............................................................................................................................................6 第二章 概念界定与文献综述.....................................................................................................................7 2.1 概念界定...........................................................................................................................................7 2.1.1 高管........................................................................................................................................7 2.1.2 薪酬........................................................................................................................................7 2.1.3 薪酬差距................................................................................................................................8 2.1.4 管理层权力............................................................................................................................8 2.2 文献综述.........................................................................................................................................10 2.2.1 国外研究现状......................................................................................................................10 2.2.2 国内研究现状......................................................................................................................13 2.2.3 国内外研究现状评述..........................................................................................................15 第三章 理论基础与研究假设...................................................................................................................16 3.1 理论基础.........................................................................................................................................16 3.1.1 最优契约理论......................................................................................................................16 3.1.2 高阶理论..............................................................................................................................16 3.1.3 管理层权力理论..................................................................................................................16 3.1.4 锦标赛理论..........................................................................................................................17 3.1.5 行为理论..............................................................................................................................18 3.2 研究假设.........................................................................................................................................18 3.2.1 高管内部薪酬差距与公司绩效..........................................................................................18 3.2.2 高管员工薪酬差距与公司绩效..........................................................................................19 3.2.3 薪酬差距、管理层权力与公司绩效..................................................................................19 3.3 概念模型.........................................................................................................................................22 第四章 变量定义和模型构建...................................................................................................................23V 4.1 数据来源及选取............................................................................................................................23 4.2 变量设计.........................................................................................................................................23 4.2.1 被解释变量..........................................................................................................................23 4.2.2 解释变量..............................................................................................................................24 4.2.3 调节变量..............................................................................................................................24 4.2.4 控制变量..............................................................................................................................25 4.3 模型构建.........................................................................................................................................26 第五章 数据分析.......................................................................................................................................28 5.1 描述性统计.....................................................................................................................................28 5.2 相关性分析.....................................................................................................................................29 5.3 多元回归分析.................................................................................................................................30 5.3.1 薪酬差距对公司绩效影响的回归分析..............................................................................30 5.3.2 两职兼任情况对薪酬差距与公司绩效间关系调节作用的回归分析 ..............................31 5.3.3 董事会规模对薪酬差距与公司绩效间关系调节作用的回归分析 ..................................32 5.3.4 高管持股比例对薪酬差距与公司绩效间关系调节作用的回归分析 ..............................33 5.3.5 独立董事比例对薪酬差距与公司绩效间关系调节作用的回归分析 ..............................34 5.4 稳健性检验.....................................................................................................................................36 第六章 研究结论与展望...........................................................................................................................40 6.1 研究结论.........................................................................................................................................40 6.2 管理启示.........................................................................................................................................40 6.3 研究局限及展望.............................................................................................................................41 6.3.1 研究局限..............................................................................................................................41 6.3.2 研究展望..............................................................................................................................41