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上市公司财务舞弊的影响因素研究-基于多元回归与QCA方法的双重分析_硕士论文

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财务舞弊作为具有 300 多年历史的问题不仅没有被解决,反而愈演愈烈,使 得财务舞弊的治理面临着严峻挑战。研究财务舞弊的影响因素有助于从源头防 治财务舞弊行为的发生,常见的回归分析法作为定量分析的经典方法,可以解释 事件发生的概率或各因素影响舞弊发生的可能性。而定性分析法则可以检验各 因素对舞弊行为所发挥的必要性作用。将二者相结合,基于定量分析找出对财务 舞弊有显著影响的因素,然后进一步应用 QCA 法检验这些因素在财务舞弊中的 必然性,以期发现财务舞弊的充要条件,为财务舞弊的治理提供相关的理论支持。 首先,以欺诈三角理论为基础,对财务舞弊的影响因素进行梳理。依据欺诈 三角理论,财务舞弊行为的发生需要压力、机会和借口。一般地,企业的主要压 力来源是财务压力,因此财务危机可能是导致财务舞弊的压力因素;根据 COSO 的报告,超过 70%的 CEO 参与了舞弊过程,CEO 权力膨胀导致权责失衡是财务 舞弊发生的主要原因之一,因此 CEO 掌握超过合理限度的权力可能是财务舞弊 发生的机会因素;当前资本市场上的舞弊处罚力度低,低廉的舞弊成本导致舞弊 利润空间大,可能是财务舞弊发生的借口因素。接着利用回归分析的方法,探究 以上因素对财务舞弊的影响。选取 2000-2017 年因财务舞弊行为被监管机构处罚 的公司作为样本,并按一定标准选取配对的非舞弊样本。回归分析的结果表明: 财务压力、CEO 权力强度和舞弊处罚力度与财务舞弊之间是显著相关的。另外, 高管持股比例、内部控制指数和资产收益率等因素也和财务舞弊存在相关关系。 然后基于回归分析的结论,利用 QCA 继续分析与财务舞弊存在相关关系的 影响因素。考虑到非舞弊样本不存在相关的舞弊处罚力度数据,因此将该变量替 换成外部审计质量。根据软件计算的结果得出舞弊行为和非舞弊行为的必要性 条件,并通过分析发现财务压力是舞弊行为的关键影响因素,且高质量的内部控 制体系可以有效遏制财务舞弊行为的发生。 最后,根据多元回归和 QCA 双重分析的研究结果,就上市公司和监管当局 两个层面提出建议:提升内部控制质量、优化 CEO 权力配置;加大处罚力度、 强化有效执法的措施、加强涉案高管的责任追究力度,以及提升监管机构查处财 务舞弊行为的积极性。II 关键词:财务舞弊 CEO 权力 影响因素 QCAIII Abstract As a problem with more than 300 years of history, financial fraud has not only been solved, but has become increasingly fierce, making the governance of financial fraud face serious challenges. Studying the influencing factors of financial fraud helps to prevent the occurrence of financial fraud from the source. The common regression analysis method is a classic method of quantitative analysis, which can explain the probability of occurrence of events or the possibility of various factors affecting fraud. While, the qualitative analysis rule can test the necessary role of various factors in the fraud. Combine the two methods, find out the factors that have significant influence on financial fraud based on quantitative analysis, and then further apply the QCA method to test the inevitability of these factors in financial fraud, in order to find the necessary and sufficient conditions of financial fraud. Thereby providing relevant theoretical support for the governance of financial fraud. Firstly, combing the influencing factors of financial fraud based on fraud triangle theory. According to the fraud triangle theory, the occurrence of financial fraud requires pressure, opportunity and excuses. Generally speaking, the main source of pressure for enterprises is financial pressure, so financial crisis may be the pressure factor for financial fraud; according to COSO's report, more than 70% of CEOs are involved in the fraud process. The expansion of CEO power leads to imbalance of power and responsibility, which is one of the main reasons for financial fraud. Therefore, the CEO's power to exceed reasonable limits may be an opportunity factor for financial fraud; the current fraudulent penalties in the capital market are low, and the low cost of fraud leads to large profit margins for fraud, which may be an excuse for financial fraud. Then use the method of regression analysis to explore the impact of the above three factors on financial fraud. The companies that were punished by the regulatory agencies for financial fraud in 2000-2017 were selected as samples, and the matching non-fraud samples were selected according to certain criteria. The results of the regression analysis show that there is a significant correlation between financial pressure, CEO power intensity, fraud penalty and financial fraud. In addition, factors such as the seniorIV management shareholding ratio, the internal control index and the return on assets are also related to financial fraud. Then based on the conclusions of the regression analysis, QCA is used to continue to analyze the influencing factors related to the relationship between financial fraud and financial fraud. Considering that the non-fraud sample does not have relevant fraud penalty data, the variable is replaced with the external audit quality. According to the results of software calculation, the necessary conditions for fraud and non-fraud behavior are obtained. Through analysis, it is found that financial pressure is the key influencing factor of financial fraud, and high-quality internal control system can effectively curb the occurrence of financial fraud. Finally, based on the results of multiple regression and QCA dual analysis, recommendations are made on the two levels of listed companies and regulatory authorities: improving the quality of internal control, rationally configuring the CEO's power; increasing penalties, strengthening effective law enforcement measures, and strengthening the accountability of senior executives involved in the case, improving the enthusiasm of regulators to investigate financial fraud. Key Words: Financial Fraud CEO Power Influencing factors QCAV 目 录 第 1 章 引言...............................................................................................................1 1.1 研究背景与意义...............................................................................................1 1.1.1 研究背景 ....................................................................................................1 1.1.2 研究意义 ....................................................................................................2 1.2 文献综述...........................................................................................................3 1.2.1 关于财务舞弊影响因素的文献综述 ........................................................3 1.2.2 关于 CEO 权力强度的文献综述 ..............................................................6 1.2.3 财务压力与财务舞弊关系的文献综述 ....................................................7 1.2.4 违规处罚对 CEO 行为影响的文献综述 ..................................................8 1.2.5 文献述评 ....................................................................................................9 1.3 研究内容与方法.............................................................................................10 1.3.1 研究内容 ..................................................................................................10 1.3.2 研究方法 ..................................................................................................11 1.4 主要创新点.....................................................................................................12 第 2 章 关键概念及理论基础.................................................................................14 2.1 关键概念界定.................................................................................................14 2.1.1 财务舞弊 ..................................................................................................14 2.1.2 盈余管理 ..................................................................................................15 2.2 理论基础.........................................................................................................17 2.2.1 欺诈三角理论 ..........................................................................................17 2.2.2 权力循环理论与 CEO 权力 ....................................................................19 第 3 章 上市公司财务舞弊及其处罚现状.............................................................21 3.1 财务舞弊现状.................................................................................................21 3.1.1 财务舞弊公司分布 ..................................................................................21 3.1.2 财务舞弊类型分布 ..................................................................................22 3.2 财务舞弊处罚现状.........................................................................................23VI 3.2.1 财务舞弊处罚主体分析 ..........................................................................24 3.2.2 处罚对象和处罚频率分析 ......................................................................26 3.3 财务舞弊处罚的时效性分析.........................................................................26 3.3.1 处罚及时性分析 ......................................................................................26 3.3.2 处罚震慑力—再处罚分析 ......................................................................29 3.4 本章小结.........................................................................................................30 第 4 章 基于回归分析法的财务舞弊影响因素研究.............................................32 4.1 研究假设.........................................................................................................32 4.2 研究设计.........................................................................................................34 4.2.1 样本选取与数据来源 ..............................................................................34 4.2.2 变量选择与模型建立 ..............................................................................35 4.3 实证结果分析.................................................................................................39 4.3.1 描述性统计 ..............................................................................................39 4.3.2 多元回归设计 ..........................................................................................40 4.3.3 稳健性检验 ..............................................................................................45 4.4 本章小结.........................................................................................................47 第 5 章 基于 QCA 的财务舞弊影响因素研究.........................................................48 5.1 研究设计.........................................................................................................48 5.1.1 样本选取 ..................................................................................................48 5.1.2 变量选取 ..................................................................................................48 5.2 数据分析过程.................................................................................................49 5.3 结果分析.........................................................................................................51 5.3.1 单一条件变量的必要性分析 ..................................................................51 5.3.2 以舞弊为结果变量的分析 ......................................................................52 5.3.3 以非舞弊为结果变量的分析 ..................................................................53 5.4 本章小结.........................................................................................................54 第 6 章 结论与对策建议.........................................................................................56 6.1 研究结论.........................................................................................................56 6.2 对策建议.........................................................................................................57 6.2.1 上市公司层面 ..........................................................................................57VII 6.2.2 监管当局层面 ..........................................................................................57 6.3 研究不足之处.................................................................................................58