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摘要
所有权和经营权分离是现代股份制公司不断发展的基石，但这种分离也带来了股
东与经理人之间的委托代理问题。解决委托代理问题一方面可以通过加强对经理人的
监督来实现，另一方面通过对经理人进行激励来实现。股权激励是目前国内外常用的
一种激励方式。在我国，由于上市公司实施股权激励时间较短，再加上整体的法制环
境和公司治理机制还不完善，所以股权激励能否发挥激励的作用，很大程度上取决于
契约设计的约束性。在股权激励契约的制定过程中公司会受到内外部的监管，由于面
对的外部监督环境基本都是相同的，因此，本文的研究重点是内部监督是否会影响股
权激励契约约束性。

本文以《管理办法》为制度背景，以 2005 年 12 月 31 日至 2013 年 12 月 31 日在
国内公告并授权实施股权激励的上市公司为研究对象。首先运用独立样本 T 检验筛选
出能够衡量股权激励契约约束性的要素，并将约束性程度划分为三个水平。然后运用
层次分析法建立内部监督强度综合指标。最后，通过建立有序多分类的 Logistic 模型
研究内部监督强度对股权激励契约约束性的影响。此外，本文还进一步比较研究了两
者的关系在不同激励方式和不同实际控制人性质下是否有所差异。实证检验结果表
明：
（1）股权激励契约中激励期限和行权（解锁）业绩条件是约束性要素。激励期
限越长，行权（解锁）业绩条件越严格，股权激励契约约束性越强。

（2）内部监督强度越大，股权激励契约约束性越强。内部监督强度由股权集中
度、股东大会出席率、机构投资者持股比例、独立非执行董事比例、两职合一和监事
会持股比例进行合成。

（3）股票期权方式中内部监督强度显著影响契约约束性，而限制性股票方式中
内部监督强度对契约约束性影响不显著。

（4）无论是国有控股，还是非国有控股上市公司，内部监督强度都显著影响股
权激励契约的约束性。在非国有控股上市公司样本中，资产负债率显著影响契约的约
束性。

关键词：内部监督；股权激励契约；约束性；实际控制人性质

Abstract
Separation of ownership and management is a cornerstone of continuous development
of modern joint-stock companies, but this separation also brings principal-agent problem
between shareholders and managers. On the one hand we can solve the principal-agent
problem by strengthening the supervision of managers, on the other hand by the managers
incentives. Equity incentive is a common incentive used at home and abroad. In China, the
time that listed companies implement equity incentive is short, plus the overall legal
environment and corporate governance mechanism is not perfect, so whether the equity
incentive can play the role of incentive, largely depends on the restrictive of the contract
design. During the making process of equity incentive contract, the company will be
subject to internal and external supervision. In fact，external oversight environment are
basically the same, so the focus of this study is whether internal oversight equity will affect
the restrictive of incentive contracts.
In this paper, we choose domestic listed companies which were announced and
authorized equity incentive for the study since December 31, 2005 the management
approach promulgated to December 31, 2013. First, use independent samples T-test
screening select elements which can measure the restrictive of equity incentive contract,
and then divide the restrictive of the degree to low, medium and high three levels. Then use
AHP set up the oversight strength composite indicators. Finally, through the establishment
of an orderly Discrete Choice Model research on the impact of internal oversight strength
incentive contract restrictive of the shares. In addition, the paper further comparative study
whether the relationship between the two differ in different incentives ways and different
actual control nature. Empirical results show that:
（1）Equity incentive contract incentive term and vesting (unlock) performance
conditions are the restrictive elements. The longer term incentives, more rigorous exercise
(unlocked) performance conditions, the stronger equity incentive contract restrictive.
（2）The greater the intensity of internal oversight, the stronger the equity incentive
contract restrictive. Internal Oversight strength is synthesized by ownership concentration,
the shareholders' meeting attendance rate, the proportion of institutional investors holding,
the proportion of independent non-executive directors, CEO duality and the supervisory