Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND
intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication
online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it
is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of
its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit
/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make
communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,
nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.
RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
Support RAND
Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at
/giving/contribute
For more information on this publication, visit /t/CF387
Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.
Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation
R is a registered trademark.
iii
Preface
In order to explore the origins, development, and implications of Japan’s decision to establish
an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) within the Japan Ground Self-Defense
Force (JGSDF), the RAND Corporation convened a public conference on March 6, 2018, at its
offices in Santa Monica, California, that brought together leading U.S. and Japanese military and
security experts to explore the issue. Among these experts were two of the leading Japanese
generals responsible for helping to initiate and establish the ARDB, an expert scholar on
Japanese security and defense policy, and a U.S. Marine general responsible for cooperating with
the JGSDF in Okinawa. The scholars and practitioners who contributed to this event were asked
to evaluate the reasons for the ARDB’s establishment, its deterrence and defense capabilities, its
relevance for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, the extent to which it
contributes to jointness within the Japan Self-Defense Forces, its relationship with and value to
the U.S. Marine Corps, and ideas for the future evolution of Japan’s amphibious operations
capabilities.
This work was sponsored by the Government of Japan and conducted within the International
Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,
the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S.
Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations.
For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see
/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information provided on the
webpage).
iv
Table of Contents
Preface .. iii
Figures ... v
Abbreviations .... vi
1. Introduction .... 1
2. Japan’s New Defense Strategy in the Southwest Islands and Development of Amphibious
Operations Capabilities ......... 8
Introduction .... 8
The China Threat ........ 8
Japan’s “Southwestern Wall Strategy”9
The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade12
A Proposed Agenda for the ARDB’s Future Evolution .......... 14
Conclusion .... 15
3. An Insider's View of the History, Evolution, and Prospects of Japan's Amphibious Rapid
Deployment Brigade ........... 16
“What Is the Counterpart of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Japan Self-Defense Forces” ........ 17
The Western Army Infantry Regiment and the Iron Fist and Dawn Blitz Exercises .... 18
The ARDB and HA/DR Missions...... 20
The Establishment of the ARDB and the Challenges Ahead .. 21
Conclusion .... 24
4. Japan’s Amphibious Joint Pain ......... 25
Japan’s Quest to Develop Amphibious Operations Capabilities ......... 26
Challenges to Jointness in the JSDF .. 32
Command and Control ...... 32
Communications and Information-Sharing35
Fires ......... 37
Equipment40
Conclusion .... 45
5. The ARDB, the USMC, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and a Free and Open Indo-Pacific47
Background .. 47
The Relevance of the Pacific to U.S. National Security.......... 48
The U.S.–Japan Alliance and Japanese Forces’ Complementarity with the United States ....... 49
Suggestions for the Way Forward...... 53
The Past Is the Key to the Future ....... 57
6. Conclusion.... 59
References ........ 61
v
Figures
Figure 2.1. Japan’s “Southwestern Wall Strategy” ........ 10
Figure 2.2. Location of Yonaguni Island, the Southwest Islands, and Taiwan ... 11
Figure 2.3. The ARDB’s Disposition and Organization. 14
Figure 4.1. Planned Deployments of JGSDF Units in the Southwest Islands ..... 29
Figure 5.1. Deployment Status of Major Units in the Southwest Islands 56 。。。