它对企业的效应主要包括认证效应、逐名效应和逆向选择效应

认证理论认为，风险投资具有第三方认证功能，可缓解企业 IPO 过程中的信
息不对称问题，并监督企业的发展，从而有利于抑制股市泡沫。逐名理论认为，
风险投资公司急于通过业绩表现向市场传递自身能力信号、建立行业口碑，其 IPO
估值泡沫会更严重。逆向选择效应认为仅仅是劣质企业才会让风险投资机构入股，
以实现其融资目的，这类企业在上市后可能由于其糟糕的经营业绩和市场表现而
不得不退市

为验证风险投资的不同效应，本文选用 2009—2012 年共 862 家上市企业为样
本，包括有风险投资机构支持的企业和没有风险投资支持的企业，采用差异性检
验、回归分析等方法，研究有无风险投资机构支持对企业 IPO 估值泡沫（新股发
行价对新股内在价值的偏离度，其中新股的内在价值用剩余收益模型衡量）的影
响差异，以及有无风险投资机构支持对企业后续经营业绩（ROE、ROA）的影响
差异。结果发现，相对于没有风险投资机构支持的企业，有风险投资机构支持的
企业的 IPO 估值泡沫程度更严重，企业后续经营业绩也更差，从而证实了风险投
资会助长 IPO 估值泡沫，且会降低企业长期业绩

关键词：风险投资，IPO 估值泡沫，经营业绩ABSTRACT
II
ABSTRACT
Venture Capital, as an important investor in China&39;s stock market, has deeply
involved in enterprise IPO operation. Its effect on the enterprise mainly includes the
certification effect, grandstanding effect and the adverse selection effect.
According to the theory of certification, venture capital has third party
authentication function. It can alleviate the problem of asymmetric information in the
IPO process, and supervise the development of invested company, which is conducive
to the suppression of the stock market bubble.
According to the theory of grandstanding, VC is eager to prove its ability to the
market and establish its industry reputation by operation performance of the invested
company, which is often immature and in poor quality. Thus, it makes the invested
company’s IPO valuation bubble more serious.
Only those inferior enterprises will allow venture capital to hold their stock for
achieving their financing purposes. Such companies may be forced to withdraw from
the market because of their poor operating and market performance.
In order to verify the different effects of venture capital to the invested company,
We has selected 862 IPO companies from the year of 2009 to 2012 as samples,
including venture capital backed and non-venture backed firms.
We use variable-difference analysis and regression analysis method in order to find
the differences between VC backed and non-VC backed company on IPO valuation
bubble, as well as on operating performance of post-IPO companies.
The results showed that, compared with non-VC backed company, VC backed
company&39;s IPO valuation bubble is more serious and its operating performance of
post-IPO companies get worse.
Keywords: Venture Capital, IPO valuation bubble, operating performance目 录
III
目 录
摘要.......I
ABSTRACT .........II
目 录...... III
第一章 绪论........ 1
1.1 研究背景 1
1.2 研究目的及意义 1
1.2.1 研究目的1
1.2.2 研究意义2
1.3 研究思路、框架和方法 3
1.3.1 研究思路3
1.3.2 研究内容与框架3
1.3.3 研究方法4
第二章 文献综述 6
2.1 风险投资对 IPO 抑价的影响的相关文献 ....... 6
2.1.1 风险投资缓解 IPO 抑价 6
2.1.2 风险投资助长 IPO 抑价 7
2.1.3 风险投资对 IPO 抑价无显著影响........ 8
2.2 风险投资对 IPO 估值泡沫的影响的相关文献 ........... 9
2.2.1 风险投资缓解了 IPO 估值泡沫 9
2.2.2 风险投资助推了 IPO 估值泡沫.......... 10
2.3 风险投资对后续经营业绩影响的相关文献.. 10
2.3.1 风险投资使经营业绩更好 ...... 10
2.3.2 风险投资使经营业绩更差 .......11
2.3.3 风险投资对经营业绩无明显影响 ...... 12
第三章 相关理论及研究假设.. 13
3.1 IPO 估值泡沫... 13
3.1.1 IPO 估值及 IPO 估值泡沫的含义 ....... 13目 录
IV
3.1.2 IPO 估值泡沫的度量.... 13
3.2 IPO 估值泡沫的产生原因及后果....... 19
3.2.1 IPO 估值泡沫产生的原因........ 19
3.2.2 IPO 估值泡沫带来的后果........ 21
3.3 理论分析和研究假设.. 23
3.3.1 相关理论 .......... 24
3.3.2 研究假设 .......... 25
第四章 风险投资对 IPO 估值泡沫的影响研究.......... 26
4.1 研究设计.......... 26
4.1.1 样本选择与数据来源 .. 26
4.1.2 研究变量 .......... 26
4.1.3 实证模型 .......... 28
4.2 实证检验.
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