股权激励是处理股东与管理者之间信息不对称和代理问题最普遍的一种方 式，它通过管理层持股安排，使其以股东的身份参与公司事务，从而更好地为公 司长期发展做贡献。然而，已有研究表明，旨在为解决委托代理问题而设计的股 权激励制度，往往会诱使管理层实施盈余管理等道德风险行为。现有学者大多探 讨的是股权激励与应计盈余管理的关系，却忽略了对真实盈余管理的探讨，并且 较少关注股权激励作用盈余管理的机制及其影响效果。而随着会计准则的日趋 完善，利用应计盈余管理进行利润操控的空间逐渐被压缩，管理层很可能进行真 实盈余管理，盈余管理的存在不仅损害了投资者的利益，也不利于公司的长远发 展，因此，研究股权激励如何影响盈余管理具有重要意义。基于此，本文同时考 虑应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理，全面考察股权激励与盈余管理之间的关系及 其作用机制，并从多视角探讨股权激励对盈余管理影响效果的异质性。 本文首先对国内外盈余管理和股权激励的相关文献进行了梳理与归纳。其 次，基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、契约理论和人力资本理论，探讨了股 权激励对盈余管理的影响机理。同时，本文结合了不同的现实情境，分析了股权 激励对盈余管理影响效果的差异性，并提出研究假设。最后，本文以我国2009- 2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本，运用多元回归方法进行了实证检验。实证结 果表明，股权激励容易诱发应计和真实盈余管理。在不同情境中探讨发现：在产 品市场竞争更激烈的公司，股权激励更容易诱发应计和真实盈余管理；在外部审 计质量较低的公司，股权激励更容易诱发应计和真实盈余管理；在市场化进程较 低地区的公司，股权激励更容易诱发应计和真实盈余管理；相比国有企业，非国 有企业股权激励更容易诱发应计和真实盈余管理；进一步研究，本文揭示了薪酬 业绩敏感性、风险承担这两条潜在渠道发挥的中介作用。 本文的贡献之处在于：第一，同时以应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理为研究对 象，较为全面地探讨了股权激励与盈余管理之间的关系；第二，基于产品市场压 力、外部审计监督、市场化进程以及公司产权性质的治理特征，从多视角考察了 股权激励对盈余管理的异质性影响；第三，考察了股权激励影响盈余管理的作用 机制，揭示了薪酬业绩敏感性和风险承担的中介传导效应。本文从理论上补充了 现有学者关于股权激励的相关研究，也为上市公司如何规范盈余管理行为并提 升股权激励的实施效果、为投资者如何更好地甄别和使用上市公司的盈余信息 以及为监管部门的信息披露监管政策提供证据支持。 关键词：股权激励，应计盈余管理，真实盈余管理，业绩考核压力，公司治理 II Abstract The equity incentive is the most common way to deal with information asymmetry and agency issues between shareholders and managers. By managers shareholding arrangements, it enables managers to participate in company’s various affairs as shareholders, so they can better contribute to the company's long-term development. However, existing research shows that equity incentive systems designed to solve the agency problem often induce managers to implement moral hazard behaviors such as earnings management. Most existing scholars discuss the relationship between equity incentives and accrual earnings management, but ignore another earnings management method, that is, real earnings management, and there are few studies on the effect and mechanism of equity incentives affecting earnings management. With the continuous improvement of accounting standards, the space for managers to implement accrual earnings management has gradually been reduced, and it is likely that real earnings management will be carried out. In addition, the existence of earnings management not only damages the interests of investors, but also is not conducive to the long-term development of the company. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the impact of equity incentives on earnings management. On this basis, this thesis considers accrual earnings management and real earnings management, and comprehensively examines the effect of equity incentives on earnings management and their mechanism of action. It also discusses the heterogeneous impact of equity incentives on earnings management from multiple perspectives. Firstly, this thesis combs and summarizes the domestic and foreign related literature on earnings management and equity incentives. Secondly, on the basis of principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, contract theory and human capital theory, the mechanism of the impact of equity incentives on earnings management is discussed. At the same time, combining different realistic situations, this thesis analyzes the difference in the effect of equity incentives on earnings management, and proposes research hypotheses. Finally, this thesis takes the data of A- share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009-2018 as samples, and uses the multiple regression method to conduct empirical tests. The empirical results show III that equity incentives can easily induce accrual and real earnings management. In the discussion of different situations, it is found that: in companies with greater product market competition, equity incentives are more likely to induce accrual and real earnings management; in companies with lower external audit quality, equity incentives are more likely to induce accrual and real earnings management; For companies in regions with lower marketization, equity incentives are more likely to induce accrual and real earnings management. Compared with state-owned enterprises, non-state-owned enterprises' equity incentives are more likely to induce accrual and real earnings management. Further research reveals the mediating role of these two potential channels of pay-performance sensitivity and risk-taking. The contributions of this thesis are: firstly, it takes accrual earnings management and real earnings management as research objects simultaneously, and explores the effect of equity incentives on earnings management comprehensively. Secondly, based on the product market pressure, external audit supervision, marketization process and the property rights of the company, this thesis examines the heterogeneous impact of equity incentives on earnings management from multiple perspectives; Thirdly, it examines the mechanism of equity incentives affecting earnings management and reveals the mediating effects of pay-performance sensitivity and risk-taking.This thesis supplements existing scholars' research on equity incentives theoretically and shows how listed companies can standardize earnings management behavior and improve the effectiveness of equity incentives. It also provides evidence to support investors in how to better identify and use earnings information of listed companies, as well as the information disclosure supervision policies of the regulators. Keywords: Equity Incentives, Accrual Earnings Management, Real Earnings Management, Performance Appraisal Pressure, Corporate Governance IV 目 录 摘要 . I Abstract .......................... II 第1章 导论 .................... 1 1.1 研究目的与意义 1 1.1.1 研究目的 .. 1 1.1.2 研究意义 .. 2 1.2 国内外研究综述 3 1.2.1 盈余管理的相关研究 ............. 3 1.2.2 股权激励的相关研究 ............. 8 1.2.3 股权激励与盈余管理的相关研究 ...................... 11 1.2.4 文献述评 12 1.3 研究内容与方法 ............................. 13 1.3.1 研究内容 13 1.3.2 研究方法 14 1.4 创新点 .............. 15 第2章 理论基础与机理分析 ..................... 17 2.1 相关概念界定 .. 17 2.1.1 股权激励 17 2.1.2 盈余管理 17 2.2 理论基础 .......... 18 2.2.1 委托代理理论 ....................... 18 2.2.2 信息不对称理论 ................... 19 2.2.3 契约理论 20 2.2.4 人力资本理论 ....................... 21 2.3 股权激励对盈余管理的影响机理分析 ........................ 21 2.3.1 基于薪酬业绩敏感性的机理分析 ...................... 21 2.3.2 基于风险承担的机理分析 ... 23 第3章 研究设计 .......... 25 3.1 研究假设 .......... 25 3.1.1 股权激励对盈余管理的影响假设 ...................... 25 3.1.2 股权激励对盈余管理影响效果的情境假设 ...... 26 V 3.2 样本选择与数据来源 ..................... 33 3.2.1 样本选择 33 3.2.2 数据来源 33 3.3 变量定义 .......... 34 3.3.1 被解释变量 ........................... 34 3.3.2 解释变量 35 3.3.3 控制变量 36 3.4 模型构建 .......... 37 第4章 实证检验 .......... 38 4.1 描述性统计和相关性分析 ............. 38 4.1.1 描述性统计 ........................... 38 4.1.2 相关性分析 .....................