分类号F830.91密级公开
收藏编号__________学号160727081
学校代码10386编号_____________
(专题研究)
上市公司董事会治理、内部控制与并购绩效
研究方向：财务管理
研究生姓名：林昱
指导教师、职称：李文高级会计师
协助导师、职称：
所在学院：经济与管理学院
答辩委员会主席签名：郑剑军
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上市公司董事会治理、内部控制与并购绩效
摘要
并购是现代经济环境下企业扩大规模、调整产业布局的重要手段，也是市场
经济条件下企业进行资本运营的重要内容，已然成为我国上市公司寻求外部发展
常见、快捷的手段之一。董事会作为公司治理的核心，对并购决策的制定和执行
负有直接责任，探究董事会治理对并购绩效带来的可能影响，具有一定的实际意
义。众多的并购案例，企业期待借助并购作为前进动力，但事实上并购失败率却
一直居高不下,“并购悖论”的存在受到学者与实业家们的广泛关注。有学者研究
表明企业制度不完善、风险监管薄弱，是并购悖论存在的重要原因之一。内部控
制旨在改善信息沟通渠道以削弱信息不对称、建立健全企业风险控制与监督机制
等，能够有效应对上述企业漏洞。因此，探索企业并购存在的风险和症结，内控
角度是值得关注的切入点，有助于进一步解开“并购悖论”的神秘面纱。
本文利用我国沪深两市2013-2015年三年间的并购案例为样本，选取董事会
治理相关的指标（包含了董事会行为、构成特征、管理层激励情况等方面），通
过对上市公司董事会治理与并购绩效的关系探究，分析并购绩效下滑可能的影响
因素，同时引入内部控制质量这一调节变量，试图观察分析不同内控质量环境下，
董事会治理与并购绩效的关系。
研究结果表明：从并购的市场反映来看，市场对于并购事件的反应在首次公
告日后变动明显，董事会会议次数、董事会持股比例及不领取薪酬的董事比例与
并购短期绩效呈正相关，两职合一情况与并购短期绩效呈现显著负相关关系；不
同的内部控制条件带来的调节作用并不明确。从并购的中长期影响来看，董事会
议次数、董事会持股比例及不领取薪酬的董事比例与并购中长期绩效的关系为显
著正相关，内部控制水平变化所带来的调节作用在中长期观察中显著影响了董事
会持股比例以及不领取薪酬的董事比例与并购绩效的关系。
针对本文的研究结果，得出如下启示：建立和完善组织架构可以有效防范各
种风险，良好的组织架构需要依赖治理结构与治理制度的和谐发展；并购企业应
回归人本关注，重视企业文化融合与建设；建立健全科学有效的内部控制体系，
不仅通过明文规定，还应重视道德软环境。
关键词：上市公司；董事会治理；内部控制；并购绩效
I
Board Governance,Internal Control and M&A
Performance of Listed Companies
ABSTRACT
Merger and acquisition (M&A)is an important means for enterprises to expand
their scale and adjust their industrial layout in the modern economic environment.It is
also an important part of capital operation in the market economy.It has become one
of the common and fast means for listed companies to seek external development.As
the core of corporate governance,the board of directors is directly responsible for the
formulation and implementation of M&A decisions.It is of practical significance to
explore the possible impact of Board Governance on M&A performance.Many cases
of mergers and acquisitions,enterprises look forward to take them as a driving force
for progress,but in fact,the failure rate of M&A has remained high."The paradox of
M&A"has been widely concerned by scholars and industrialists.Some
scholars'studies show that there are loopholes in the enterprise system and lack of risk
supervision,which is one of the important reasons for the low success rate of mergers
and acquisitions.Internal control plays an important role in improving corporate
governance structure,weakening information asymmetry,and improving risk
identification and supervision mechanism.Therefore,exploring the crux and risk of
M&A from the perspective of internal control quality plays an important role in
uncovering the mystery of M&A performance.
This paper uses the cases of mergers and acquisitions in Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges from 2013to 2015as samples,starting with the factors of board
governance,through exploring the relationship between board governance and
mergers and acquisitions performance of listed companies,and analyzing the possible
influencing factors of the decline in the performance of M&A,at the same time
introducing the moderating variable of internal control quality,trying to observe and
analyze the board governance and M&Aperformance under different internal control
quality environment.
The results show that the market reaction to M&A events changes significantly
after the first announcement.The number of board meetings,the proportion of board
shareholdings and the proportion of directors who do not receive remuneration are
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positively correlated with the short-term performance of M&A,and the combination
of two positions is negatively correlated with the short-term performance of
M&A.The regulatory role of internal control quality is not clear.View the medium and
long-term impact of M&A,the number of board meetings,the proportion of board
shareholdings and the proportion of directors who do not receive remuneration are
positively correlated with the medium and long-term performance ofM&A.The
moderating effect brought by the change of internal control level in the medium and
long-term observation has a significant impact on the proportion of board
shareholdings and the proportion of directors who do not receive remuneration.
According to the results of this study,the following enlightenments can be drawn:
to establish and improve the organizational structure can effectively prevent various
risks,a good organizational structure needs to rely on the harmonious development of
governance structure and governance system;mergers and acquisitions enterprises
should return to humanistic concern,attach importance to the integration and
construction of corporate culture;to establish and improve a scientific and effective
internal control system,not only through explicit provisions,but also pay attention to
the moral environment.
Key words：the Listed Companies；the Board Governance；
Internal Control；M&A Performance
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