根据“理性人”假设，经济活动中的个体均以个人利益最大化为目标，这引 发了高管为了提高收入而操纵盈余的动机。同时，由于内外部监督机制的不完善， 加大了高管进行盈余管理行为的可能性。为了促使高管与股东的利益趋同，减少 盈余管理行为，企业制定了一系列薪酬契约制度。但近年来，越来越多的学者研 究发现，传统的薪酬契约制度并不能有效缓解委托代理问题，反而增加了高管操 纵盈余的可能性。为了检验薪酬激励制度对高管盈余管理行为的影响，本文将高 管薪酬水平详细区分为绝对薪酬水平和相对薪酬水平即薪酬差距，从应计盈余管 理和真实盈余管理两个角度出发，首先检验了绝对薪酬水平与应计及真实盈余管 理间的关系。其次，将相对薪酬水平划分为高管内部薪酬差距、高管与员工间薪 酬差距及高管外部薪酬差距三个维度，分别检验其对应计及真实盈余管理行为的 影响。最后，本文考察了薪酬水平与盈余管理的关系在不同产权性质企业中是否 存在差异，并从外部监督及审计质量角度分析了审计费用能否有效调节二者关系。 本文的研究结果表明，首先，高管的绝对薪酬水平和相对薪酬水平即薪酬差 距无法抑制应计及真实盈余管理，反而成为高管进行盈余管理行为的动机。其次， 通过产权性质分组检验发现，相比非国有企业，高管绝对薪酬水平、高管内外部 薪酬差距与盈余管理间的关系在国有企业中更为显著，而无论在国有企业还是非 国有企业中高管与员工间薪酬差距均只能引发真实盈余管理行为。最后，审计费 用对高管绝对薪酬水平和应计及真实盈余管理的关系均存在抑制作用，而对于相 对薪酬水平方面，仅能抑制其与真实盈余管理间的关系。 本文针对以往研究仅考察绝对薪酬水平而忽视相对薪酬水平的情况进行了 补充，丰富了薪酬差距与盈余管理关系的文献，其次，从产权性质和外部监督角 度对二者关系进行了更深一步的分析，最后，为不同性质上市公司制定合理的薪 酬水平和薪酬差距提供参考意见，以期减少盈余管理行为的发生。 关键词：薪酬水平，薪酬差距，盈余管理，产权性质，审计费用 兰州大学硕士学位论文 上市公司高管薪酬水平与盈余管理关系研究 II RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT OF LISTED COMPANIES——BASED ON EMPIRICAL DATA OF SHANGHAI AND SHENZHEN A-SHARES Abstract According to the "rational person" assumption, individuals in economic activities aim to maximize their personal interests, which has triggered the motivation of executives to manipulate earnings in order to increase income. At the same time, the imperfection of internal and external supervision mechanisms has increased the possibility of executives' earnings management behaviors. In order to promote the convergence of the interests of executives and shareholders and reduce earnings management behaviors, the company has formulated a series of salary contract systems. However, in recent years, more and more scholars have found that the traditional salary contract system cannot effectively alleviate the principal-agent problem, but instead increases the possibility of executives to manipulate earnings. In order to test the impact of the salary incentive system on executive earnings management behavior, this paper divides executive pay levels into absolute pay levels and relative pay levels, or pay gaps. From the perspective of accrual earnings management and real earnings management, it firstly examines the relationship between absolute pay levels and accrued and real earnings management. Secondly, the relative pay level is divided into three dimensions: the internal pay gap between senior executives, the pay gap between senior executives and employees, and the external pay gap between senior executives, and their respective impacts on accrued and real earnings management behaviors are examined. Finally, this paper examines whether the relationship between pay levels and earnings management differs among companies with different property rights. It also analyzes whether the audit fees can 兰州大学硕士学位论文 上市公司高管薪酬水平与盈余管理关系研究 III effectively adjust the relationship between the two from the perspective of the external supervision and audit quality. The results of this study show that, firstly, the absolute and relative pay levels of executives, or, the pay gap, cannot inhibit the accrued and real earnings management, but instead become the motivation for executives to conduct earnings management. Secondly, through the property group test, it was found that compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the relationship between the absolute pay level of senior executives, the pay gap between internal and external of senior executives and earnings management is more significant in state-owned enterprises. And in both state-owned and non-state-owned companies, the pay gap between executives and employees can only trigger real earnings management. In the end, audit fees have an inhibitory effect on the relationship between executives' absolute pay levels and accrued and real earnings management, while in terms of relative pay levels, they can only restrain their relationship with real earnings management. This article supplements previous studies that only examined absolute pay levels and ignored relative pay levels, enriching the literature on the relationship between pay gaps and earnings management. Secondly, this article analyzes the relationship between the two from a perspective of property rights and external supervision. Finally, it provides reference opinions for the formulation of reasonable pay levels and pay gaps for listed companies of different natures, with a view to reducing the occurrence of earnings management behaviors. Keywords: pay level, pay gap, earnings management, nature of property, audit fee 兰州大学硕士学位论文 上市公司高管薪酬水平与盈余管理关系研究 IV 目 录 中文摘要 ................................................. I Abstract ................................................. II 第一章 绪论 ............................................. 1 1.1 研究背景 .......................................... 1 1.2 研究目的与研究意义 ................................ 2 1.2.1 研究目的 ................................................ 2 1.2.2 研究意义 ................................................ 3 1.3 研究方法与研究内容 ................................ 4 1.3.1 研究方法 ................................................ 4 1.3.2 研究内容 ................................................ 4 1.4 论文的创新点 ...................................... 7 第二章 文献综述 ......................................... 8 2.1 盈余管理概念界定 .................................. 8 2.1.1 盈余管理概述 ............................................ 8 2.1.2 盈余管理的类型 .......................................... 9 2.2 文献综述 .......................................... 9 2.2.1 薪酬激励的相关研究 ...................................... 9 2.2.2 盈余管理的相关研究 ..................................... 13 2.2.3 文献评述 ............................................... 14 第三章 理论分析与研究假设 .............................. 16 3.1 相关理论基础 ..................................... 16 3.1.1 委托代理理论 ........................................... 16 3.1.2 锦标赛理论 ............................................. 17 3.1.3 行为理论 ............................................... 17 3.2 研究假设 ......................................... 18 3.2.1 绝对薪酬水平与盈余管理 ................................. 18 3.2.2 内部薪酬差距与盈余管理 ................................. 18 兰州大学硕士学位论文 上市公司高管薪酬水平与盈余管理关系研究 V 3.2.3 外部薪酬差距与盈余管理 ................................. 19 3.2.4 产权性质的调节作用 ..................................... 20 3.2.5 审计费用的调节作用 ..................................... 20 第四章 研究设计 ........................................ 22 4.1 样本选择与数据来源 ............................... 22 4.2 变量选取及定义 ................................... 22 4.2.1 被解释变量 ............................................. 22 4.2.2 解释变量 ............................................... 24 4.2.3 其他变量 ............................................... 25 4.3 模型设计 ......................................... 26 第五章 实证过程与结果分析 .............................. 28 5.1 描述性统计 ....................................... 28 5.1.1 全样本描述性统计 .....