由此，本文从操纵难度、隐蔽性、经济后果三个方面对应计盈余操纵策略
与真实盈余操纵策略的本身特点进行了对比分析，在此基础上，从机构投资者
持股、大股东控制、管理层持股三个维度探究了不同股权结构特征下，上市公
司在两种不同特点的盈余操纵策略之间的选择偏好，两种盈余操纵策略的空间
分配问题，并提出了研究假设
本文主要包括六部分：1、绪论：阐述了本文研究的相关背景及其意义，并
且介绍了本文所用到的研究方法、研究内容、技术路线以及创新点；2、国内外
研究动态回顾：从盈余管理内涵、应计盈余操纵与真实盈余操纵手段之间的对
比权衡、股权结构与盈余操纵行为相关性三方面回顾了已有理论和研究成果；3、
理论分析：用机会主义、利益趋同等理论分析了企业的盈余操纵行为，同时从
决策的角度分析了企业对两种盈余操纵策略的权衡选择；4、研究设计：对文章
的假设、变量、模型做出了详细的说明；5、实证检验：对样本数据进行实证检
验；6、结论与启示
本文主要采用文献研究法、规范研究法以及实证研究法得出了本文的研究
结论：1、管理层持股：(1)管理层持股会同时抑制应计与真实盈余操纵行为，
此时利益趋同效应相较机会主义效应占据主导地位，管理层持股体现出治理效
应；(2) 此时相较于操纵真实盈余，企业更偏好于选择操纵应计盈余。2、机构
投资者持股：(1)机构投资者持股能对企业的应计与真实盈余操纵行为产生抑制
作用，但未如本文预期导致企业对应计盈余操纵的偏好。(2)把该类投资者分为
稳定型与非稳定型两类：稳定型机构投资者会诱发企业对应计盈余操纵的偏好，
非稳定型机构投资者则不会。3、大股东控制力：(1)大股东控制力会同时引发
企业的应计与真实盈余操纵行为；(2)此时企业的盈余操纵手段趋于隐形化，存
在对于真实盈余操纵的偏好
关键字：股权结构 策略选择 应计盈余操纵 真实盈余操纵III
Abstract
In recent years, real earnings management is attached great importance by scholars,
which has been the main way to study how to implement the company's earnings
management with accrual earnings management. At the same time, the relationship
between the two means has become an important issue among scholars. Overseas
study found that in the process of earnings management, there is a trade-off between
the two strategies.
In this paper, we analyze the character of earnings management from three aspects:
manipulation, concealment, and economics consequences of earnings management.
On this basis, we analyze the trade-off between the two strategies from aspects:
managerial ownership, institutional ownership and the control force of major
shareholders, and then put forward the hypothesis.
This paper consists of six parts: The first part is the introduction, this section is a
summary of the background, which leads to research questions and reveals its value
and significance. The second part is the literature review. The third part is theory
alynasis; we analyze the earnings management, using the theory of convergence of
interest hypothesis, Opportunism theory and so on. At the same time, we analyze the
trade-off between the two strategies; using the theory of decision-making. The forth
part is study design, this section puts forward hypnosis, defines the variables, the
model. The fifth part is the empirical analysis. This part is to come to a conclusion,
basing on the collected sample data, the corresponding assumptions, the models. The
sixth part is the conclusion of this article.
This paper mainly uses experimental methodology, legal analysis method
documentary research and then concludes that:1.The managerial stockholding:(1)The
managerial stockholding can inhibit both accrual management and real earnings
management.(2)At the same time, managers will do more accrual earnings
management behavior than real earnings management.2.Institutional investors
holding:(1)Institutional investors holding would inhibit accruals and real earnings
management, but it can’t lead to accrued earnings management preferences as weIV
expect. (2) We divide the institutional investors into stable and non-stable
institutional investors. Stable institutional investors can lead to the accrued earnings
management preferences. However the non-stable institutional investors can
not.3.The control of major shareholder: (1) The majority shareholder control will
increase the accrual and real earnings management. (2) Under the large shareholders
control, comparing with the accrual earning management, the real earnings
management behavior will be used more frequently.
Key Words: Ownership Structure Strategic Choice Accrual Earnings
Management Real Earnings ManagementV
目 录
第 1 章 绪论 ........1
1.1 研究背景与意义 ...........1
1.1.1 研究背景 .1
1.1.2 选题意义 .1
1.2 研究内容与方法 ...........2
1.2.1 研究内容 .2
1.2.2 研究方法 .3
1.3 本文创新之处 .3
1.4 技术路线图....5
第 2 章 国内外研究动态 ..........7
2.1 盈余管理的内涵 ...........7
2.2 关于应计与真实盈余操纵二者之间权衡选择的文献综述 .8
2.3 股权结构与盈余操纵 ......10
2.4 文献述评 ....12
第 3 章 理论分析 ...15
3.1 应计与真实盈余操纵的联系与区别 ......15
3.2 委托代理理论.16
3.3 信息不对称理论...........18
3.4 契约理论 ....18
3.5 机会主义理论.19
3.6 利益趋同效应.20
3.7 运用决策行为分析盈余操纵方式选择.....21
第 4 章 研究设计 ...23
4.1 基本研究假设 23
4.1.1 管理层持股 ..........23
4.1.2 机构投资者持股 ......24
4.1.3 大股东控制力 ........26VI
4.2 变量设计.....27
4.2.1 被解释变量...........27
4.2.2 解释变量.30
4.2.3 控制变量 30
4.3 研究模型构建 33
4.4 样本选择与数据来源.......33
第 5 章 实证检验 ...35
5.1 描述性统计 ..35
5.2 相关性分析 ..36
5.3 多元回归分析 38
5.3.1 股权结构对于应计、真实盈余操纵的影响模型 ....38
5.3.2 股权结构对于盈余操纵隐性化程度的影响模型 ....41
5.3.3 关于机构投资者属性的分类回归 ....43
5.4 稳健性分析 ..44
第 6 章 研究结论与启示 .........49
6.1 研究结论 ....49
6.2 政策建议 ....50
6.3 本文局限 ....52
参考文献 ..........55
致 谢 .61
个人简历 ..........631
第 1 章 绪论
1.1 研究背景与意义
1.1.1 研究背景
盈余操纵可划分为运用会计手段的应计盈余操纵与构造或改变真实交易的
真实盈余操纵。Roychowdhury()
。。。。。。以上简介无排版格式，详细内容请下载查看
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