分类号F275密级___公开______
收藏编号___________学号__190727053__
学校代码10386编号_____________
(专题研究)
问询函监管对公司财务风险的治理效应研
究——以我国制造业上市公司为例
研究方向：财务管理
研究生姓名：孔令颉
指导教师、职称：方巧玲讲师
协助导师、职称：
所在学院：经济与管理学院
答辩委员会主席：辛林教授
二〇二二年六月
问询函监管对公司财务风险的治理效应研究——以我
国制造业上市公司为例
摘要
在证监会改革监管方式的背景下，交易所问询函已成为一线监管的关键要
素。新形势下，我国提出简政放权、放管结合和优化服务的改革要求，完善问询
函监管机制对激发市场内在活力具有深远意义。在新常态经济形势下，我国制造
业上市公司为谋求高质量、智能化发展，对公司的筹资、投资以及营运能力都提
出了新要求，因此需要及时对公司财务风险进行治理。
过去我国对资本市场监管的研究以政府监管为主，而对行业自律性监管关注
较少。目前，研究者在关于问询函监管作用因素的探讨中，认为问询函监管能够
提升上市公司的信息披露质量、抑制公司避税活动以及提高证券分析师预测准确
性。然而，考察问询函与公司财务风险领域的研究相对鲜见。因此，本文围绕问
询函监管对公司财务风险的治理效应进行探究，以期丰富问询函监管以及公司财
务风险的研究。
基于管制理论和自律监管理论，本文通过实证研究法与案例研究法相结合，
研究了问询函监管、公司财务风险以及治理效应相关问题。在实证研究方面，本
文搜集并整理了我国A 股制造业上市公司的问询函和财务数据进行定量分析，
研究发现，收到问询函后，制造业上市公司的财务风险减少约30.6%。另外，本
文采用倾向得分匹配后的样本重新进行回归，研究结果通过了稳健性检验。在案
例研究方面，选取我国A 股制造业的两家上市公司作为案例研究对象，并根据
2015年到2019年间收到的问询函发函与回函分析其财务风险在收到问询函前后
的变化，发现在收函后公司的筹资、投资和营运风险都有所减小，公司财务风险
总体水平下降。综上，本文通过实证与案例相结合的研究方法均证实，交易所的
问询函监管会对我国制造业上市公司的财务风险产生治理效应。
本文关于问询函监管对公司财务风险的治理效应的研究，为我国的问询函监
管提升治理有效性提供了证据，同时有助于构建“问询函监管——公司治理效应
——财务风险降低”的传导机制，为我国问询函监管研究提供补充。本文提出了
继续完善非惩罚性监管、加强交易所和监管部门联动以及提高媒体关注度的政策
建议，并对未来的研究方向进行展望。
关键词：财务风险；自律监管；问询函
I
Study on the governance effect of comment
letter supervision on corporate financial
risks——Taking China's manufacturing listed
companies as an example
Abstract
In the context of the CSRC's reform of the regulatory approach,the exchange
comment letter has become a key element of front-line supervision.Under the new
situation,China put forward the reform requirements of streamlining administration
and optimizing services,and improving the supervision mechanism of comment
letters is of far-reaching significance to stimulate the inherent vitality of the market.
Under the new normal economic situation,China's manufacturing listed companies
seek high-quality and intelligent development,and put forward new requirements for
the company's financing,investment and operational capabilities,so it is necessary to
manage the company's financial risks in a timely manner.
In the past,China's research on capital market supervision was mainly
government supervision,while less attention was paid to industry self-regulatory
supervision.At present,in the discussion on the factors involved in the supervision of
comment letters,researchers believe that the supervision of comment letters can
improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,inhibit corporate
tax avoidance activities,and improve the accuracy of securities analysts'forecasts.
However,comment letters and research in the area of corporate financial risk are
relatively rare.Therefore,this paper explores the governance effect of inquiry letter
supervision on corporate financial risks,in order to enrich the research on comment
letter supervision and corporate financial risks.
Based on regulatory theory and self-regulatory theory,this paper combines
empirical research method with case study method to study the issues related to the
supervision of comment letters,corporate financial risks,and governance effects.In
terms of empirical research,this paper collects and sorts out the comment letters and
financial data of China's A-share manufacturing listed companies for quantitative
analysis,and the study finds that after receiving the inquiry letter,the financial risk of
manufacturing listed companies is reduced by about 30.6%.In addition,in this paper,
the samples with matched propensity scores were used to re-perform,and the results
II
passed the robust test.In terms of case studies,two listed companies in China's
A-share manufacturing industry were selected as cases,and according to the comment
letters received from 2015to 2019,the changes in their financial risks before and after
receiving the comment letters were analyzed,and it was found that after receiving the
letters,the company's financing,investment and operational risks were reduced,and
the overall level of the company's financial risks decreased.In summary,through the
combination of empirical evidence and case research methods,this paper confirms
that the supervision of the comment letter of the exchange will have a governance
effect on the financial risks of listed manufacturing companies in China.
This paper provides evidence for the effectiveness of inquiry letter supervision
on the market,and helps to build a transmission mechanism of "comment letter
supervision -corporate governance effect -financial risk reduction",which provides
supplementary research on the supervision of inquiry letters in China.This paper
proposes policy recommendations for continuing to improve non-punitive supervision,
strengthening the linkage between exchanges and regulatory authorities,and
increasing media attention,and looks forward to future research directions.
Keywords:Financial Risk;Self-regulation;Comment Letter
III
目录
第一章绪论...............................................................................................1
1.1研究背景及意义...............................................................................1
1.1.1研究背景.....................................................................................1
1.1.2研究意义.....................................................................................3
1.2研究内容与研究方法.......................................................................3
1.2.1研究内容.....................................................................................3
1.2.2研究方法.....................................................................................4
1.2.3技术路线.....................................................................................5
1.2.4创新之处.....................................................................................5
第二章文献综述与理论基础..................................................................7
2.1文献综述...........................................................................................7
2.1.1问询函.........................................................................................7
2.1.2财务风险.....................................................................................9
2.1.3公司治理效应...........................................................................11
2.2理论基础.........................................................................................12
2.2.1信息不对称理论.......................................................................12
2.2.2信号传递理论...........................................................................13
2.2.3管制理论...................................................................................14
2.2.4投资者保护理论.......................................................................14
2.2.5自律监管理论...........................................................................15
第三章问询函概述及国内外对比........................................................16
3.1问询函概述.....................................................................................16
3.1.1问询函定义...............................................................................16
3.1.2问询函类别...............................................................................16
3.2国内外问询函对比.........................................................................16
3.2.1问询函发函对比.......................................................................16
3.2.2问询函内容对比.......................................................................17
3.2.3问询函回函对比.......................................................................18
3.2.4问询函有效性对比...................................................................19
第四章问询函监管对公司财务风险治理效应的实证研究................20
4.1理论假设.........................................................................................20
4.2研究设计.........................................................................................20
4.2.1数据来源...................................................................................20
4.2.2基于倾向得分匹配法的样本筛选...........................................21