Research on the impact of CVC joint
investment on the technological innovation
performance of enterprises——
From the perspective of Member
Heterogeneity
by
Gao Yuan
Thesis Submitted to the faculty of the Xi’an Technological University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER
in
Finance
Supervisor: Prof. Xiang Haiyan
Xi’an Technological University
May 2022
Xi’an, Shaanxi, P.R.China

摘
要
企业风险投资（CVC）是指金融行业以外的成熟企业的权益类投资，获取被投资企业
一定比例的股份，其价值在于提供资金的同时提供其他互补性资源，从而有利于提升被投
资企业技术创新绩效。当前，CVC正处于蓬勃发展阶段。为规避投资风险，CVC在战略
实施过程中常常采用联合投资的方式，即多个 CVC对同一家企业的同时持股。由于成员
之间的联动与竞争机制，使得 CVC联合投资对被投资企业技术创新的作用方向存在较大
不确定性。联合投资已日益成为 CVC的重要模式，因而明确其投资效果及其对创新的影
响与作用机制具有一定的现实意义。
本文基于委托代理理论、资源基础理论、风险收益理论，分析了 CVC联合投资与被
投资企业技术创新的关系。首先，明确 CVC联合投资对被投资企业创新绩效的影响。其
次，分析 CVC联合投资成员持股比例、产权性质、进入时点以及成员母公司行业等方面
的异质性对被投资企业技术创新的作用。再次，从股权集中度与产品市场竞争度两个角度，
研究在不同的公司治理水平下，CVC联合投资对企业创新的影响是否存在差异。最后，
本文研究了 CVC联合投资影响被投资企业绩效的作用机制。
本文以 2016-2019年创业板上市企业作为研究样本，运用负二项回归模型对所提假设
进行检验。结论如下：与 CVC单独投资相比，CVC联合投资显著地降低了被投资企业技
术创新绩效。进一步地，CVC联合投资成员的持股比例异质性越大，被投资企业的创新
绩效越低；产权性质异质性越大，被投资企业的创新绩效越高；进入时点异质性越大，被
投资企业的创新绩效越高；CVC联合投资成员母公司所处行业差别越大，被投资企业创
新绩效越高；CVC联合投资成员母公司与被投资企业所处行业越接近，被投资企业创新
绩效越低。公司股权集中度越低、产品市场竞争越激烈，则 CVC联合投资对被投资企业
创新绩效的抑制作用越明显。而 CVC联合投资之所以抑制了企业创新绩效，部分原因在
于减少了企业创新投入。在稳健性检验环节，本文采用 PSM法以及改变创新绩效衡量方
式，回归结果依然显著。
本文有以下创新：首先，细分 CVC模式，验证了 CVC联合投资与单独投资对被投
资企业创新绩效的差异化影响。现有研究在 CVC对被投资企业创新绩效的作用效果上结
论不一，本文可在一定程度上对这一现状给予解释。其次，深入研究了联合成员多维度的
异质性对企业创新绩效的影响，厘清了 CVC联合投资影响企业创新的内在机理，同时也
对联合投资研究作了补充。最后，从内、外两个层面综合分析了公司治理的权变作用，并
将企业研发投入与创新绩效有机整合，检验了 CVC联合投资影响被投资企业创新绩效的
可能渠道，进而为政府决策提供依据，有针对性地进行 CVC市场的优化与效率提升。
关键词： CVC联合投资；异质性；技术创新；公司治理

Abstract
Corporate venture capital (CVC) refers to the equity investment of mature corporates outside
the financial industry to obtain a certain proportion of shares of the target enterprise. Its value lies
in providing funds and other complementary resources, which is conducive to improving the
technological innovation ability of the invested enterprises and feeding themselves. It can be seen
that CVC focuses on strategic objectives and takes into account financial benefits. At present,
CVC is in the stage of vigorous development. In order to avoid investment risks, CVC often
adopts the way of joint investment in the process of strategy implementation, that is, multiple
CVCs hold shares in the same enterprise at the same time. Due to the linkage and competition
mechanism among members, there is great uncertainty about the role of CVC joint investment in
the technological innovation of the invested enterprises. Joint investment has increasingly
become an important model of CVC, so it is of certain practical significance to clarify its
investment effect and its impact on innovation and action mechanism.
Based on principal-agent theory, resource-based theory and risk return theory, this paper
analyzes the relationship between CVC joint investment and technological innovation of invested
enterprises. Firstly, it studies how CVC joint investment affects the innovation performance of
invested enterprises. Secondly, it analyzes the effect of the heterogeneity of CVC joint investment
members on the technological innovation of the invested enterprises. Thirdly, using the
company's equity concentration and product market competition as adjustment variables, this
paper studies whether there are differences in the impact of CVC joint investment on enterprise
innovation under different internal and external governance environment. Finally, this paper
studies the mechanism of CVC joint investment affecting the performance of invested enterprises.
Taking the enterprises listed on the gem from 2016 to 2019 as the research sample, this paper
uses the negative binomial regression model to test the proposed hypothesis. The conclusions are
as follows: compared with single a CVC, CVC joint investment significantly reduces the
technological innovation performance of the invested enterprises. Furthermore, the greater the
heterogeneity of shareholding ratio of CVC joint investment members is, the lower the innovation
performance of the invested enterprises is; The greater the heterogeneity of property rights is, the
lower the innovation performance of the invested enterprises is; The greater the heterogeneity of
entry time, the higher the innovation performance of the invested enterprises; The greater the
industry difference between the parent companies of CVC joint investment members is, the more
innovative output of the invested enterprises is; The closer the parent company of CVC joint
investment member is to the industry of the invested enterprise is, the lower the innovation
。。。以下略