硕士学位论文
治理机制对高标准农田治理绩效的影响研究
——以湖南省为例
研究生姓名李诗
所在学院经济学院
指导教师刘辉教授
学科专业农林经济管理
研究方向产业经济与组织
二○二三年六月
分类号密级公开
U D C 单位代码10537
湖南农业大学
硕士学位论文
治理机制对高标准农田治理绩效的影响研究
——以湖南省为例
Research on the Influence of Governance Mechanism
on Governance Performance of Well-facilitated
Farmland——Take Hunan Province as an example
研究生姓名李诗
指导教师刘辉教授
学科专业农林经济管理
研究方向产业经济与组织
论文答辩日期答辩委员会主席
论文评阅人
二○二三年六月
摘要高标准农田是“藏粮于地，藏粮于技”的重要物质基础，在粮食安全问题重要性凸
显的背景下，加强高标准农田建设意义非凡。党的十八大以来，我国高标准农田建设
不断创造新辉煌，实现量和质“双提升”。截至2022年底，全国建成10亿亩高标准农
田，稳定保障1.3万亿斤以上粮食产能，中国人的饭碗端得更牢了。然而，建成后的高
标准农田由于缺乏长效管护机制，普遍存在“有人用、无人管”“老化失修”等一系列问
题，加之治理过程中主体机会主义行为频发，导致农业生产“最后一公里”甚至“最后一
米”不畅通，已成为突破现代农业发展掣肘的关键点。为了充分发挥高标准农田效益，
推动农田变“良田”，因此需要加强高标准农田治理。而治理机制作为重要工具，在新
时代背景下探究治理机制如何差异化影响高标准农田治理绩效是十分重要的。
本文首先阅读梳理了大量的国内外相关文献，厘清了治理机制的内容边界，从微
观视角将高标准农田治理机制划分为契约治理与关系治理。其次，构建“契约治理——
关系治理——治理绩效”这一主体关系，深入剖析高标准农田治理过程中，契约治理、
关系治理的核心内容，即契约治理由契约完备性、契约柔性和履约严格性三个维度的
内容组成，关系治理同样也包含信任、沟通和联合行动三个维度的内容。在对契约治
理以及关系治理的内容维度进行明确的基础上，理论推导各个维度对高标准农田治理
绩效的所产生的影响，提出相应的研究假设，构建整体的理论模型。最后，在阐明湖
南省高标准农田治理的现实情况与存在的问题的基础上，形成契约治理、关系治理与
治理绩效的测量量表，利用442份调研数据，运用结构方程模型方法对前文所构建的
理论研究模型进行实证检验。
实证结果表明：契约治理、关系治理的各个维度均能直接正向地影响高标准农田
治理绩效。同时，契约治理通过作用于关系治理，间接影响高标准农田治理绩效，验
证了契约治理、关系治理与高标准农田治理绩效之间的关系，为高标准农田治理的相
关研究提供参考与借鉴。
关键词：高标准农田；契约治理；关系治理；治理机制；治理绩效
I
湖南农业大学硕士学位论文
Abstract
Well-facilitated farmland is an important material basis of "storing grain in the ground
and storing grain in technology".Under the background of the prominent importance of food
security,it is of great significance to strengthen the construction of well-facilitated farmland.
Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,China's well-facilitated
farmland construction has continuously created new glories and achieved "double
improvement"in quantity and quality.By the end of 2022,1billion mu of well-facilitated
farmland has been built nationwide,and the grain production capacity of more than 1.3
trillion Jin has been stably guaranteed,making China people's rice bowls more secure.
However,due to the lack of long-term management and protection mechanism,there are a
series of problems such as "occupied,neglected"and "aging and disrepair"in the
well-facilitated farmland after completion,and the opportunistic behavior of the main body
frequently occurs in the process of management,which leads to the unsmooth "last mile"or
even "last meter"of agricultural production,which has become the key point to break
through the constraints of modern agricultural development.In order to give full play to the
benefits of well-facilitated farmland and promote farmland to become "fertile farmland",it is
necessary to strengthen the management of well-facilitated farmland.As an important tool,it
is very important to explore how the governance mechanism affects the governance
performance of well-facilitated farmland in the new era.
Firstly,this paper reads and sorts out a large number of domestic and foreign related
documents,clarifies the content boundary of governance mechanism,and divides
well-facilitated farmland governance mechanism into contract governance and relationship
governance from a micro perspective.Secondly,this paper constructs the main relationship
of "contract governance-relationship governance-governance performance",and deeply
analyzes the core contents of contract governance and relationship governance in the process
of well-facilitated farmland governance,that is,contract governance consists of three
dimensions:contract completeness,contract flexibility and strict performance,and
relationship governance also includes three dimensions:trust,communication and joint
II
摘要
action.On the basis of defining the content dimensions of contract governance and
relationship governance,this paper theoretically deduces the influence of each dimension on
the performance of well-facilitated farmland governance,puts forward corresponding
research hypotheses,and constructs an overall theoretical model.Finally,on the basis of
clarifying the reality and existing problems of well-facilitated farmland governance in Hunan
Province,the measurement scale of contractual governance,relational governance and
governance performance is formed,and the theoretical research model constructed above is
empirically tested by using 442survey data and structural equation model method.
The empirical results show that all dimensions of contractual governance and relational
governance can directly and positively affect the performance of well-facilitated farmland
governance.At the same time,contract governance indirectly affects the performance of
well-facilitated farmland governance by acting on relational governance,and verifies the
relationship between contract governance,relational governance and well-facilitated
farmland governance performance,which provides reference for related research on
well-facilitated farmland governance.
Keywords:Well-facilitated farmland;Contract governance;Relationship governance;
Governance mechanism;Governance performance
III