我国现行经济模式来源于计划经济，政府干预在经济发展初期起到了关键性 推动作用，多年的实践探索使得经济体制不断发展完善，但政府行为仍保留着计 划时期的“干预色彩”，经济模式和政府行为的不匹配严重制约着市场效率和企 业发展。宏观经济发展进入新常态，企业必须由“粗犷”式发展向精细化管理转 变，对管理节点的把控，尤其是对成本的控制是企业亟待解决的问题。探讨政府 行为对企业成本决策的影响，将会对政府决策及企业应对具有一定的指导作用。 本文以2011-2017年沪深A股制造业国有上市公司为研究对象，结合我国特 有的制度环境，从第二类代理问题视角出发，考察了政府干预对企业成本粘性的 影响，并基于实际控制人行政级别差异及地区环境差异对上述影响过程进行了深 入探讨。研究发现：政府掌控着区域要素分配权、国企人事任命权是政府影响国 有企业的必要条件，政府干预通过赋予国有企业政策性负担对企业成本粘性产生 显著的强化作用；中央国企独立性强、曝光度高、管理体系完善，相较于中央国 企，政府干预对成本粘性的影响在地方国企中更为显著；东部地区经济发达程度 高、要素配置效率高、市场竞争激烈，东部地区政府干预引致的企业成本粘性最 不明显、中部地区较为明显、西部地区最显著。本文将制度环境与国有企业股权 特征紧密结合并将其引入企业成本管理研究领域，研究结果揭示了政府干预对国 有企业成本决策的影响作用。 关键词：政府干预；政策性负担；成本粘性；实际控制人差异；地区差异 III Abstract Thecurrenteconomicmodelofourcountryoriginatesfromtheplanned economy.Thegovernmentinterventionplaysakeyroleintheearlystageofeconomic development.Manyyearsofpracticeandexplorationhavemadetheeconomicsystem developandimprovecontinuously.However,thegovernmentbehaviorstillretainsa strong"interventioncolor"leftoverfromtheplannedperiod.Themismatchbetween theeconomicmodelandthegovernmentbehaviorisserious.Itrestrictsmarket efficiencyandenterprisedevelopment.Macroeconomicdevelopmenthasentereda newnormalstate,enterprisesmustchangefrom"rough"developmenttofine management,controlofmanagementnodes,especiallythecostcontrolisanurgent problemtobesolved.Discussingtheimpactofgovernmentbehavioronenterprise costdecision-makingwillpromotegovernmentdecision-makingandenterprise responsetoacertainextent. Takingthestate-ownedlistedcompaniesinShanghaiandShenzhenA-share manufacturingindustryfrom2011to2017astheresearchobject,combiningwith China'suniqueinstitutionalenvironment,fromtheperspectiveofthesecondtypeof agencyproblem,thispaperexaminestheimpactofgovernmentinterventiononthe CostStickinessofenterprises,andbasedonthedifferencesofactual controllers'administrativelevelsandregionalenvironmentaldifferences,the above-mentionedimpactprocessiscarriedout.Furtherdiscussion.Itisfoundthatthe governmentcontrolstherightofregionalfactordistributionandtherightof appointmentofpersonnelinstate-ownedenterprisesarethenecessaryconditionsfor thegovernmenttoinfluencestate-ownedenterprises.Inthecentralstate-owned enterprises,theinfluenceofgovernmentinterventiononCostStickinessismore significantinthelocalstate-ownedenterprises;theeasternregionhasahighdegreeof economicdevelopment,highefficiencyoffactorallocationandfiercemarket competition;theeasternregionhastheleastobviouscoststickinesscausedby governmentintervention;thecentralregionismoreobvious,andthewesternregionis themostsignificant.Thispapercombinestheinstitutionalenvironmentwiththe ownershipcharacteristicsofstate-ownedenterprisesandintroducesitintothe IV researchfieldofenterprisecostmanagement.Theresultsrevealtheinfluenceprocess ofgovernmentinterventiononcostdecision-makingofstate-ownedenterprises. Keywords:governmentintervention;Policyburden;CostStickiness;Actual ControllerDifferences;Regionaldifferences V 目录 摘要..................................................................................................................I Abstract.................................................................................................................III 第一章绪论....................................................................................................-1- 1.1研究背景与意义.......................................................................................-1- 1.1.1研究背景........................................................................................-1- 1.1.2研究意义........................................................................................-2- 1.2研究目的与内容.......................................................................................-3- 1.2.1研究目的........................................................................................-3- 1.2.2研究内容........................................................................................-3- 1.3研究思路与方法.......................................................................................-4- 1.3.1研究思路........................................................................................-4- 1.3.2研究方法........................................................................................-5- 第二章文献综述............................................................................................-7- 2.1成本粘性相关研究...................................................................................-7- 2.1.1成本粘性的影响因素....................................................................-7- 2.1.2成本粘性的经济后果....................................................................-9- 2.2政府干预相关研究.................................................................................-10- 2.2.1政府干预的动因..........................................................................-10- 2.2.2政府干预的经济后果..................................................................-12- 2.3文献述评.................................................................................................-16- 第三章概念界定与理论基础......................................................................-17- 3.1相关概念的界定.....................................................................................-17- 3.1.1政府干预......................................................................................-17- 3.1.2成本粘性......................................................................................-17- 3.1.3终极控制人..................................................................................-18- 3.3理论基础....................................................................................................-18- 3.2.1政府干预理论..............................................................................-18- 3.2.2委托代理理论..............................................................................-19- 3.2.3政治锦标赛理论..........................................................................-20- 3.4本章小结....................................................................................................-20- 第四章研究假设..........................................................................................-21- VI 4.1政府干预与成本粘性.............................................................................-21- 4.2政府干预、实际控制人级别与成本粘性.............................................-22- 4.3政府干预、地区差异与成本粘性.........................................................-23- 4.3本章小结....................................................................................................-23- 第五章研究设计..........................................................................................-25- 5.1数据来源与样本选择.............................................................................-25- 5.2变量定义.................................................................................................-25- 5.2.1成本粘性的度量..........................................................................-25- 5.2.2政府干预的度量..........................................................................-25- 5.2.3企业实际控制人判定..................................................................-26- 5.2.4主要变量的定义和说明..............................................................-26- 5.3模型构建............................................................................