随着现代经济社会的发展，企业的组织结构也随之发展，起初企业的组织形 式多为私有制的小型企业，而随着企业规模的不断扩大，企业的所有者分身不暇， 无法亲力亲为地管理企业的所有事务，只能聘请专业的管理人员为其管理企业， 股份制便成为了大多数企业的组织形式。对于企业的所有者和管理者而言，由于 其利益的不一致，显然不能只靠一纸委托代理合同来约束管理者，使其尽职尽责 地履行管理义务，努力为企业所有者创造财富，因此，便有了企业的各种内部控 制制度。内部控制并不是企业各种治理问题的灵丹妙药，有药到病除的功效，许 多企业虽然拥有自己的内部控制制度，可各种治理问题依然不断，资本市场上也 不时会出现财务造假、贪污舞弊的案件。究其根本，这些情况的出现大多与内部 控制体系设计不合理，执行不到位相关。为了使企业建立有效的内部控制体系， 国内外政府推出了一系列的法律法规，强制企业披露其内部控制信息,使外部投 资者了解企业的内部控制运行情况，有效的促进资源的合理分配。 本文基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、信号传递理论、战略管理理论， 对内部控制与企业绩效的关系、内部控制与代理成本的关系、代理成本与企业绩 效的关系、代理成本在内部控制影响企业绩效的过程中所起的中介效应进行了研 究，厘清了内部控制、代理成本与企业绩效之间的内在逻辑关系。 本文采用实证分析方法，首先对相关文献进行梳理总结，在理论分析的基础 上提出研究假设，选取 2014-2018 年深证 A 股上市公司中的制造业企业共 5006 个样本数据为研究对象，进行变量设计和模型构建，利用 STATA 软件对建立的模 型进行实证分析，得出如下结论：（1）内部控制质量越高，企业绩效越好；（2） 内部控制质量越高，代理成本越低；（3）代理成本越高，企业绩效越差；（4） 代理成本在内部控制影响企业绩效的过程中起不完全中介效应。 关键词：内部控制,代理成本,企业绩效,中介效应III Abstract With the development of modern economy and society, the organizational structure of the company has also developed. At first, the organizational form of the company was mostly a small private enterprise. With the continuous expansion of the size of the company, the owners of the company are too busy to manage the company. For all matters, only professional managers can be hired to manage the enterprise for them, and the shareholding system has become the organizational form of most enterprises. For the owners and managers of an enterprise, due to their inconsistent interests, it is clear that they cannot rely on a single agency contract to constrain managers to fulfill their management obligations with due diligence and strive to create wealth for the owner of the enterprise. Therefore, There are various internal control systems of the enterprise. Internal control is not a panacea for various corporate governance issues. It has a cure-all effect. Although many companies have their own internal control systems, various governance issues continue to occur, and financial fraud and corruption will occur from time to time in the capital market. Case. The root cause is that most of these situations are related to the irrational design of the internal control system and improper implementation. In order for enterprises to establish an effective internal control system, domestic and foreign governments have introduced a series of laws and regulations, forcing companies to disclose their internal control information, enabling external investors to understand the operation of the company's internal control, and effectively promoting the rational allocation of resources. This article is based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, signal transmission theory, and strategic management theory. The relationship between internal control and corporate performance, the relationship between internal control and agency costs, the relationship between agency costs and enterprise performance, and the impact of agency costs on internal control The intermediary effect in the process of corporate performance has been studied, and the internal logical relationship between internal control, agency costs and corporate performanceIV has been clarified. This article uses an empirical analysis method. First, it sorts out and summarizes the relevant literature, puts forward research hypotheses based on theoretical analysis, and selects a total of 5006 sample data from manufacturing companies in the Shenzhen Stock A listed company from 2014 to 2018. Variable design and model establishment. The empirical analysis of the established model using STATA software leads to the following conclusions: (1) the higher the quality of internal control, the better the company's performance; (2) the higher the quality of internal control, the lower the agency cost; (3) The higher the agency cost, the worse the corporate performance; (4) The agency cost plays an incomplete intermediary effect in the process of internal control affecting corporate performance. Keywords: Internal Control, Agency Cost, Corporate Performance, Information Disclosure, Mediation EffectV 目 录 声明..............................................................................................................................Ⅰ 摘要..............................................................................................................................Ⅱ 英文摘要......................................................................................................................Ⅲ 第一章 绪论..............................................................................................................1 一、引言.................................................................................................................1 二、研究目的和意义.............................................................................................2 （一）研究目的..............................................................................................2 （二）研究意义..............................................................................................3 三、文献综述.........................................................................................................3 （一）内部控制质量的评价方法研究..........................................................4 （二）内部控制、代理成本与企业绩效三者关系研究..............................6 （三）文献评述..............................................................................................9 四、研究方法和总体框架...................................................................................10 （一）研究方法............................................................................................10 （二）总体框架............................................................................................10 第二章 理论概述...................................................................................................12 一、理论基础.......................................................................................................12 （一）信息不对称理论................................................................................12 （二）委托代理理论....................................................................................13 （三）信号传递理论....................................................................................14 （四）战略管理理论....................................................................................14 二、内部控制理论概述.......................................................................................15 （一）内部控制的定义................................................................................15 （二）内部控制的内容................................................................................16 三、代理成本理论概述.......................................................................................16 （一）代理成本的定义................................................................................16 （二）代理成本的类型................................................................................17VI 四、企业绩效理论概述.......................................................................................17 （一）企业绩效评价体系............................................................................17 （二）企业绩效影响因素............................................................................19 第三章 理论分析和提出假设............................................................................22 一、关于内部控制与企业绩效的理论分析及假设...........................................22 二、关于内部控制与代理成本的理论分析及假设...........................................23 三、关于内部控制、代理成本与企业绩效的理论分析及假设.......................23 第四章 实证研究...................................................................................................25 一、样本选取与数据来源...................................................................................25 二、变量设计.......................................................................................................26 （一）被解释变量........................................................................................26 （二）解释变量............................................................................................26 （三）中介变量............................................................................................27 （四）控制变量............................................................................................27 三、模型设定.......................................................................................................29 四、实证结果分析...............................................................................................30 （一）描述性统计........................................................................................30 （二）相关性分析........................................................................................31 （三）回归分析............................................................................................33 五、稳健性检验...................................................................................................36 第五章 研究结论及对策建议............................................................................39 一、研究结论.......................................................................................................39 二、对策建议.......................................................................................................39 （一）构建良好的公司治理体系................................................................39 （二）使用整合报告代替传统财务报告....................................................40 （三）重视并降低企业舞弊风险................................................................40 （四）加强信息技术在内部控制方面的应用............................................41 三、研究不足及展望...........................................................................................41VII