近年来并购重组已经成为公司业务扩展和产业转型升级的重要手段之一，在并购交易中 业绩承诺这一创新的并购契约正不断地被并购双方广泛采用。随着业绩承诺大规模运用，弊 端逐渐显现，一定程度上阻碍了并购重组交易顺利进行。因此，完善业绩承诺的必要性逐渐 凸显。 本文以创业板上市公司2014年-2016年发生非同一控制企业合并的904起并购事件为研 究样本，尝试对业绩承诺契约相关具体要素的经济后果进行研究，以期据此提出改进上市公 司并购重组中业绩承诺契约的条款设计，完善这一对赌协议，更好地发挥其在并购重组中的 激励作用和投资者保护功能。 本文手工搜集与并购相关的业绩承诺相关要素，包括业绩承诺的金额、承诺指标、承诺 期限、承诺方向、补偿方式以及从2014-2017年各年业绩承诺完成情况，分析在不同契约设 计情况下的业绩承诺完成率的差异，并使用倾向得分匹配法研究不同业绩承诺要素、同一要 素不同维度的使用所产生的经济后果。 研究结果表明：业绩承诺对并购绩效有积极正向作用，双向业绩承诺并购绩效显著高于 单向业绩承诺，股份补偿方式的并购绩效明显好于现金补偿方式，业绩承诺增长率在合理范 围内能显著提高并购绩效。本文的研究结论拓展了业绩承诺的研究视角，为监管部门完善业 绩承诺制度提供参考，对并购交易双方在签订对赌协议完善契约条款、改善公司治理机制有 一定的借鉴意义。 关键词: 业绩承诺 ，并购重组 ，并购绩效 ，经济后果 II Abstract In recent years, mergers and acquisitions have become one of the important means for the company's business expansion and industrial transformation and upgrading. In the M&A transaction, the performance commitment is an innovative M&A contract that is being widely adopted by both parties. With the large-scale application of performance commitments, the drawbacks gradually appeared, which hindered the smooth progress of mergers and acquisitions transactions to a certain extent. Therefore, the need to improve performance commitments has gradually become more prominent. This paper takes 904 mergers and acquisitions of non-identical control companies in the GEM listed companies from 2014 to 2016 as a research sample, and attempts to study the economic consequences of specific factors related to the performance commitment contract, in order to improve the merger and reorganization of listed companies. The terms of the performance commitment contract are designed to improve the gambling agreement and better play its incentive role and investor protection function in mergers and acquisitions. This paper manually collects relevant factors related to M&A, including the amount of performance commitment, commitment indicator, commitment period, commitment direction, compensation method and the completion of performance commitments from 2014-2017, and analyzes the situation under different contract design. The difference in performance commitment completion rate, and the propensity score matching method to study the economic consequences of different performance commitment factors and the use of different dimensions of the same element. The research results show that performance commitment has positive positive effects on M&A performance, and the two-way performance commitment M&A performance is significantly higher than the one-way performance commitment. The M&A performance of share compensation method is obviously better than the cash compensation method. The performance commitment growth rate can be within a reasonable range significantly improve M&A performance. The research conclusions of this paper expand the research perspective of performance commitment, provide reference for the regulatory authorities to improve the performance commitment system, and have certain reference significance for the parties to the M&A transaction to sign the contract terms and improve the corporate governance mechanism. Key words: performance commitment, mergers and acquisitions, M&A performance , economic consequences III 目录 第一章 绪论 .. 1 1.1 研究背景和意义 ............ 1 1.1.1 研究背景 ............. 1 1.1.2 研究意义 ............. 1 1.2 研究内容和研究方法 .... 2 1.2.1 研究内容 ............. 2 1.2.2 研究方法 ............. 3 1.3 研究框架 ........................ 4 1.4 本文所做的工作 ............ 4 第二章 文献综述 ......................... 6 对赌协议文献综述 ........ 6 业绩承诺文献综述 ........ 7 2.2.1 业绩承诺的内涵 . 7 2.2.2 业绩承诺的激励效应 ........................ 8 2.2.3 业绩承诺对评估价值的影响 ............ 8 2.2.4 业绩承诺对股东利益的影响 ............ 9 2.3 文献述评 ...................... 10 第三章 相关概念及理论基础 ... 12 3.1相关概念 ....................... 12 3.1.1 并购重组的概念 .............................. 12 3.1.2 业绩承诺的概念 .............................. 12 3.1.3 业绩承诺条款设定 .......................... 12 3.2 理论基础 ...................... 14 3.2.1 委托代理理论 ... 14 3.2.2 信息不对称理论 .............................. 14 3.2.3 信号传递理论 ... 15 3.2.4 激励理论 ........... 15 第四章 业绩承诺及完成情况统计分析 .................. 17 信息披露概况 .............. 17 4.2 业绩承诺方案要素统计分析 ..................... 19 4.2.1 有无业绩承诺 ... 19 4.2.2 业绩承诺方向 ... 19 4.2.3 业绩承诺期限 ... 20 4.2.4 业绩承诺评价指标 .......................... 21 4.2.5 业绩承诺考核指标 .......................... 23 4.2.6 业绩承诺增长率指标 ...................... 23 4.2.7 业绩承诺补偿方式 .......................... 25 4.3 业绩承诺完成情况 ...... 27 4.3.1 业绩承诺完成率情况 ...................... 27 4.3.2 业绩承诺要素完成率情况 .............. 32 4.3.3 业绩承诺补偿情况 .......................... 35 4.3.4 业绩承诺未完成原因 ...................... 36 4.4 本章小结 ...................... 36 第五章 实证设计 ....................... 38 IV 5.1 研究假设 ...................... 38 5.2 研究方法 ...................... 39 5.2.1 方法简述 ........... 39 5.2.2 倾向得分匹配模型 .......................... 40 5.2.3 匹配规则 ........... 40 5.3 样本与数据来源 .......... 41 5.4 变量选取 ...................... 41 5.4.1 结果变量 ........... 41 5.4.2 处理变量 ........... 42 5.4.3 混杂变量 ........... 42 第六章 实证分析 ....................... 44 6.1描述性统计 ................... 44 6.2倾向得分匹配法实证 ... 45 6.2.1业绩承诺对并购绩效的影响 ........... 45 6.2.2业绩承诺方向对并购绩效的影响.... 48 6.2.3业绩承诺补偿方式对并购绩效的影响 ........................... 50 6.2.4业绩承诺增长率对并购绩效的影响 52 6.3 本章小结 ...................... 55 第七章 总结与展望 ................... 57 7.1 结论 .............................. 57 7.2 建议 .............................. 57 7.2.1 合理设计业绩承诺方案 .................. 57 7.2.2 提高业绩承诺信息披露要求 .......... 59 7.2.3 拓展业绩承诺制度 .......................... 60 7.2.4 加大业绩承诺监管力度 .................. 60 7.2.5 完善业绩承诺政策 .......................... 60 7.3 不足与展望 .................. 61