为了迎合消费者购物方式的转变，越来越多的制造商选择借助网络零售平台开辟线 上直销渠道，以建立双渠道供应链。制造商的涌入推动了网络零售平台的快速发展，同 时也加剧了平台间的竞争。为了扩大市场份额，建立竞争优势，网络零售平台纷纷提出 合作广告计划，即制造商根据要求在其全国性广告中体现网络零售平台的品牌视觉元素， 平台为其提供相应比例的广告成本分担。以往的合作广告研究大多针对制造商与传统零 售商之间的合作广告问题，鲜有涉及网络零售平台。基于此，本文以网络零售平台提出 合作广告计划为现实背景，运用Stackelberg博弈的理论方法，针对线下直销制造商双渠 道供应链和线下分销制造商双渠道供应链的实际运营特征，分别研究了渠道权力结构和 渠道成员公平偏好对不同线下销售模式双渠道供应链合作广告策略的影响。 研究发现：在线下直销制造商双渠道供应链中，渠道权力结构、线上渠道交叉销售 收益及合作广告引导作用均会显著影响制造商与网络零售平台的合作广告决策，处于领 导地位的渠道成员总能够从合作广告策略中受益，但供应链的整体利润水平在集中决策 时最高；在线下分销制造商双渠道供应链中，制造商参与网络零售平台合作广告计划不 一定会损害实体零售商的利润；公平关切的实体零售商会提升其促销广告投入水平，但 过高程度的公平关切反而有利于制造商利润的提升，更加降低实体零售商的公平效用。 本文进一步丰富了有关合作广告问题的研究，为不同线下销售模式双渠道供应链渠道成 员更好的制定和实施合作广告策略提供了理论和方法指导。 关键词：双渠道供应链；合作广告；线下销售模式；渠道权力结构；公平关切 III In order to meet the change of shopping mode of consumers, manufacturers open up online direct selling channels in online retail platforms to establish dual-channel supply chain. The influx of manufacturers has driven the rapid growth of online retail platforms and intensified competition among them. In order to further expand market share and establish competitive advantages, online retail platforms have put forward cooperative advertising programs, that is, manufacturers reflect the brand visual elements of online retail platforms in their national advertisements, and platforms provide them with a certain proportion of advertising cost sharing. However, most of the previous researches on cooperative advertising focus on the issue of cooperative advertising between manufacturers and brick-and-mortar retailers, and seldom involve online retail platforms. Based on the realistic background that online retail platforms put forward cooperative advertising programs, using the method of Stackelberg game theory, we discusses the cooperative advertising strategies of the dual-channel supply chain with the different offline sales models, namely，offline direct-selling and offline distribution. We discusses the impact of channel power structure and the fairness concern of the channel member's on the cooperative advertising decision of dual-channel members, respectively. The results show that: in the offline direct-selling dual-channel supply chain, channel power structure, online channel cross-selling revenue and the advertising guidance of manufacturer all have significant influence on the cooperative advertising decisions of channel members. Channel members in a leading position can always benefit from cooperative advertising strategies. In the offline distribution dual-channel supply chain, the manufacturer's participation in the cooperative advertising programs of online retail platform does not necessarily decrease the profit of the brick-and-mortar retailer; the brick-and-mortar retailer with fairness concern will increase its investment level of local advertising, but the excessive level of fairness concerns will help manufacturers to increase profits and further reduce retailer’s fairness utility. This paper further enriches the research on cooperative advertising and provides theoretical and methodological guidance for the better development and implementation of cooperative advertising strategies in the dual-channel supply chain. Keywords：Dual-channel supply chain; Cooperative advertising; Offline sales model; Channel power structure; Fairness concern; V 目 录 1 绪论 ................................................................... 1 1.1 研究背景与意义 .................................................... 1 1.1.1 研究背景 ...................................................................................................... 1 1.1.2 研究意义 ...................................................................................................... 3 1.2 国内外研究现状综述 ................................................ 4 1.2.1 双渠道供应链合作广告研究现状 ............................................................... 4 1.2.2 渠道权力结构研究现状 ............................................................................... 6 1.2.3 公平关切研究现状....................................................................................... 7 1.2.4 文献评述 ...................................................................................................... 9 1.3 研究内容与方法 ................................................... 10 1.3.1 研究内容 .................................................................................................... 10 1.3.2 研究方法 .................................................................................................... 12 1.4 可能存在的创新点 ................................................. 13 2 相关概念和理论基础 .................................................... 15 2.1 双渠道供应链定义与分类 ........................................... 15 2.2 渠道权力结构概述 ................................................. 16 2.3 公平关切理论概述 ................................................. 17 2.3.1 公平关切理论内涵..................................................................................... 17 2.3.2 公平关切理论的模型表示 ......................................................................... 17 3 线下直销制造商双渠道供应链合作广告策略 ................................ 19 3.1 问题描述与基本假设 ............................................... 19 3.2 符号与变量 ....................................................... 20 3.3 模型建立与求解 ................................................... 21 3.3.1 制造商未参与合作广告计划的决策模型（N模型） .............................. 21 3.3.2 网络零售平台主导的合作广告模型（P模型） ...................................... 22 3.3.3 制造商主导的合作广告模型（M模型） ................................................. 23 3.3.4 集中决策的合作广告模型（C模型） ..................................................... 25 3.4 比较分析 ......................................................... 26 3.4.1交叉销售收益和广告引导作用对平台分担比例的影响 ........................... 26 3.4.2交叉销售收益和广告引导作用对制造商广告投入水平的影响 ............... 28 3.5 数值算例 ......................................................... 29 VI 3.5.1 交叉销售收益和广告引导作用对平台分担比例的影响 .......................... 30 3.5.2 交叉销售收益和广告引导作用对制造商广告投入水平的影响 .............. 31 3.5.3 交叉销售收益和广告引导作用对渠道成员利润的影响 .......................... 32 3.6 本章小结 ......................................................... 34 3.6.1 相关结论 .................................................................................................... 34 3.6.2 管理启示 .................................................................................................... 35 4 线下分销制造商双渠道供应链合作广告策略 ................................ 37 4.1 问题描述与基本假设 ............................................... 37 4.2 符号与变量 ....................................................... 39 4.3 模型建立与求解 ................................................... 39 4.3.1 单边合作广告模型（U模型） ................................................................. 39 4.3.2 双边合作广告模型（B模型） ................................................................. 41 4.3.3 考虑实体零售商公平关切的双边合作广告模型（F模型） ................... 42 4.4 比较分析 ......................................................... 45 4.4.1 平台分担比例对渠道成员决策和利润的影响 ......