并购业绩承诺对股价崩盘风险的影响研究
摘要
近年来，我国金融市场企业并购热情不断高涨，并购业绩承诺协议作为推动并购
完成的关键契约安排之一，逐渐被交易各方所采纳。业绩承诺协议设计的本意是希望
增加并购交易的公平性，从而减少了估值风险，保护信息劣势一方的权益。由于市场
上更多的标的公司业绩承诺均出现未达标，并由此引发了国内金融市场股票价格大跌，
导致了股票价格崩盘，从而引申出了两个问题，业绩承诺对国内的 A股上市公司的股
票价格崩盘风险具体有利还是有弊，以及其具有怎样的传导路径。根据第一个问题，
当前理论研究中一般有两个观点，依次为根据效率观减少股价崩盘风险和根据代理观
增加股价崩盘风险，但关于第二个问题的研究成果目前较少。所以，本文力图在现有
文献基础上，对第一个问题展开更具体的分析，并对第二个问题展开更深入的分析。
本文以 2012年至 2020年中国 A股上市公司在并购交易前签订业绩承诺协议的并
购事件为主要研究样本，控制了被并购方特征，以业绩承诺目标作为业绩承诺的代理
变量，并探讨了业绩承诺目标对并购交易发生后一年的股价崩盘风险会带来什么变化。
此外把并购商誉作为中介变量，以探究其在二者之间如何起到传导功能。在调节效应
分析阶段，本文以产权性质、支付方式、交易规模、制度环境进行分组回归，研究了
不同产权性质、支付方式、交易规模和制度环境下的组间差异，验证了本文的研究假
设。
研究结果表明：（1）业绩承诺设立的越高，越会加剧股价崩盘风险。（2）业绩承
诺增加，会导致并购溢价即商誉的确认金额也随之上升。（3）当业绩承诺设立的过高
时，会通过增加并购商誉的方式来提升股价崩盘风险。（4）在并购方为非国有企业、
采用非纯股权补偿方法、交易规模更大以及处于制度环境更差的地区，业绩承诺与股
价崩盘风险之间关系更为显著。
关键词：业绩承诺；股价崩盘风险；并购商誉
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Abstract
Abstract
In recent years, the enthusiasm of M&A in China's financial market has been rising. As
one of the key contractual arrangements to promote the completion of M&A, M&A
performance commitment agreement is increasingly used by all parties to the transaction. The
performance commitment agreement is designed to increase the fairness of M&A transactions,
so as to reduce the valuation risk and protect the rights and interests of the party with inferior
information. As more target companies in the market failed to meet their performance
commitments, which led to a sharp decline in stock prices in the domestic financial market,
leading to the collapse of stock prices. This leads to two questions: whether performance
commitment is beneficial or harmful to the risk of stock price collapse of domestic A-share
listed companies, and what kind of transmission path it has. According to the first question,
there are generally two viewpoints in the current theoretical research: reducing the risk of
stock price collapse according to the concept of efficiency and increasing the risk of stock
price collapse according to the concept of agency; However, there are few research results on
the second problem. Therefore, based on the existing literature, this thesis tries to carry out a
more specific analysis of the first problem and a more in-depth analysis of the second problem.
Taking the M&A events in which Chinese A-share listed companies signed performance
commitment agreements before M&A transactions from 2012 to 2020 as the main research
sample, this thesis controls the characteristics of the acquiree, takes the performance
commitment target as the proxy variable of performance commitment, and discusses what
changes the performance commitment target will bring to the risk of stock price collapse one
year after the M&A transaction. In addition, M&A goodwill is used as an intermediary
variable to explore how it plays a transmission function between the two. In the regulatory
effect analysis stage, this thesis makes a group regression based on the nature of property
rights, payment methods, transaction scale and institutional environment, studies the
differences between groups under different nature of property rights, payment methods,
transaction scale and institutional environment, and verifies the research hypothesis of this
thesis.
The results show that: (1) the higher the performance commitment, the greater the risk of
stock price collapse. (2) The increase of performance commitment will lead to the increase of
M&A premium, that is, the recognized amount of goodwill. (3) When the performance
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并购业绩承诺对股价崩盘风险的影响研究
commitment is set too high, it will increase the risk of stock price collapse by increasing the
goodwill of M&A. (4) In areas where the acquirer is a non-state-owned enterprise, adopts non
pure equity compensation method, has a larger transaction scale and is in a worse institutional
environment, the relationship between performance commitment and stock price collapse risk
is more significant.
Key Words: performance commitment; risk of share price collapse; M&A goodwill
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