分类号：学校代码：10139
U D C：学号：20211204371
Research on inventory game problem of dual
-channel supply chain under
中文摘要
在经济全球化的背景下，电子商务得到了快速发展，双渠道营销模式已经成
为越来越多品牌制造商的主要运营模式。由于网络渠道的开设，零售商之间的竞
争越来越激烈，如何缓解零售商之间的冲突，提高双渠道供应链效率是供应链成
员面临的重要问题。目前，虽然已有大量文献对双渠道供应链的协调策略进行了
研究，但是缺乏考虑零售商之间的非对称竞争。市场需求的不确定性以及激烈的
竞争环境，会加剧零售商之间的非对称竞争，使小型零售商在非对称竞争中的处
境更加艰难，制造商面对大型零售商时缺乏议价能力。
本文从双渠道供应链视角出发，以回购契约、收益共享契约和数量折扣契约
对双渠道供应链效率和制造商议价能力的影响为主要研究目标，进行零售商均衡
订货量和制造商最优定价的分析。具体的，文章考虑了回购契约、收益共享契约、
数量折扣契约三种行为偏好因素，将其应用到由一个制造商和两个市场地位不同
的非对称竞争零售商构成的双渠道供应链，具体的研究内容如下：
首先，本文研究了回购契约对双渠道供应链中零售商均衡订货量的影响，建
立回购契约下零售商订货博弈模型，研究得出双渠道供应链中的制造商可以主动
提供回购契约以提高自己的收入和面对优势零售商时议价能力，弱势零售商也乐
于接受回购契约并增加自己的订货量，此时回购契约使弱势零售商均衡订货量增
加，同时均衡订货量会随回购价格的提高而增加，优势零售商均衡订货量减少，
供应链效率得到提高，制造商议价能力增强。其次，本文研究收益共享契约对零
售商均衡订货量的影响，建立收益共享契约下零售商订货博弈模型，研究发现双
渠道供应链中的制造商可以主动提供收益共享契约以提高自己的收入和面对优
势零售商时议价能力，但收益共享率不能设置过高，否则会减少弱势零售商的订
货量，使自身收入和议价能力下降。收益共享契约会使弱势零售商均衡订货量增
加，同时均衡订货量会随收益共享率的提高而减少，优势零售商均衡订货量减少，
供应链效率得到提高，制造商议价能力增强，最后，本文研究数量折扣契约对零
售商均衡订货量的影响，建立数量折扣契约下零售商订货博弈模型，研究发现双
渠道供应链中的制造商可以主动提供数量折扣契约以提高自己的收入和面对优
势零售商时议价能力，当提供数量折扣契约会使弱势零售商均衡订货量增加，优
势零售商均衡订货量减少，同时弱势零售商均衡订货量会随高订货下批发价格的
提高而减少，供应链效率得到提高，制造商议价能力增强。
关键词：回购契约；收益共享契约；数量折扣契约；双渠道供应链；替代竞
争；库存博弈
ABSTRACT
In the context of economic globalization,e-commerce has developed
rapidly,and the dual channel marketing model has become the main
operating mode for more and more brand manufacturers.Due to the
establishment of online channels,competition among retailers is
becoming increasingly fierce.How to alleviate conflicts between retailers
and improve the efficiency of dual channel supply chains is an important
issue faced by supply chain members.At present,although a large
amount of literature has studied the coordination strategies of dual
channel supply chains,there is a lack of consideration for asymmetric
competition among retailers.The uncertainty of market demand and
intense competitive environment will exacerbate asymmetric competition
among retailers,making it more difficult for small retailers to face
asymmetric competition.Manufacturers lack bargaining power when
facing large retailers.
