分类号密级
硕士学位论文
题目：食品监管中的“养鱼执法”问题研究
英文并列题目：The Research on “Fish Farming Law Enforcement”
in Food Safety Regulatory
研究生：宾波
专业：市场经济法
研究方向：国际经济法律制度研究
导师：杨文丽
指导小组成员：谢玉梅、雷育德、潘云华
学位授予日期：2016年6月
答辩委员会主席：谢玉梅
江南大学
地址：无锡市蠡湖大道1800号
二○一六年六月
摘要食品安全不仅仅关系到老百姓身体健康，还影响到社会稳定、和谐。食品安
全事件的频繁发生，表明行政机关在食品安全监管环节出现了漏洞，甚至出现了
“养鱼执法”这一以罚款替代其他的行政处罚措施的行政执法方式。在这种模式
下，执法者对企业违法情节不予考虑，对企业违法行为只处以罚款，且罚款数额
是在法定的罚款额度内取较小值，这种罚而不处的执法模式使得企业违法所得大
于违法生产成本，间接放纵违法行为的发生。
对“养鱼执法”这一现象进行研究，对完善食品安全监管机制，保障食品安
全具有重大作用，本文采用了文献研究、实证分析等研究方法对“养鱼执法”进
行研究。以理性经济人、自由裁量权作为研究的理论基础，运用了博弈论的相关
知识构建博弈模型进行实证分析，找出影响“养鱼执法”的相关因素，以寻求规
制的途径。
通过查阅相关文献以及博弈分析，发现低成本与高收益是“养鱼执法”存在
的主要原因。“罚款返还”制度以及以罚款为主要指标的考核机制增加了“养鱼
执法”的收益；执法者自由裁量权过大以及追责机制的不完善降低了执法者违法
的成本。“养鱼执法”的存在使得食品安全监管形同虚设，食品安全状况进一步
的恶化。
基于博弈模型的结果分析，为杜绝“养鱼执法”需要从规制执法部门以及企
业行为两方面着手。主要从以下四个方面对执法者行为进行规制：第一，加强和
完善对行政机关自由裁量权的约束，杜绝执法者对自由裁量权的滥用。第二，完
善行政追责机制，加强对执法者违法行为的追责力度。第三，理顺财税机制，落
实“收缴两条线”的财税制度。第四，完善考核机制，废除以罚款数额为指标的
考核机制，建立与我国国情相适应的行政考核机制。对企业行为进行规制主要是
通过提高企业成本着手，首先，加大对企业违法行为的惩戒力度，提高企业的违
法成本。其次，倡导全民监督的社会风气，增大企业违法行为被发现的概率。
关键词：食品安全；养鱼执法；博弈模型
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Abstract
Abstract
Food safety is not just affect the people's health,also affect the social stability
and harmony.Food safety affair constantly happened，Supervision department should
take unshirkable responsibility for frequent occurrences of food affair.More than that,
"fish law enforcement"exist in food safety regulatory.Fines has replaced other forms
of administrative penalty.Under the circumstances,some related factors without
taking into account,fines has been the only measure to publish the illegal behavior.
And the forfeit amount is minimum in the statutory fine lines,which made the illegal
income bigger than the illegal cost,result in illegal behavior happened.
To improve the supervision of food safety and ensure the food safety we need to
porhibit the "fish farming law enforcement".In the process of studying "fish farming
law enforcement"literature research and empirical analysis be used in the paper.
Rational economic man theory and discretion theory as the theoretical basis of the
research.In order to find out the related factors of "fish farming law enforcement"a
game model has been build.
The "fish farming law enforcement"occure frequently in food safety supervisor.
The main reason of "fish farming law enforcement"is high earnings and low cost.The
return of administrative penalty and assessment mechanisms increase the earning;
Overlarge discretion and imperfect accountability mechanisms lower the cost.The
exist of "fish farming law enforcement"made the food safety supervision and
management exist in name.The situation of food safety becoming more and more
bad.
According to the result of game model analysis,to eradicate the phenomenon of
"fish farming law enforcement"we need to regulation the behavior of producing e
nterprise and law-executor.We need regulator the behavor of law-executor from the
following aspects.First,we need strengthen and perfect the constraints of ad
ministrative discretion,to avoid abuse the discretion;Second,perfect the
administrative accountability mechanism,strengthen the law enforcement
accountability for illegal activities;Third,Straighten out the fiscal and taxation
mechanism,implement the fiscal and taxation system.Last,improve the assessment
mechanism,set up the assessment mechanism adapted to the situation of our country.
Besides,we need regulator the behavor of entreprise from the following aspects.First,
increasing punishment of illegal behavior of the enterprise,improve the illegal cost.
II
Abstract
Second,encourage all the people participate in supervise food safety,improve the
probability of illegal behavior be found.
Key words:Food safety;Fish farming law enforcement;Game theory
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