基于信息可信性的平台供应链质量披露及定价策略研究
Quality Disclosure and Pricing Strategy
of platform supply chain based on information
credibility
熊歆妍
Xiong Xinyan
分类号密级
U D C 编号
硕士学位论文
学位论文题目：基于信息可信性的平台供应链质量披露及定价策略研究
Quality Disclosure and Pricing Strategy
of platform supply chain based on information credibility
姓名熊歆妍1
学号20212110731
学院商学院1
学位类别：学术硕士□专业硕士□同等学力
学科专业技术经济及管理1
指导教师晏妮娜（教授）1
第二导师1
提交论文日期：2023年5月9日
摘要
在电子商务时代，网络购物成为人们不可或缺的消费方式，线上产品质量信息的不
对称性成为线上交易的重大障碍。线上商家如何可信地披露质量信息，消费者如何甄
别线上产品质量信息，这些问题具有强烈的现实意义。同时，目前学术界很少有文献
探究信息可信性对平台供应链质量披露与定价策略的影响。据此，提出本文的研究问
题：（1）制造商质量披露和平台质量披露哪种才是制造商的最优质量披露方式？（2）
在两种质量披露方式下，是否存在空谈博弈均衡？如果存在，哪些因素影响空谈博弈
均衡的实现？（3）不同空谈博弈均衡类型和不同质量披露方式对平台供应链最优定价
产生怎样的影响？
为讨论上述研究问题，本文将线上商家向消费者披露产品质量信息的行为看作一场
廉价磋商，建立空谈博弈和斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型并求解均衡结果。首先，建立基于
制造商质量披露的定价策略模型，运用KKT 条件求解制造商和消费者的空谈博弈，对
最优价格、销量与制造商利润进行对比分析和比较静态分析。其次，建立基于平台质
量披露的定价策略模型，运用KKT 条件求解平台和消费者的空谈博弈，运用逆向归纳
法求解制造商和平台的斯坦克尔伯格博弈，并对均衡价格、供应链利润进行对比分析。
最后，对制造商质量披露和平台质量披露两种质量披露模式下的空谈博弈实现情况、
最优价格与制造商最优利润进行对比分析。
综合定价模型的求解与均衡结果的分析，最终得出本文结论：第一，制造商的最优
质量披露模式取决于披露方的信誉水平和产品的实际质量。当披露方披露低等质量时，
当平台与制造商的信誉水平之比较小（较大）时，制造商利润在制造商（平台）质量
披露模式下更优；当披露方披露高等质量时，当产品实际质量较高（较低）时，制造
商利润在制造商（平台）质量披露模式下更优。第二，无论质量披露模式是制造商质
量披露还是平台质量披露，披露方与消费者之间均能够实现空谈博弈均衡，并且均衡
结果随着消费者的质量偏好程度与退货成本、披露方声誉损失成本以及产品实际质量
的变化而变化。第三，从空谈博弈均衡类型来说，完全披露均衡下制造商最优定价不
高于局部披露均衡；从质量披露模式来说，制造商质量披露模式下的产品销售价格低
于平台质量披露模式。最后为线上制造商与电商平台提出可行的管理启示。
关键词：信息可信性平台供应链质量披露定价策略
Abstract
In the era of e-commerce,online shopping has become an indispensable way of
consumption,and the asymmetry of online product quality information has become a major
obstacle to online transaction.How to credibly disclose the quality information for online
merchants and how to discriminate the quality information of online products for consumers,
both questions have strong practical significance.At the same time,there are few literature
exploring the influence of information credibility on quality disclosure and pricing strategy of
platform supply chain.Based on these,the research questions of this paper are put forward:(1)
Which is the best quality disclosure method,manufacturers quality disclosure or platform
quality disclosure?(2)Is there an cheap-talk game equilibrium under the two quality
disclosure methods?If so,what factors affect the realization of equilibrium in cheap-talk
game?(3)What effects do different types of cheap-talk game equilibrium and different
quality disclosure methods have on the optimal pricing of platform supply chain?
In order to discuss the above research questions,this paper regards the behavior of online
merchants disclosing product quality information to consumers as a cheap talk,establishes the
model of cheap-talk game and Stackelberg game,and solves the equilibrium results.The third
chapter of this paper establishes a pricing strategy model based on manufacturer quality
disclosure method,uses KKT condition to solve the cheap-talk game between manufacturer
and consumer,and conducts sensitivity analysis and comparative analysis on the optimal price,
sales volume and manufacturer profit.In the fourth chapter,a pricing strategy model based on
platform quality disclosure method is established.KKT condition is used to solve the cheap-
talk game between platform and consumer,and the Stackelberg game between manufacturer
and platform is solved by backward induction,and the equilibrium price and supply chain
profit are compared and analyzed.The fifth chapter of this paper compares and analyzes the
realization of the cheap-talk game,the optimal price and the optimal profit of the
manufacturer under the two quality disclosure modes of manufacturer quality disclosure and
platform quality disclosure.
After the pricing model is solved and the equilibrium results are analyzed,the conclusion
of this paper is finally drawn:first,the manufacturer’s optimal quality disclosure mode
depends on the reputation level of the disclosing party and the actual quality of the product.
When the disclosing party discloses low quality,and when the reputation level ratio between
the platform and the manufacturer is small (large),the manufacturer’s profit is better under
the manufacturer (platform)quality disclosure mode.When the disclosing party discloses
high quality,and when the actual quality of the product is higher (lower),the manufacturer’s
profit is better under the manufacturer (platform)quality disclosure mode.Second,no matter
the quality disclosure mode is manufacturer quality disclosure or platform quality disclosure,
the disclosing party and consumers can achieve an cheap-talk game equilibrium,and the
equilibrium results will change with the quality preference degree of consumers,the cost of
return,the reputation loss cost of the disclosing party and the actual quality of products.
Thirdly,from the perspective of the game equilibrium type,the manufacturer’s optimal
pricing under the full disclosure equilibrium is not higher than the partial disclosure
equilibrium.from the perspective of quality disclosure mode,the selling price of products in
manufacturer quality disclosure mode is lower than that in platform quality disclosure mode.
Finally,this paper proposes feasible management inspirations for online manufacturers and e-
commerce platforms.
Key words:Information credibility;platform supply chain;quality disclosure;pricing
strategy