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本文通过实证分析得到以下成果和结论：（1）政治晋升与在职消费这两种激励之
间存在非对称的替代效应，政治晋升可能性越高的高管越有可能收敛其在职消费行为
（2）政治晋升激励不仅对当期在职消费存在抑制作用，还存在“预期效应”，即会在晋
升前一年这一重要考核年收敛异常在职消费行为。（3）管理层权力相对较弱的高管，
其政治晋升激励对于在职消费的抑制作用更加明显。（4）相较于中央国有企业，地方
国有企业的高管面临晋升激励时，对在职消费尤其是异常在职消费的收敛行为更加显
著。（5）垄断行业国企中政治晋升激励对于在职消费的抑制效果非常显著，但竞争行
业的抑制效果相对不显著。相较经济发达的东部地区，西部地区高管隐性激励的替代
效应更加显著。本研究不仅丰富和完善了高管隐性激励的文献研究，还为新一轮国企
改革中激励手段的选择与作用效果提供了新的思路和参考，兼具理论和实践意义
关键词：隐性激励；政治晋升；在职消费；管理层权力；制度环境
作者：姜心怡
指导老师：刘海燕英文摘要 国企高管政治晋升对在职消费的影响：理论分析和实证研究
II
The Influence of Political Promotion of SOE Executives
on Perquisite Consumption:
Theoretical and Empirical Research
Abstract
With the advancement of state-owned enterprises(SOE) reform process, formulating
efficient and effective incentive plans for executives has played a key role in the whole
process. Based on current researches, the study of implicit incentives mainly focused on
the substitution mechanism between implicit and explicit incentive, or the effects of
implicit incentives on company value. However, the study of internal relationship between
different implicit incentives is rare. This paper made an in-depth analysis of CEO’s implicit
incentive mechanism after reviewing literatures and taking the background of the specific
appointment system of SOE’s CEOs in China into consideration. Based on the panel data
of state-owned listed companies from 2011 to 2015, the author analyzes the inherent
substitution mechanism between one implicit incentive (political promotion) and another
implicit incentive (perquisite consumption). Also, a comprehensive discussion of the
impact of political promotion on the perquisite consumption is conducted under diverse
scenarios including management power, government control level and institutional
environment.
In this paper, the following results and conclusions are obtained through empirical
analysis: (1) there is an asymmetric alternative between political promotion and perquisite
consumption. The higher the probability of political promotion is, the more likely it is that
the CEOs may limit their perquisite consumer behavior. (2) the political promotion
incentive reduces perquisite consumption not only in current year, but also in the year
before the promotion when CEOs’ behaviors are highly assessed. In other words, an
“expected effect” exists that CEOs tend to cut down their abnormal perquisite consumption
dramatically when they are expected to get promoted in the future. (3) CEOs with
relatively weak management power are more likely to limit their perquisite consumption
when faced with political promotion incentives. (4) compared with the central state-owned
enterprises, local state-owned enterprises’ CEOs tend to limit their perquisite consumption,国企高管政治晋升对在职消费的影响：理论分析和实证研究 英文摘要
III
especially abnormal consumption more significantly when facing the promotion incentives.
(5) the effect of promotion incentive on perquisite consumption is more prominent in
monopoly industry while the effect is not significant in the competitive industry. Also, this
relationship works better for SOEs in west region than in east region.
The study of relationship between political promotion and perquisite consumption not
only enriches current literature about implicit incentive, but also provides a new way of
thinking when selecting and implementing incentives in the new round of state-owned
enterprise reform. Therefore, it has both theoretical and practical significance.
Key words: implicit incentives; political promotion; perquisite consumption;
management power; institutional environment
Written by：Jiang Xinyi
Supervised by：Liu Haiyan目录
1.导论 1
1.1 研究背景及意义..........1
1.1.1 研究背景 ...1
1.1.2 研究意义 ...5
1.2 研究框架和方法..........6
1.2.1 研究框架 ...6
1.2.2 研究方法 ...7
1.3 创新点..8
1.4 概念界定..........9
1.4.1 在职消费 ...9
1.4.2 政治晋升 ...9
2.理论基础与文献综述 · 10
2.1 理论基础........10
2.1.1 委托代理理论 .....10
2.1.2 最优契约理论 .....12
2.1.3 管理层权力理论 .12
2.1.4 寻租理论 .13
2.1.5 激励理论 .14
2.1.6 理论评述 .14
2.2 文献综述........15
2.2.1 激励相关的文献综述 .....15
2.2.2 在职消费相关的文献综述 .........18
2.2.3 政治晋升相关的文献综述 .........22
2.2.4 管理层权力相关的文献综述 ....
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