Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RANDintellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publicationonline is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as itis unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any ofits research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit /pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help makecommunities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at/giving/contributeFor more information on this publication, visit /t/RR2574 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0098-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R is a registered trademark.iiiPrefaceThis report examines Chinese maritime and air activity near Japan, especially around theSenkaku Islands. It considers implications for the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) andoffers recommendations on ways to manage the challenges presented by Chinese air activity.A long-standing rivalry between China and Japan has intensified in recent years, owing inpart to growing parity between the two Asian great powers. Although the competition involvesmany issues and spans political, economic, and security domains, the dispute over the SenkakuIslands remains a focal point. This paper examines how China has stepped up its surface and airactivities near Japan, in particular near the Senkaku Islands. It surveys the patterns in Chinesevessel and air activity and considers Japan’s responses to date. The paper concludes that resourceconstraints and limited inventories of fighter aircraft impose formidable obstacles to the JASDF’sability to match Chinese air activity. Given China’s quantitative advantage in fighter aircraft,Japan’s current approach may not be sustainable. The paper offers recommendations for theconsideration of the United States and Japan.The research reported here was commissioned by the U.S. Air Force and conducted withinthe Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a fiscal year 2017project on the growing reach of Chinese aerospace power. This report documents work originallyshared with the U.S. Air Force in December 2017.RAND Project AIR FORCERAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. AirForce’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAFprovides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting thedevelopment, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, andcyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine; ForceModernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; and ResourceManagement. The research reported here was prepared under contract FA7014-16-D-1000. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: /paf. This report documents work originally shared with the U.S. Air Force in January 2018. Thedraft report, issued on January 22, 2018, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and U.S. AirForce subject-matter experts.ivContentsPreface ....... iii Figures ......... v Summary ..... vi Acknowledgmentsvii Abbreviations ...... viii 1. Introduction ......... 1 2. Strategic Context . 3 Intensifying Mutual Perceptions of Threat .......... 5 Senkaku Islands Dispute .. 6 3. Chinese-Japanese Maritime Vessel Interactions . 9 4. Chinese-Japanese Military Aircraft Interactions ........... 12 Japan’s Response to Chinese Air Activity ........ 15 Related Measures Taken by Japan That Support the Aerial Domain .... 22 Issues and Concerns ...... 22 5. Conclusion ......... 25 References . 30 vFiguresFigure 4.1. Aggregate Reporting on Japanese Scrambles . 12 Figure 4.2. China’s Air Defense Identification Zone ........ 14 Figure 4.3. Aggregate Reporting on Japanese Scrambles to Chinese Aircraft ...... 18Figure 4.4. Japan’s Air Defense Zones ..... 20Figure 4.5. Japanese Scrambles by Ingressing Aircraft Origin ..... 21 Figure 4.6. Total Scrambles by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force Through September 30, 2017 ... 21 。。。。。。