索取号：C934/10.311:190502068
硕士学位论文
全渠道旅游供应链
捆绑定价和服务努力水平决策研究
研究生：唐超楠
指导教师：陈志松（教授）
培养单位：商学院
一级学科：工商管理
二级学科：技术经济及管理
完成时间：2022年5月16日
答辩时间：2022年5月21日
摘要随着数字经济的发展和用户消费需求的不断提髙，全渠道旅游模式呈现蓬勃
发展之势。全渠道模式打通了旅游行业线上渠道和线下渠道之间的壁垒，充分利
用线上信息搜索与线下体验相结合的优势，实现渠道间的融合与互补。全渠道模
式下，旅游供应链各主体的价格机制和服务努力水平成为决策的关键因素。区别
于现有研究，本文考虑了在线旅行社拓展线下实体门店新渠道的经营现象，将供
应商、旅行社线上和旅行社门店三个渠道的服务努力水平纳入研究范围。基于捆
绑销售策略，聚焦双线同价、功能互补的旅游产品，运用博弈论和供应链优化协
调理论，分别构建了分布式、准分布式决策情形下的Nash 非合作博弈和
Stackelberg 博弈模型，以及协调决策情形下的博弈模型。最后，本文利用Matlab
R2018a 分别对分布式、准分布式和协调决策情形下的模型进行数值模拟和对比
分析，得出结论和管理启示。研究结果表明：（1）当以全渠道旅游供应链整体利
润最大化为目标进行决策时，旅游产品供应商和旅行社往往能够提供较高水平的
服务。（2）收益共享契约可以有效地协调全渠道旅游供应链的利润分配情况，双
方能够实现“双赢”。（3）捆绑销售价格与渠道间融合系数、服务努力系数和服
务努力水平成正比，与价格弹性系数成反比。（4）随着渠道间融合系数的增大，
供应商和旅行社提供的服务水平增加，全渠道旅游供应链的利润增加。（5）适当
提高服务努力水平可以为旅游产品供应商和旅行社带来更多利润，但是过度提高
服务水平反而会导致成本增加，利润减少。（6）无论是在分布式还是准分布式决
策情形下的Stackelberg 博弈模型中，在市场上占据主导地位的一方总是能够创
造比另一方更多的利润。（7）在旅游产品供应商和旅行社各自进行独立决策时，
采用Nash 非合作博弈是最理想的决策策略。
关键词：全渠道；旅游供应链；捆绑定价；互补品；服务努力水平
I
Abstract
Abstract
With the development of digital economy and the continuous improvement of
consumer demand,the omni-channel tourism model is developing vigorously.The
omni-channel mode breaks through the barriers between online and offline channels in
the tourism industry,and makes full use of the advantages of the combination of online
information search and offline experience to achieve the integration and
complementarity between channels.In omni-channel mode,the price mechanism and
service effort level of each subject of tourism supply chain are the key factors for
decision-making.Different from the existing researches,this paper considers the
operation phenomenon of online travel agencies expanding new channels of offline
physical stores,and includes the service effort level of suppliers,online travel agencies
and travel agencies'stores into the research scope.Based on the bundling sales strategy,
this paper focuses on two-line tourism products with the same price and complementary
functions,and uses game theory and supply chain optimization and coordination theory
to construct distributed,quasi-distributed and coordinated decisions respectively.
Finally,this paper uses Matlab R2018a to conduct numerical simulation and
comparative analysis of the models under distributed,quasi-distributed and coordinated
decision-making respectively,and draws conclusions and management implications.
The results show that:(1)When the overall profit maximization of the supply chain is
the goal of decision-making,tourism product suppliers and travel agencies are often
able to provide a high level of service.(2)Revenue sharing contract can effectively
coordinate the profit distribution of the omni-channel tourism supply chain,and both
sides can achieve a "win-win situation".(3)Bundling price is directly proportional to
channel convergence coefficient,service effort coefficient and service effort level,and
inversely proportional to price elasticity coefficient.(4)With the increase of the
integration coefficient between channels,the service level provided by suppliers and
travel agencies will increase,and the profit of the omni-channel tourism supply chain
will increase.(5)Appropriately improving the service level can bring more profits to
tourism product suppliers and travel agencies,but excessively improving the service
level will lead to cost increase and profit reduction.(6)In Stackelberg game models
with distributed or quasi-distributed decision making,the dominant party in the market
can always create more profits than the other party.(7)Nash non-cooperative game is
II
Abstract
the best decision-making strategy when tourism product suppliers and travel agencies
make independent decisions.
Key words:Omnichannel;Tourism supply chain;Bundling pricing;
Complementary products;Service effort level
III