分类号F832.51密级公开
收藏编号___________学号190727039
学校代码10386编号_____________
案例分析
中小股东成功维权的机制及治理效应研究
——以茅台撤销捐赠议案为例
研究方向：财务管理
研究生姓名：陈婷
指导教师、职称：张怀教授
协助导师、职称：
所在学院：经济与管理学院
答辩委员会主席：童益恭高级会计师
二〇二二年六月
中小股东成功维权的机制及治理效应研究
——以茅台撤销捐赠议案为例
摘要
近年来，大股东资金占用、资产转移、关联交易、权力滥用等损害中小股东
利益的事件屡见不鲜。同时，党和国家政府高度重视中小股东权益保护问题，推
动颁布和实施了新《证券法》，最高人民法院就中小股东权益保护问题做出了诸
多解释，并调整与完善了中小股东参与公司治理的相关制度。在此背景下，深入
探讨中小股东成功维权的机制及其治理效应，对提高中小股东维权积极性、完善
公司治理机制、推进资本市场健康发展等均具有重要意义。
本文以贵州茅台酒股份有限公司（简称“贵州茅台”）撤销捐赠议案为例，深
入剖析了中小股东成功维权的具体机制及治理效应。首先，本文在梳理我国投资
者保护相关制度背景及中小股东维权、中小股东参与公司治理相关文献的基础
上，结合双重委托代理、信息不对称、信号传递等理论，对中小股东成功维权的
机制及治理效应进行了理论分析。其次，本文基于个人股东及网络平台视角分析
了贵州茅台中小股东成功维权的公司治理机制。最后，本文综合运用事件研究法、
财务比率法等方法分析了中小股东成功维权对资本市场反应、企业财务绩效、公
司内部治理与代理问题的影响，并结合研究结论提出了相关启示与展望。
研究发现，首先，中小股东成功维权主要依赖于以个人股东为代表、以网络
平台为主导的公司治理机制。一方面，个人股东对企业的长期投资倾向导致其公
司治理意愿和联结程度较高，从而在个人股东代表的号召之下，中小股东放弃“用
脚投票”，积极维权。另一方面，中小股东积极利用网络平台表达自身诉求，引
起媒体关注，使管理层在监管部门介入和网络舆论的双重压力下改变公司决策，
从而成功维权。其次，在治理效应方面，外部资本市场对中小股东成功维权事件
的反应是正向积极的，中小股东成功维权不仅增强了中小股东的信心和外部监督
意愿，还提高了企业财务绩效，促使管理层重视股东利益，优化公司治理，增强
与中小股东互动意识，缓解代理冲突，从而为股东创造更多财富。
本文对案例企业捐赠代理冲突背景下中小股东成功维权机制及治理效应的
探讨，契合当前国家强化中小股东权益保护的时代主题，有助于进一步丰富中小
股东权益保护方面的文献，对推进中小股东通过个人股东代表和网络平台的维权
机制进行维权，促进企业完善治理机制、缓解代理冲突，推动资本市场健康发展
亦具有一定的参考价值。
关键词：中小股东；成功维权；公司治理；代理冲突
I
Research on the Mechanism and Governance
Effects of Small and Medium Shareholders'
Successful Rights Protection:A Case Study of
Moutai's Proposal to Withdraw Donation
Abstract
In recent years,it is not uncommon for major shareholders to damage the
interests of small and medium shareholders by occupying funds,transferring assets,
related transactions,and abuse of power.At the same time,The Party and the national
government attach great importance to the protection of the rights and interests of
small and medium shareholders,and has promoted the promulgation and
implementation of the New Securities Law.The Supreme People's Court has made
many interpretations on the protection of rights and interests of small and medium
shareholders,adjusted and improved the relevant systems for small and medium
shareholders to participate in corporate governance.In this context,in-depth
discussion of the successful rights protection mechanism of small and medium
shareholders and its governance effects is of great significance to enhancing the
enthusiasm of small and medium shareholders to protect their rights,improving the
corporate governance mechanism,and promoting the healthy development of the
capital market.
