中图分类号：F279.23学校代码：10856
学号：M030119240
上海工程技术大学硕士学位论文
上市企业并购重组中业绩承诺行为
对盈余管理的影响研究
作者姓名：李和娟
指导教师：胡文伟
专业：企业管理
学院：管理学院
申请学位：管理学院硕士
完成时间：2022年2月
评阅人：苏宗伟田雪莹
答辩委员会主席：苏宗伟
成员：孟勇、石明虹、叶枫、吴刚、
田雪莹、梁鑫
I
University Code：10856
Student ID:M030119240
THE EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE COMMITMENT
BEHAVIOR ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN THE M&A
ACTIVITIES OF LISTED COMPANIES
Candidate:Li Hejuan
Supervisor:Hu Wenwei
Major:Business Administration
School of management
Shanghai University of Engineering Science
Shanghai,P.R.China
March ,2022
II
上市企业并购重组中业绩承诺行为对盈余管理的影响研究
摘要
为约束和限制并购这一经济活动中存在的信息不对称、估值不合理等问题，业绩
承诺协议被引入到并购重组交易中，同时也被交易参与者认可并广泛使用。虽然业绩
承诺协议一定程度上可以缓解信息不对称问题，但当被并购方发觉存在业绩无法达标
的可能性时，就很有可能通过盈余管理操纵业绩以逃避业绩补偿义务，这反而对中小
股东的利益产生不利影响。因此，论文深入研究业绩承诺行为对盈余管理的影响，探
究在业绩承诺期间企业选择盈余管理类型的偏好以及盈余管理水平的变化，为针对性
地解决盈余管理问题提供参考。
本文以2009-2020年并购重组交易中签订业绩承诺协议的企业为对象，使用多元
回归、倾向得分匹配法等统计分析方法对业绩承诺行为对盈余管理影响进行了分析和
检验。在翻阅梳理了盈余管理、业绩承诺行为以及两者关系的相关文献之后，本文依
托于信息不对称理论、信号理论等基础理论，分析了业绩承诺行为与盈余管理之间的
内在联系，并据此提出本文的研究假设。其中业绩承诺行为从业绩承诺期间、承诺的
业绩金额、业绩承诺补偿方式以及补偿方向这四个维度来度量，盈余管理则选择了学
者们广泛使用的模型进行度量。为了更为全面地了解业绩承诺行为对盈余管理的影
响，本文还将三种盈余管理的绝对值作为衡量盈余管理水平指标，引入到模型中做进
一步的探究。
研究结果表明，一是，处于业绩承诺期间的企业存在盈余管理行为，并且在业绩
承诺期间，作出高额业绩承诺、约定以股份方式进行业绩补偿以及签订双向业绩承诺
协议的企业都更偏好实施归类变更盈余管理来调整企业业绩；二是，当企业处于协议
约定的期间时，作出高额业绩承诺的行为会促使企业提升盈余管理水平，并且约定以
股份方式进行业绩补偿比约定以非股份方式进行业绩补偿的企业具有更高的盈余管
理水平，但研究发现双向业绩承诺协议的签订行为对盈余管理水平并没有显著影响。
基于上述研究得出的结论，本文分别从价值评估机制、准则制定、外部监管、会计准
则完善等方面提出了减少企业盈余管理行为的对策建议，以期为政府优化业绩承诺机
V
制、企业完善业绩承诺协议提供参考。
关键词：业绩承诺行为，应计盈余管理，真实盈余管理，归类变更盈余管理
VI
THE EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE COMMITMENT
BEHAVIOR ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
IN THE M&AACTIVITIES OF LISTED COMPANIES
ABSTRACT
In order to constrain and limit information asymmetry and unreasonable
valuations in the M&A activities and to protect the interests of minority shareholders,
performance commitment agreements have been introduced into M&A activities and are
widely used.The performance commitment agreement can alleviate the problem of
information asymmetry to a certain extent,but when the acquired firm finds that the
performance commitment agreement cannot be completed,it’s likely to manipulate the
performance through earnings management to avoid performance compensation
obligations,which damage to the interests of minority shareholders.Therefore,this paper
deeply studies the impact of performance commitment behavior on earnings management,
explores the preference of companies to choose earnings management types and the
changes in earnings management level during performance commitment,and provides a
reference for solving earnings management problems in a targeted manner.
This paper takes companies that signed performance commitment agreements in
the M&A activities from 2009to 2020,and uses statistical analysis methods such as
multiple regression and propensity score matching to analyze and test the relationship
between performance commitment behavior and earnings management.After reviewing
and sorting out the relevant literature on earnings management,performance commitment
behavior and the relationship between them,this paper analyze the internal relationship
between performance commitment behavior and earnings management which relies on
basic theories such as information asymmetry theory and signaling theory and then put
forward the research hypothesis.Among them,performance commitment behavior is
measured from four dimensions:performance commitment period,committed performance
amount,performance commitment compensation method and compensation direction.
Earnings management chooses a model widely used by scholars to measure.In order to
understand the impact of performance commitment behavior on earnings management
VII