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基于演化博弈的互联网金融应收账款融资研究_MBA毕业论文DOC

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文本描述
摘要
中小企业作为一种特殊群体,对经济增长的贡献功不可没。但是由于缺少抵
押资产,资信等级低,融资成本高等原因,其很难从传统金融机构如银行获得资
金方面的支持。随着移动支付、社交网络、搜索引擎、大数据和云计算等技术的
迅猛发展,互联网金融应运而生,其具有方便、高效和成本低等优点,对传统金
融机构发起挑战,也为传统金融业务的开拓提供了更多的可能。互联网金融应收
账款融资模式处于互联网金融领域的前沿,代表着互联网金融发展的较高水平。

此时银行成为单纯的资金提供者,信贷模式转变为以电商为主导的一对多应收账
款贷款,能够实现“多方共赢”,在我国银行经营风险大、中小企业融资难融资贵、
竞争激烈的大背景下,能够在一定程度上缓和银行与急需融资的中小企业间矛
盾。

关于互联网金融应收账款融资的研究目前主要集中在探讨银行、中小企业与
核心企业在供应链融资过程中的最优方式以及应收账款融资过程中的最优策略
组合,大多以单一核心企业与单一中小企业的情形为研究对象,对于多个核心企
业与多个中小企业的研究相对较少,基本假定三方是完全理性的,而现实中信息
往往是不对称的,并且缺乏对监督惩罚机制的考虑。本文在该领域内已往研究的
基础上,通过整理相关文献,运用演化博弈论的方法,建立了由电商群体与供应
商群体组成的互联网金融两级供应链中关于应收账款融资模式选择的博弈模型,
研究了传统意义下两级供应链合作情形、供应链金融应收账款信贷模式以及互联
网金融应收账款信贷模式等不同的合作方式以及合作中的信誉机制。研究表明:
要实现互联网金融应收账款信贷模式,系统必须满足电商实行非让利策略并且供
应商净收益大于零;引入信誉机制后,系统更倾向于互联网金融应收账款信贷模
式。

关键词:互联网金融,应收账款,演化博弈,信誉机制III
ABSTRACT
Small and medium-sized enterprises make great contributions to the economic
growth as a special group. But these enterprises find it difficult to get money from
Banks and other financial institutions of traditional support because of lacking of
mortgage assets, low credit level and high costs of financing. Internet financial arises
at the historic moment with rapid development of mobile payments, social networks,
search engines, big data and cloud computing technologies. Internet financial
challenges traditional financial institutions with its convenient, efficient, low-cost, and
it also provides a wide stage to the traditional financial business’s extension. Internet
financial accounts receivable financing mode is at the forefront of the Internet
financial areas, represents the higher level of Internet banking business development.
Banks become pure provider of funds, and credit mode changes into one-to-many
accounts receivable loan dominated by electricity. It can achieve win-win”. It can
solve the contradiction between banks and of small and medium-sized enterprises
which have urgent need of financing very well, while banks operation risk, small and
medium-sized enterprise face a expensive, competitive financing conditions.
Research of the Internet financial accounts receivable financing now mainly
focused on the optimal model in the process of supply chain financing and the optimal
strategy in the process of accounts receivable financing combination among banks,
the small and medium-sized enterprises and the core enterprises, mostly treat a single
core enterprise or a single small and medium-sized enterprise as a research object, but
less for multiple core enterprises and multiple small and medium-sized enterprise. It
basically assumes that all of the three sides are completely rational, but there are often
information asymmetry in reality. It is also lack in consideration of supervision and
punishment mechanism. By applying evolutionary game theory, the paper established
a game model of accounts receivable financing in two-level supply chain composed of
electricity retailers and suppliers, and researched the cooperation of a two-level
supply chain, accounts receivable financing models of supply-chain finance and
internet finance, and reputation mechanism in the process of cooperation. We found
that in order to realize the accounts receivable financing models of internet finance,
the system should satisfy the conditions that electricity retailers and suppliers must
make a profit. When the reputation mechanism is introduced, the accounts receivableIV
financing model of internet finance is more likely to be realized.
KEYWORDS: Internet finance, Accounts receivable, Evolutionary game theory,
Reputation mechanism目录
摘要 .. I
ABSTRACT ........ III
第 1 章 绪论 ....... 1
1.1 研究背景和意义..........1
1.1.1 研究背景. 1
1.1.2 研究意义. 5
1.2 研究现状..........6
1.2.1 中小企业融资难及融资模式研究 ... 7
1.2.2 供应链金融应收账款融资模式研究........... 8
1.2.3 互联网金融应收账款融资模式研究........... 9
1.3 研究思路与结构........11
1.3.1 研究方法........... 11
1.3.2 研究内容........... 12
1.4 论文创新点与不足....15
1.4.1 论文创新点 ...... 15
1.4.2 论文不足之处.. 15
第 2 章 互联网金融主体及模式分析 .......... 17
2.1 互联网金融概念的形成、提出和发展........17
2.1.1 互联网金融概念的形成和提出...... 17
2.1.2 互联网金融的发展 .... 17
2.2 互联网金融参与主体.18
2.2.1 电商企业-核心企业 ... 18
2.2.2 金融机构-单纯的资金提供方......... 19
2.2.3 中小企业-融资需求方........... 19
2.3 互联网金融融资模式20
2.3.1 订单融资模式.. 20
2.3.2 应收账款融资模式 .... 21
2.3.3 委托贷款融资模式 .... 21
2.3.4 仓单质押融资模式 .... 22
2.3.5 四种融资模式对比分析 ....... 232.4 博弈论基础....24
2.4.1 博弈论基本概念 ......... 24
2.4.2 演化博弈相关知识 .... 24
第 3 章 互联网金融应收账款融资模式的演化博弈模型构建... 27
3.1 基本假设、变量定义及模型建立....27
3.1.1 基本假设...........