This study takes Kweichow Moutai Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as
"Kweichow Moutai")which withdrew its donation proposal as an example,and
deeply analyzes the specific mechanism and governance effects of the successful
rights protection of small and medium shareholders.First of all,on the basis of sorting
out the relevant institutional background of investor protection in China,the rights
protection of small and medium shareholders,and the participation of small and
medium shareholders in corporate governance,this study combines dual
principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,signal transmission theory and
other related theories to make a theoretical analysis of the mechanism and governance
effects of small and medium shareholders’successful rights protection.Afterwards,
based on the perspective of individual shareholders and network platforms,it analyzes
the corporate governance mechanism used in the process of successful rights
protection of small and medium shareholders in Moutai.Finally,this study
comprehensively uses event research method,financial ratio method and other
II
methods to analyze its impacts on reaction of capital market,corporate financial
performance,corporate internal governance and agency issues,and puts forward
relevant enlightenment and prospects based on research findings.
The study finds that,first of all,the successful rights protection of small and
medium shareholders mainly depends on the corporate governance mechanism
represented by individual shareholders and dominated by online platforms.On the one
hand,the long-term investment tendency of individual shareholders in enterprises
leads to a high level of corporate governance and connection,so under the call of
individual shareholder representatives,small and medium shareholders give up
“voting with their feet”and actively protect their rights.On the other hand,small and
medium-sized shareholders actively use the web-based platform to express their
demands and attract media attention,so that the management can change the
company’s decision under the dual pressure of administrative intervention and
web-based public opinion,thus successfully protecting their rights.Secondly,in terms
of governance effects,the external capital market has a positive reaction to the
successful rights protection of small and medium shareholders.The successful rights
protection of small and medium shareholders not only enhances the confidence of
small and medium shareholders and their willingness to external supervision,but also
improves the financial performance of the company,prompting management to pay
attention to shareholders’interests,optimize corporate governance,enhance the
awareness of interaction with small and medium shareholders,and alleviate agency
conflicts,thus creating more wealth for shareholders,thus creating more wealth for
shareholders.
Discussing the successful rights protection mechanism and governance effects of
small and medium shareholders under the background of the case company's donation
agency conflict,which is in line with our country’s current theme of strengthening the
protection of small and medium shareholders'rights and interests,this study can
further enrich the literature on the protection of small and medium shareholders’
rights and interests.It also has certain reference value in promoting small and medium
shareholders'rights protection by means of the mechanism of online platforms and
individual shareholder representatives,promoting enterprises to improve their
governance mechanisms,alleviating agency conflicts,and promoting healthy
development of capital markets.
Key Words:Small and Medium Shareholders;Rights Protection;
Corporate Governance;Agency Conflicts
III
目录
第一章绪论...............................................................................................1
1.1研究背景...........................................................................................1
1.2研究意义...........................................................................................2
1.2.1理论意义.....................................................................................2
1.2.2现实意义.....................................................................................3
1.3研究方法...........................................................................................3
1.3.1文献研究法.................................................................................3
1.3.2案例分析法.................................................................................4
1.3.3事件研究法.................................................................................4
1.4研究内容与研究框架.......................................................................4
1.5研究的创新点...................................................................................6
第二章文献回顾......................................................................................8
2.1利益侵占问题相关研究...................................................................8
2.2中小股东的维权积极性相关研究..................................................9
2.3中小股东权益保护机制相关研究..................................................9
2.4中小股东参与公司治理效果相关研究........................................11
2.5文献述评.........................................................................................12
第三章相关概念、理论基础与理论分析............................................13
3.1概念界定.........................................................................................13
3.1.1中小股东...................................................................................13
3.1.2公司治理...................................................................................13
3.1.3企业捐赠...................................................................................13
3.2相关理论基础.................................................................................14
3.2.1双重委托代理理论...................................................................14
3.2.2信息不对称理论.......................................................................15
3.2.3信号传递理论...........................................................................16
3.2.4股东积极主义理论...................................................................16
3.3理论分析.........................................................................................17
3.3.1代理冲突引发中小股东维权...................................................17
3.3.2中小股东成功维权的机制分析...............................................18
3.3.3中小股东成功维权的治理效果分析.......................................18
3.4理论分析框架.................................................................................19
第四章案例介绍....................................................................................21
4.1案例选择.........................................................................................21