This article starts from the perspective of a dual channel supply
chain and focuses on the impact of repurchase contracts,revenue sharing
contracts,and quantity discount contracts on the efficiency of the dual
channel supply chain and the bargaining power of manufacturers.The
main research objectives are to analyze the equilibrium order quantity of
retailers and the optimal pricing of manufacturers.Specifically,the article
considers three behavioral preference factors:repurchase contracts,
revenue sharing contracts,and quantity discount contracts,and applies
them to a dual channel supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and
two asymmetric competitive retailers with different market positions.The
specific research content is as follows:
Firstly,this article studies the impact of repurchase contracts on the
equilibrium order quantity of retailers in a dual channel supply chain.A
retailer ordering game model under repurchase contracts is established,
and it is found that manufacturers in the dual channel supply chain can
actively provide repurchase contracts to improve their income and
bargaining power when facing advantageous retailers.Disadvantaged
retailers are also willing to accept repurchase contracts and increase their
order quantity.At this time,repurchase contracts increase the equilibrium
order quantity of disadvantaged retailers,and the equilibrium order
quantity will increase with the increase of repurchase prices.The
equilibrium order quantity of advantageous retailers decreases,the supply
chain efficiency improves,and the bargaining power of manufacturers
strengthens.Secondly,this article studies the impact of revenue sharing
contracts on the equilibrium order quantity of retailers,establishes a
retailer ordering game model under revenue sharing contracts,and finds
that manufacturers in a dual channel supply chain can actively provide
revenue sharing contracts to improve their income and bargaining power
when facing advantageous retailers.However,the revenue sharing rate
cannot be set too high,otherwise it will reduce the order quantity of
disadvantaged retailers,leading to a decrease in their own income and
bargaining power.The revenue sharing contract will increase the
equilibrium order quantity of disadvantaged retailers,while the
equilibrium order quantity will decrease with the increase of revenue
sharing rate.The equilibrium order quantity of advantageous retailers will
decrease,the supply chain efficiency will be improved,and the
bargaining power of manufacturers will be enhanced.Finally,this article
studies the impact of quantity discount contracts on the equilibrium order
quantity of retailers,establishes a retailer ordering game model under
quantity discount contracts,and finds that manufacturers in dual channel
supply chains can actively provide quantity discount contracts to improve
their income and bargaining power when facing advantageous retailers.
When providing quantity discount contracts,the equilibrium order
quantity of disadvantaged retailers will increase,and the equilibrium
order quantity of advantageous retailers will decrease.At the same time,
the equilibrium order quantity of disadvantaged retailers will decrease
with the increase of wholesale prices under high orders,improving supply
chain efficiency and bargaining power of manufacturers.Enhancement.
Key Words:Buy-back contract;Revenue sharing contract;Quantity
discount contract;Dual channel supply chain;Alternative competition;
Inventory game
目录
第1章绪论...............................................................................................1
1.1研究背景...........................................................................................1
1.2研究意义...........................................................................................4
1.2.1理论意义.....................................................................................4
1.2.2现实意义.....................................................................................4
1.3研究内容...........................................................................................5
1.4研究方法及技术路线.......................................................................6
1.4.1研究方法.....................................................................................6
1.4.2技术路线图.................................................................................7
1.5论文创新点.......................................................................................8
1.6论文结构...........................................................................................8
第2章文献综述....................................................................................10
2.1双渠道供应链相关研究.................................................................10
2.2库存博弈相关研究.........................................................................10
2.3供应链契约相关研究.....................................................................12
2.3.1回购契约...................................................................................12
2.3.2收益共享契约...........................................................................13
2.3.3数量折扣契约...........................................................................14
2.4文献评述.........................................................................................15
第3章回购契约下双渠道非对称竞争零售商订货博弈....................16
3.1引言.................................................................................................16
3.2问题描述和模型构建.....................................................................16
3.3回购契约下零售商的均衡订货量................................................20
3.4回购契约下制造商的最优定价策略和最优回购价格................26
3.5本章小结.........................................................................................28
第4章收益共享契约下双渠道非对称竞争零售商订货博弈............29
4.1引言.................................................................................................29
4.2问题描述和模型构建.....................................................................29
4.3收益共享契约下零售商的均衡订货量........................................32
4.4收益共享契约下制造商的最优定价策略和收益共享率............35
4.5本章小结.........................................................................................37
第5章数量折扣契约下双渠道非对称竞争零售商订货博弈............38
5.1引言.................................................................................................38
5.2问题描述和模型构建.....................................................................38