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类 ：Ｆ２ ７ ５ 单 ： ３ ６
分 号位代 码
： ： ２０ １ ９ １ ９ ０３ ００４
密级 公 开学号
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成丨鉀 範 七 ＃
硕士学 位论 文
中 文 论文题目 ： 混合 所 有 制改革 、 内 外 部 治理 与 企 业
创 新一一基于 政 府 放 权的 被 调 节的 中 介作 用
ｉ ｘｅｄｗｎｅ ｒｓｈ ｉ ｅ ｆｏｒｍ Ｉ ｎｔｅｒｎａ ｌ ａｎ ｄ
英文论文题 目 ： ＭＯ ｐ Ｒ，
—
Ｅｘ ｔｅ ｒｎ ａｌ Ｇｏｖ ｅｒｎ ａ ｎ ｃｅａ ｎ ｄＥｎ ｔ ｅｒｐ ｒｉｓｅ Ｉ ｎｎｏ ｖ ａ ｔｉ ｏ ｎ Ｂ ａ ｓｅｄ ｏｎ
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ｔ ｈｅ Ｍ ｅｄ ａ ｔｉ ｎ ｇ ａ ｎｄ Ｍｏｄｅｒａｔ ｉ ｎ ｇ Ｅｆｆｅｃｔｏ ｆ Ｇｏ ｖ ｅ ｒｎ ｍｅｎ ｔ
ｄｅ ｃｅｎ ｔ ｒａｌｉｚ ａ ｔｉ ｏ ｎ
论 文作 者 ：周桐 碧
指 导教师：
胡艳
专 业名 称 ： 企 业 管理
研宄方向 ：公 司治 理
所在 学 院 ： 商 学 院
：
论 文提交日期 ２ ０２２年 ５月 １ ２日
文答 日期 ：
论 辩 ２ ０ ２ ２年 ５月 １ ６ 日摘要
混合所有制改革、内外部治理与企业创新
——基于政府放权的被调节的中介作用
企业管理专业
研究生 周桐碧 指导教师胡艳
摘要 做强做优做大国有企业，是实现全民共同富裕的制度基础。一方面，需要
以科技创新催生发展动能，在高质量发展中推进共同富裕；另一方面，通过推进
国企混合所有制改革，放大国有资本功能，形成国民共进的良性格局。目前混合
所有制改革已经从单纯的股权结构的“混”深入到治理层面“合”与市场机制“改”。
具体表现为不同性质主体共同参与董事会治理，以及企业逐步剥离原有的政策性
负担。企业内部治理层面的“合”与企业外部市场机制的“改”将共同作用于国
有企业创新活力。同时，为了更充分发挥市场机制的优化资源配置、激励创新和
发展质量，政府本身也在放权，这有利于国有企业竞争力培育和转型升级，进一
步深化国有企业的改革创新。为了探究上述的改革效果，本文选择2008—2020
年沪深两市国有企业样本数据，建立一个被调节的中介模型，从非国有股东董事
会权力和政策性负担的两条路径，研究混改与企业创新的关系，并考虑政府放权
对上述中介关系的调节效应，得出以下结论：
（1）混合所有制改革通过增加非国有股东董事，显著提升企业创新投入。
这意味着混合所有制改革已经进入治理层面的“合”。非国有股东委派董事，有
利于完善董事会治理和监督机制，提升董事会的创新意愿。
（2）混合所有制改革通过减少政策性负担，显著提升企业创新投入。混改
企业已经逐步剥离政策性负担（包括战略性负担和社会性负担），实现市场机制
的“改”。通过自主经营权力的扩大，国有企业开始减少社会职能，增加创新资
源和投入，力求培育竞争优势。
（3）政府放权调节了上述两条中介路径。具体而言，政府放权正向调节了
非国有股东董事和社会性负担对混合所有制改革与企业创新的中介效应，削弱了
战略性负担对混合所有制改革与企业创新的中介效应，支持了政府放权对于国有
企业创新的重要作用。
（4）竞争性行业的国企混改主要是通过降低政策性负担的路径提高企业创
新，而垄断性行业的国企是通过提高非国有股东委派董事的占比来提高创新能力。
因此，分类改革的侧重点不同，需要制定更加细化的制度政策。
I
四川师范大学硕士学位论文
关键词：混合所有制改革 非国有股东董事会权力 政策性负担 政府放权 被调节
的中介
II
四川师范大学硕士学位论文
Mixed Ownership Reform, Internal and External Governance and
Enterprise Innovation—Based on the Mediating and Moderating Effect of
Government decentralization
Business management
Graduate Candidate: Tong bi. Zhou Academic Adivisor: Yan.Hu
AbstractMaking state-owned enterprises stronger, better and bigger is the
institutional basis for realizing common prosperity for the whole people. On the one
hand, it is necessary to use scientific and technological innovation to generate
development momentum, and to promote common prosperity in high-quality
development; on the other hand, by promoting the reform and reform of mixed
ownership of state-owned enterprises, amplify the function of state-owned capital, and
form a benign pattern of national progress. At present, the reform of mixed ownership
reform has gone from the simple "mixing" of the ownership structure to the
"integration" at the governance level and the "reform" of the market mechanism. The
specific manifestations are that subjects of different natures participate in the
governance of the board of directors, and enterprises gradually strip off their original
policy burdens. The "combination" of the enterprise;s internal governance and the
"reform" of the enterprise;s external market mechanism will jointly affect the
innovation vitality of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, in order to give full
play to the market mechanism to optimize resource allocation, stimulate innovation and
develop quality, the government itself is also delegating power, which is conducive to
the cultivation of competitiveness, transformation and upgrading of state-owned
enterprises, and further deepens the reform and innovation of state-owned enterprises.
In order to explore the effect of the above-mentioned reforms, this paper selects the
sample data of state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020,
establishes a moderated intermediary model, and studies the relationship between
mixed reform and enterprises from the two paths of board power and policy burden of
non-state-owned shareholders. The relationship between innovation, and considering
the moderating effect of government decentralization on the above-mentioned
intermediary relationship, the following conclusions are drawn:
(1) The mixed-ownership reform will significantly increase the innovation input
III
四川师范大学硕士学位论文
of enterprises by increasing the number of non-state-owned shareholders. This means
that mixed-ownership reform has entered into a "combination" at the governance level.
The appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders is conducive to
improving the governance and supervision mechanism of the board of directors and
enhancing the willingness of the board to innovate.
(2) The mixed-ownership reform will significantly increase the innovation input
of enterprises by reducing the policy burden. The mixed-ownership reform enterprises
have gradually stripped off policy burdens (including strategic burdens and social
burdens) and realized the "reform" of the market mechanism. Through the expansion
of independent management power, state-owned enterprises began to reduce social
functions, increase innovation resources and investment, and strive to cultivate
competitive advantages.
(3) The decentralization of the government regulates the above two intermediary
paths. Specifically, government decentralization positively moderates the mediating
effect of non-state shareholder directors and social burden on mixed ownership reform
and enterprise innovation, weakens the mediating effect of strategic burden on mixed
ownership reform and enterprise innovation, and supports government decentralization.
The important role of SOE innovation.
(4) The mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in competitive
industries is mainly to improve corporate innovation by reducing policy burdens, while
state-owned enterprises in monopoly industries increase the proportion of directors
appointed by non-state-owned shareholders to improve innovation capabilities.
Therefore, the focus of classification reform is different, and more detailed institutional
policies need to be formulated.
Key Word: Mixed Ownership Reform, Board Power, Policy Burdens, Government
Decentralization, mediated intermediary
IV