分类号F06密级
U D C 332编号10486
武汉大学
硕士学位论文
政府环境监管与环保补助对企业创新的
影响——基于上市公司数据研究
研究生姓名：秦佳莹
学号：2018206320010
指导教师姓名、职称：张建清、教授
学科、专业名称：区域经济学
研究方向：区域经济政策
二〇二一年六月
Heterogeneous Environmental Regulation Tools and
Enterprise Innovation
——Research based on government environmental
supervision and environmental protection subsidies
By QinJiaying
June,2021
异质性环境规制工具与企业创新——基于政府环境监管与环保补助的研究
摘要
中国“先污染后治理”的增长方式激发了公众建立协调经济增长与环境治理的新增长模式的
强烈愿望。自西方国家使用环境规制工具改善环境又不使经济发展停滞以来，中国政府也开始
青睐于探究对不同环境规制手段的应用，但这些手段在不同体制背景下是否真正具有可复制
性？因此探究异质性环境规制手段的作用将在很大程度上完善中国的环境治理体系。
本文基于2008-2019年上市公司的数据，构建双重差分模型以探究政府环境监管与环保补
助对于企业创新的影响及其作用机制。结果表明：第一，政府直接环境检查对于企业创新具有
显著的促进作用，且管理效率在这一环节中起到明显的中介作用，并且企业的政治关联对于这
种促进作用有着明显的抑制效果。第二，环保补助对于企业创新具有显著的抑制作用，环保投
资在这一环节中起到中介作用，且企业的盈余操纵在这一环节中起到调节作用。第三，在东中
分地区和分企业类型的异质性检验结果中，政府直接环境检查与环保补助对于企业创新存在着
明显的异质性影响。
本文重塑了对于政府环境监管与直接环保补贴对于企业创新影响的理解，结果表明：偏向
于惩罚措施的环境监管极大地激发了企业创新的积极性，企业通过提升管理效率有效整合自身
资源进而提升企业创新水平，但对于具有政治关联属性的公司应当被重点关注。偏向于扶持措
施的环保补贴虽然有助于改善企业短期的融资困境，但实际却降低了企业主动创新的积极性，
甚至直接导致了迎合政府的行为，企业进行盈余操纵是这一挤出作用的具体体现。
关键词：环保督察；环保补助；异质性环境规制；创新
I
武汉大学硕士学位论文
Abstract
China’s “pollution first,then governance”development approach has aroused the public’s strong
desire to establish a new development model that harmonizes economic development and
environmental protection.Since Western countries have used environmental regulation tools to
improve the environment without stagnating economic development,the Chinese government It has
also begun to favor the application of different environmental regulatory methods,but are these
methods truly reproducible under different institutional backgrounds?Therefore,considering the
effects of heterogeneous environmental regulatory tools will improve China's environmental
governance system to a large extent.
Based on the data of listed companies from 2008to 2019,this paper constructs a double
differential model to explore the impact of government environmental supervision and environmental
protection subsidies on corporate innovation and its mechanism.The results show that:First,the
government's direct environmental inspection has a significant role in promoting enterprise innovation,
and management efficiency plays an obvious intermediary role in this link,and the political
connection of enterprises has a significant inhibitory effect on this promotion.And with the passage of
time,the government environmental inspection has the greatest effect on promoting enterprise
innovation in the first three years.Second,environmental protection subsidies have a significant
inhibitory effect on corporate innovation.Environmental protection investment plays an intermediary
role in this link,and corporate earnings manipulation plays a regulatory role in this link.Third,in the
four regions of east,middle,west and east,direct government environmental supervision and
environmental protection subsidies have obvious heterogeneous effects on enterprise innovation.
Article reshapes the understanding of the impact of government environmental supervision and
direct environmental protection subsidies on enterprise innovation.Environmental supervision,which
is biased towards punitive measures,has greatly stimulated the enthusiasm of enterprises for
innovation.Enterprises can effectively integrate their own resources by improving management
efficiency to enhance the level of innovation.However,companies with politically connected
attributes should be paid more attention to.Although environmental protection subsidies favoring
support measures help to improve the short-term financing difficulties of enterprises,they actually
reduce the enthusiasm of enterprises to actively innovate,and even directly lead to behaviors that cater
to the government,earnings manipulation by enterprises is a concrete manifestation of this crowding
out.
Keywords:environmental protection inspection;environmental protection subsidy;heterogeneous
environmental regulation;innovation
II
目录
1绪论.........................................................................................................1
1.1选题背景...........................................................................................1
1.2研究意义...........................................................................................1
1.2.1理论意义.....................................................................................1
1.2.2现实意义.....................................................................................2
1.3文献综述...........................................................................................2
1.3.1环保督察与企业创新.................................................................2
1.3.2环保督察、管理效率与企业创新.............................................3
1.3.3环保督察、政治关联与企业创新.............................................4
1.3.4环保补助与企业创新.................................................................5
1.3.5环保补助、环保投资与企业创新.............................................5
1.3.6环保补助、盈余操控与企业创新.............................................6
1.4研究思路...........................................................................................6
1.5研究方法...........................................................................................7
1.5.1文献研究法.................................................................................7
1.5.2实证研究法.................................................................................7
1.6创新点...............................................................................................8
2理论基础.................................................................................................9
2.1相关概念界定...................................................................................9
2.1.1环保督察.....................................................................................9
2.1.2环保补贴.....................................................................................9
2.2相关理论.........................................................................................10
2.2.1波特假说...................................................................................10
2.2.2外部性理论...............................................................................10
3数据、变量和模型..............................................................................11
3.1数据来源.........................................................................................11
3.2变量选择.........................................................................................11
3.2.1被解释变量...............................................................................11
3.2.2核心解释变量...........................................................................12
3.2.3控制变量...................................................................................12
3.2.4中介变量...................................................................................13
3.2.5调节变量...................................................................................13
3.3计量模型.........................................................................................13
4实证结果与分析..................................................................................17