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上市公司投资信托产品的动因及经济后果研究_MBA毕业论文51页PDF

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文本描述
:10139
分类号学校代码:
0110253U密级:公
学号282开

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会计硕士(MPAc c )
学位论文
题目:上市公司投资信托产品的动因及经济后果研究
—以丰华股份为例
P c
学科门类:专业硕士(M A c )
研究方向:财务管理
研究生:邓清
指导教师:兰秀文
职称:教

二〇二〇年六月
独创性(或创新性)声明
本人声明所呈交的论文是本人在导师指导下进行的研究工作及取得的研究成
果。除了文中特别加以标注和致谢中所罗列的内容以外,论文中不包含其他人已经
发表或撰写过的研究成果。与我一同工作的同志对本研究所做的任何贡献均已在论
文中作了明确的说明并表示了谢意。申请学位论文与资料若有不实之处,本人承担
一切相关责任。
学位论文作者签名:日期:2020.06.02
关于论文使用授权的说明
学位论文作者了解内蒙古财经大学有关保留和使用学位论文的规定,即:研究
生在校攻读学位期间论文工作的知识产权单位属内蒙古财经大学。学校有权保留并
向国家有关部门或机构送交论文的复印件和磁盘,允许学位论文被查阅和借阅;学
校可以公布学位论文的全部或部分内容,可以允许采用影印、缩印或其它复制手段
保存、汇编学位论文。(保密的学位论文在解密后遵守此规定)
学位论文作者签名:指导教师签名:
日期:2020.06.02日期:2020.06.02
摘要
在我国的证券市场中,上市公司资金被大股东占用的现象时有发生,控股股东
凭借着在公司的绝对地位,频繁的将上市公司的资源占为己有。这一现象阻碍了我
国证券市场的健康发展。控股股东的资金占用行为,不光会对上市公司的正常生产
经营活动产生影响,损害中小股东的利益,甚至会使上市公司因触犯法规而面临退
市的局面。出于保护中小投资者的权益,维持证券市场的良好运行的角度,相关监
管部门推出了一系列监管法规,在一定程度上缓解了大股东占用资金的现象。然而,
由于我国目前的监管措施存在一定的局限,且当前的大部分公司股权结构存在一定
的缺陷,在对常见的资金占用行为监管加强的情况下,利用传统资金占用方式的风
险也随之增加。不少股东们开始另辟蹊径,利用相关法规的漏洞寻求新的占用途径,
这严重影响了我国证券市场的有序发展。因此,揭露控股股东占用上市公司资金的
新的手段,对控股股东资金占用行为发生的动机及经济后果进行研究,有利于对大
股东资金占用进行监管,保障中小投资者的利益,使我国证券市场稳定运行。
本文通过对丰华股份控股股东资金占用事件的分析,结合相关的理论,在当前
对于传统的资金占用方式监管加强的情况下,对如何识别大股东的行为是投资还是
资金占用进行研究。针对丰华股份大股东购买信托产品这一行为,通过分析发现大
股东购买信托产品表面上是用于理财,实际上是一种新的资金占用方式。
通过对案例的研究发现,大股东利用上市公司表面上购买信托产品,进行理财,
实则利用相关法规的漏洞,进行资金占用,信托产品沦为大股东侵占上市公司利益
的工具,影响到公司的正常运营,最终导致上市公司面临退市的风险。由此为管理
层、监管部门、利益相关者揭露一种新的资金占用方式,并针对加强控股股东资金
占用监督提出建议,对如何完善相关监管制度提出自己的见解,以促进证券市场制
定更完善的监督机制,加强对于信托产品的监管,防止此类事件再次发生,使信托
产品回归本源,起到促进资源良好配置的作用,使证券市场健康长远发展。
关键词:资金占用经济后果信托产品丰华股份
ABSTRACT
In the capital market of our country,the phenomenon that the capital of listed
company is occupied by the major shareholders often occurs.The controlling
shareholders frequently take the resources of listed company as their own by virtue of
their absolute position in the company.This phenomenon hinders the healthy
development of China's securities market.The behavior of large shareholders occupying
the funds of listed companies will not only hinder the normal production and operation
activities of listed companies,damage the interests of small and medium shareholders,
and even make listed companies face delisting due to violation of laws and regulations.
In order to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors and
maintain the good operation of the securities market,the relevant regulatory authorities
have launched a series of regulatory laws and regulations,which to some extent eased the
phenomenon of large shareholders occupying funds.However,due to the limitations of
the current regulatory measures in China,and the defects of the current equity structure
of most companies,under the condition of strengthening the supervision of the common
fund occupation behavior,the risk of using the traditional way of fund occupation also
increases,many shareholders began to find a new way to use the loopholes of relevant
laws and regulations to find a new way of occupation,which has a serious impact Sound
the orderly development of China's securities market.Therefore,to reveal the new means
of controlling shareholders'occupation of listed companies'funds,and to study the
motivation and economic consequences of the behavior of controlling shareholders'
occupation of funds is conducive to the supervision of the large shareholders'occupation
of funds,to protect the interests of small and medium investors,and to ensure the stable
operation of China's securities market.
Based on the analysis of the event of capital occupation by the controlling
shareholders of Fenghua company,combined with the relevant theories,this paper
studies how to identify whether the behavior of the major shareholders is investment or
capital occupation under the current situation of strengthening the supervision of the
traditional way of capital occupation.In view of the behavior that the majority
shareholders of Fenghua stock purchase trust products,through analysis,it is found that
the majority shareholders purchase trust products,ostensibly for financial management,
is actually a new way of capital occupation.
Through the case study,it is found that the majority shareholders use the listed
companies to purchase trust products on the surface,to conduct financial management,
but in fact,they use the loopholes of relevant laws and regulations to occupy funds.The
trust products become a tool for the majority shareholders to occupy the interests of the
listed companies,affecting the normal operation of the company,and ultimately leading
to the risk of delisting of the listed companies.Therefore,it will expose a new way of
fund occupation for the management,regulatory authorities and stakeholders,and put
forward suggestions for strengthening the supervision of controlling shareholders'fund
occupation,and put forward their own opinions on how to improve the relevant
supervision system,so as to promote the securities market to develop a more perfect
supervision system,strengthen the supervision of trust products,prevent such incidents
from happening again,and make the trust products return Return to the source,play a
role in promoting the good allocation of resources,so that the long-term development of
the securities market.
KEY WORDS:Fund occupation Economic consequences Trust products
Fenghua Co.,Ltd.