根据委托代理理论，国企经理人是国有企业的代理人，国企高管作为国有股东的 代表，其自身的努力程度、主观状态将直接影响到公司的价值，也将影响到股东对他 们的评价。现实中由于体制机制等原因，国企高管的激励存在着诸多缺陷。中国共产 党十八届三中全会提出“要积极发展混合所有制经济”。在混合所有制改革的背景下， 除了股权结构和体制机制的变化，国有企业的公司治理内容仍是衡量企业是否健康运 行的重要标准。经营者作为公司内部治理体系中重要一环，科学合理的激励机制将对 公司的发展产生至关重要作用。因此，对于国企经营者的激励机制进行研究将是非常 必要的。 本研究依托委托代理理论，首先从公司内部治理的相关涵义着手，指出公司内部 治理机制的构成，公司内部治理的激励机制实质上就是对高管的激励机制。本研究对 公司内部治理的激励机制构成内容进行了阐述，结合国内外学者的相关研究，总结了 我国国企高管的激励机制研究方面的理论状况。从报酬激励机制、剩余支配权与经营 控制权激励机制、声誉或荣誉激励机制、聘用与解雇激励机制等方面进行归纳，分析 各种激励机制的特点，提出需要将某种或某些激励机制综合进行考量，从而发挥其最 佳激励效果。本研究以处于混合所有制改革背景下的国有T集团公司为例，分析T公 司高管激励机制方面的问题并提出对策。论文利用文献研究法、案例研究法、阅卷调 查法、访谈法等方法，通过对T公司高管进行调研得出比较翔实的基础资料。结合T 公司的发展、产权结构变化等进行归纳整理，分析和总结了影响T公司内部治理的激 励现状及影响因素，对T公司高管层的激励机制存在的问题进行研究和探讨。 作为传统的国有企业，T公司的经理人激励机制方面存在着激励力度不够且高管 满意度低、物质激励多精神激励少、激励方式不够丰富、对高管的约束和退出机制比 较僵化等问题。针对T公司在经理人激励方面存在的问题，本研究提出应在国有企业 完善职业经理人制度、完善公司内部分配制度、完善国企高管的任命制度、强化产品 市场与资本市场的激励效应、建立和完善经营者风险抵押金制度等，适合不同高管的 某种或某些激励机制的组合，从而发挥出经理人激励机制的最佳成效，使委托人与代 理人的目标趋同。本研究将对国内其他处于混合所有制改革的国有企业或国有集团公 司，在进行经理人激励机制设计方面提供一定的参考和借鉴意义。 关键字：混改； 国企；公司治理；经理人；激励机制 II ABSTRACT According to the principal-agent theory, the managers of state-owned enterprises are the agents of state-owned enterprises. As the representatives of state-owned shareholders, their own efforts and subjective state will directly affect the value of the company, and also affect the evaluation of shareholders on them. In reality, due to the system and mechanism, there are many defects in the incentive of state-owned enterprise executives. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed "to actively develop the mixed ownership economy". Under the background of mixed ownership reform, in addition to the changes of ownership structure and system mechanism, the content of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises is still an important standard to measure whether the enterprises operate healthily. As an important part of the company's internal governance system, a scientific and reasonable incentive mechanism will play an important role in the development of the company. Therefore, it is necessary to study the incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers. Based on the principal-agent theory, this study starts with the related meaning of corporate internal governance, and points out the composition of corporate internal governance mechanism. The incentive mechanism of corporate internal governance is essentially the incentive mechanism for executives. This study expounds the content of the incentive mechanism of the internal governance of the company, and summarizes the theoretical situation of the incentive mechanism of the executives of the state-owned enterprises in China based on the relevant research of scholars at home and abroad. From the aspects of reward incentive mechanism, residual control and management control incentive mechanism, reputation or honor incentive mechanism, employment and dismissal incentive mechanism, this paper analyzes the characteristics of various incentive mechanisms, and puts forward that some or some incentive mechanisms need to be comprehensively considered in order to give full play to their best incentive effect. This study takes the state-owned T Group Company under the background of mixed ownership reform as an example to analyze the problems of executive incentive mechanism of T company and put forward countermeasures. This paper uses the methods of literature research, case study, examination paper survey, interview and so on, through the investigation of T company's senior executives to get more detailed basic information. Combined with the development of T company and the change of property right structure, this paper analyzes and summarizes the current situation and influencing factors of the incentive mechanism affecting the internal governance of T company, and studies and discusses the problems existing in the incentive mechanism of the senior management of T company. III As a traditional state-owned enterprise, there are some problems in the incentive mechanism of T company's managers, such as insufficient incentive strength and low satisfaction of senior managers, more material incentive and less spiritual incentive, less incentive methods, more rigid constraint and exit mechanism for senior managers. In view of the problems existing in the incentive mechanism of T company, this study proposes that we should perfect the professional manager system, the internal distribution system, the appointment system, the incentive effect of the product market and the capital market, the establishment and improvement of the manager's risk mortgage system, etc. in the state-owned enterprises, which are suitable for the combination of some incentive mechanisms of different executives, So as to give full play to the best effect of manager's incentive mechanism, and make the goals of principal and agent converge. This study will provide some reference and reference for other state-owned enterprises or state-owned group companies in the reform of mixed ownership in the design of manager incentive mechanism. Key words: Mixed Ownership Reform，State-owned enterpris，corporate governance， manager，system of encouragement 目 录 摘要 ................... Ⅰ Abstract ............. Ⅱ 第一章 绪 论 . 1 1.1研究背景和意义 .......................... 1 1.1.1本研究的基本背景 ................... 1 1.1.2本研究的理论意义 ................... 1 1.1.3本研究的实践意义 ................... 2 1.2研究思路、框架 .......................... 3 1.2.1研究思路 .... 3 1.2.2研究内容 .... 4 1.2.3研究框架 .... 4 1.3研究方法 ....... 5 1.4预计创新点 ... 6 第二章 相关理论与研究综述 .......... 8 2.1 公司内部治理的涵义 ................. 8 2.2 公司内部治理机制的主要构成 . 8 2.2.1 公司内部治理的决策机制 ...... 9 2.2.2 公司内部治理的监督机制 ...... 9 2.2.3 公司内部治理的激励机制 .... 10 2.3 公司内部治理激励机制的构成 .............................. 11 2.3.1 报酬激励机制 ........................ 11 2.3.2 剩余支配权与经营控制权激励机制 ................... 12 2.3.3 声誉或荣誉激励机制 ............ 13 2.3.4 聘用与解雇激励机制 ............ 14 第三章 T公司内部治理激励效果的影响因素分析 .... 16 3.1国有T公司及其概况 ................ 16 3.2 T公司的产权结构及历史沿革 . 17 3.3 T公司经营者队伍及其基本构成 ............................ 17 3.4 近年来T公司的经营状况及其主要问题 .............. 18 3.5 T公司内部治理激励的基本状况 ............................ 20 3.5.1 经营者的权力配置 ................ 20 3.5.2 经营者的收入水平 ................ 21 3.5.3 经营者的持股状况 ................ 22 3.5.4 经营者的晋升制度 ................ 23 3.5.5 经营者的指标考核体系 ........ 23 第四章 国有T公司内部治理激励机制问题的调查与分析 .................... 26 4.1 调查问卷的设计思路 ............... 26 4.2 问卷调查的基本对象与调查过程 .......................... 26 4.3 调查问卷的数据整理及结果分析 .......................... 27 4.3.1 关于T公司高管选任方面的基本结论 ............... 27 4.3.2 关于T公司调研对象的基本概况 ....................... 29 4.3.3 关于T公司高管激励状况方面的