Contents
1. Introduction .1
2. Reconstituting Strategic Warning for the Digital Age .........5
3. Unifying Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and
Dissemination (TCPED) Across the U.S. Intelligence Community ...16
4. Managing Security as an Enterprise .........25
5. Better Utilizing Publicly Available Information ......31
6. Surging Intelligence in an Unpredictable World ...44
7. Conclusion .56
Abbreviations 57
References ....58
Acknowledgments ....64
About the Authors .....64
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I
n December 2017, the White House’s
National Security
Strategy
described a vision for the U.S. Intelligence
Community (IC):
America’s ability to identify and respond to geostra-
tegic and regional shifs and their political, eco-
nomic, military, and security implications requires
that the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) gather,
analyze, discern, and operationalize information. In
this information-dominant era, the IC must contin-
uously pursue strategic intelligence to anticipate geo-
strategic shifs, as well as shorter-term intelligence so
that the United States can respond to the actions and
provocations of rivals. Te ability of the United States
to modernize our military forces to overmatch our
adversaries requires intelligence support. Intelligence
is needed to understand and anticipate foreign
doctrine and the intent of foreign leaders, prevent
tactical and operational surprise, and ensure that
U.S. capabilities are not compromised before they
are felded. In addition, virtually all modern weapon
systems depend upon data derived from scientifc
and technical intelligence.1
Tis vision encapsulates the current state of activities
already underway in the IC, while simultaneously describ-
ing an aspirational state. In this vision, no bureaucracies
or red tape are acknowledged as standing in the way of
intelligence ofcers adapting to the global environment. In
this vision, one might assume that the IC is a unifed entity
with no organizational structures, acquisition regulations,
or security clearance backlogs that impede U.S. intelligence
ofcers from hunting information anywhere it resides and
creating actionable intelligence. Tis vision describes an
IC that anticipates geostrategic shifs, pivots quickly to
short-term crises, and utilizes all possible information and
scientifc advancements.
Te White House’s
National Security Strategy,
and
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
National Defense
Strategy
that followed months later,2 describe an increas-
ingly complex global security environment and the reemer-
gence of strategic competition among nations. Tese two
strategy documents implicate China and Russia as revi-
sionist states seeking to undermine an already weakening
post–World War II international order,3 while acknowledg-
ing that the United States must continue to defeat terrorism
and counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran.
Te
National Defense Strategy
argues that the United States
now faces adversaries with the ability to contest U.S. domi-
nance in all domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.
In addition to this more lethal battlespace, the UnitedChapter 1. IntroductionStates faces threats short of war, including information
operations, proxy warfare, intelligence operations, cyber
attacks, and subversion. Finally, technological advances,
such as artifcial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and
hypersonics, to name just a few, are changing the char-
acter of war and undermining U.S. military superiority.
While the strategy emphasizes that the United States aims
for deterrence, it also acknowledges that the United States
must be prepared to fght and win in a confict with a near-
peer competitor.4
Tis strategic environment—with emerging threats to
the international order, rogue regimes, terrorists, the rise of
near-peer competitors, and the proliferation of cyber weap-
ons and weapons of mass destruction—presents the IC
with a wide range of challenges. Indeed, an escalating crisis
or confict with a near-peer competitor will put enormous
strain on the IC; the U.S. military and intelligence appara-
tus will come to the fght with what they have on hand and
will almost certainly face rapid degradation. It is unclear
whether the IC is prepared to provide decisionmakers and
warfghters with the intelligence they need and expect for
decision advantage and to ensure that U.S. forces can fght
and win in this environment.
Our team convened a workshop in 2017 with fellow
RAND researchers who are experienced across the IC,
DoD, U.S. Department of State, and congressional com-
mittees to discuss the following questions: What are the
most important intelligence enterprise topics that are not
being addressed today Which emerging changes is the
IC ill-prepared to address Where are the IC’s blind spots
What issues are contrary to the IC’s status quo and require
a new way of thinking or doing business, particularly with
the rise of near-peer competitors5
Tis Perspective provides some answers to these ques-
tions by presenting discussion of fve separate topics related
to intelligence. Each chapter of this document provides
analysis and recommendations on a separate topic that may
be read, acted on, and implemented alone. But we believe
that the IC has an opportunity to leap forward in helping to
realize the
National Security Strategy
’s vision—by acting in
a coordinated manner on all fve of the topics together.
In Chapter Two, we describe how strategic warning
warrants new investments and focus, including new trade-
craf for the digital age and for complex global challenges,
such as hybrid warfare. Te warning mission is fraught
with problems, not the least of which is denial, deception,
and disinformation. Te rise of near-peer competitors and
the prospect of a major war inject a new sense of urgency
into the warning discipline; early and accurate warning
will be critical in preparing to surge for a major confict.
In Chapter Tree, we describe why a federated
approach to tasking, collection, processing, exploitation,
and dissemination (TCPED) architectures and processes
could overcome stubborn stovepipes and yield new
We believe that the IC
has an opportunity to
leap forward in helping
to realize the National
Security Strategy’s vision.advancements. TCPED is the backbone of the IC, and
unifying TCPED has the potential to reduce friction and
increase speed, a critical capability in the context of a near-
peer confict, in