近年来，学术界和企业界始终给予盈余管理持续的关注和重视，这是由于盈余管理 除了会对投资者的投资决策行为产生影响之外，同时对出现盈余管理的企业产生不利于 长期可持续发展的影响。盈余管理同样会导致社会经济产生诸多问题产生，特别对一些 股份制公司而言，发生这类行为的企业管理层利用会计政策选择、公司治理不足等机会， 进行一些会计操作方面的盈余管理，其动机包括资本市场进行融资的需要，增股配股的 需要，以及所谓的“合理”避税的需要，而实施盈余管理的行为和手段，操作会计盈余 信息。如此产生的会计管理盈余信息，必然是被扭曲失真的信息，严重误导投资者，债 权人等信息使用者，导致投资方错误的投资而蒙受经济损失。对于股权结构复杂、存在 企业并购、资产重组等业务活动的企业，更是容易隐藏盈余管理行为。 因此，本文正是在这样的背景下，选择管理者盈余管理行为作为研究问题，并选择 有并购、资产重组的 A 公司作为研究对象，分析其盈余管理行为，探究其动因，从而提 出治理建议，以期为保护投资者利益提供参考。 本文共五部分，第一、二部分包括绪论、概念及理论基础。第三部分对本文研究对 象 A 公司及其盈余管理基本状况进行阐述，包括公司的组织架构和股权结构以及主营业 务状态，突出对案例公司两项重大的会计差错的更正过程进行介绍，重点分析这些会计 差错更正对案例公司盈余管理产生的影响，作为本文后续研究工作的基础和依据。第四 部分通过分析案例公司盈余管理的动因，深度分析案例公司商誉确认和会计政策的实施 状况，以及披露的信息质量和公司治理结构存在的问题。第五部分基于前文对案例公司 盈余管理动因的分析，针对 A 公司的具体情况，提出规范商誉确认、避免重大会计差错、 规范信息披露、加强公司治理等治理盈余管理的相应对策。综上，本文选择 A 公司作为 研究案例颇具现实意义，对于其他公司而言有着警示作用，为我国市场经济的稳定和快 速发展提供助力。 关键词：盈余管理；商誉减值；投资收益；公司治理III Abstract In recent years, academia and business circles have always paid close attention to earnings management. This is because earnings management not only affects investors' investment decision-making behavior, but also has adverse effects on the long-term sustainable development of enterprises with earnings management. Earnings management will also lead to many social and economic problems, especially for some joint-stock companies, the enterprise management who have such behavior take advantage of the opportunity of accounting policy choice and insufficient corporate governance to carry out some accounting operation of earnings management. The motivation includes the need of capital market financing, the need of increasing shares and allotment, and the so-called "reasonable" management The need of tax avoidance, and the implementation of earnings management behavior and means, the operation of accounting earnings information. The resulting accounting management earnings information must be distorted information, seriously misleading investors, creditors and other information users, resulting in investors' wrong investment and economic losses. For the enterprises with complex ownership structure, merger and acquisition, asset restructuring and other business activities, it is easier to hide earnings management behavior. Therefore, in this context, this paper chooses managers' earnings management behavior as the research issue, and selects a company with merger and acquisition and asset restructuring as the research object, analyzes its earnings management behavior, explores its motivation, and puts forward governance suggestions, so as to provide reference for protecting the interests of investors. This paper consists of five parts. The first and second parts include introduction, concept and theoretical basis. The third part describes the basic situation of a company and its earnings management, including the company's organizational structure, ownership structure and main business status, highlights the correction process of two major accounting errors of the case company, and focuses on the analysis of the impact of these accounting errors on the earnings management of the case company, as the basis of the follow-up research of thisIV paper Foundation and basis. The fourth part analyzes the motivation of earnings management of the case company, deeply analyzes the goodwill recognition and the implementation of accounting policies of the case company, as well as the quality of information disclosed and the problems existing in the corporate governance structure. In the fifth part, based on the analysis of the motivation of earnings management of the case company, according to the specific situation of company a, the corresponding countermeasures of earnings management are put forward, such as standardizing goodwill recognition, avoiding major accounting errors, standardizing information disclosure, strengthening corporate governance, etc. To sum up, this paper chooses company a as the research case, which is of practical significance. It has a warning role for other companies and provides assistance for the stable and rapid development of China's market economy. Key words: Earnings Management; Goodwill Impairment; Investment Income; Corporate Governance;V 目 录 第一章 绪论...............................................................................................................................1 1.1 选题背景.......................................................................................................................1 1.2 研究目的.......................................................................................................................1 1.3 研究意义.......................................................................................................................2 1.3.1 理论意义.............................................................................................................2 1.3.2 实践意义.............................................................................................................2 1.4 文献综述.......................................................................................................................2 1.4.1 国外研究现状.....................................................................................................2 1.4.2 国内研究现状.....................................................................................................5 1.4.3 研究评述.............................................................................................................8 1.5 研究内容与技术线路图...............................................................................................9 1.5.1 研究内容.............................................................................................................9 1.5.2 技术路线图.........................................................................................................9 1.5.3 研究方法...........................................................................................................11 第二章 相关概念和理论基础.................................................................................................12 2.1 相关概念.....................................................................................................................12 2.1.1 盈余管理相关概念及方式...............................................................................12 2.1.2 盈余管理的目的...............................................................................................14 2.2 盈余管理相关理论......................................................................................................14 2.2.1 机会主义行为理论...........................................................................................14 2.2.2 现代契约理论...................................................................................................15 2.2.3 委托代理理论...................................................................................................15 2.2.4 信号传递理论...................................................................................................15 第三章 A 公司发展现状及盈余管理行为.............................................................................17 3.1A 公司的总体概况......................................................................................................17 3.1.1A 公司的成立与发展........................................................................................17 3.1.2 公司的组织结构与股权结构介绍...................................................................17 3.1.3A 公司的主营业务............................................................................................20 3.2A 公司盈余管理分析..................................................................................................21 3.2.1 企业合并中的盈余管理...................................................................................21VI 3.2.2 重要客户 SS 集团破产对盈余管理的影响....................................................22 3.3 年报披露、关联交易中的盈余管理行为..................................................................24 3.3.1 美化年度财务报告披露信息的盈余管理.......................................................24 3.3.2 为处理未披露的关联交易而进行盈余管理...................................................25 第四章 A 公司盈余管理动因分析.........................................................................................27 4.1 合并中的盈余管理动因分析.....................................................................................27 4.1.1 为达到业绩承诺的盈余管理动因...................................................................27 4.1.2 重要客户破产给 A 公司业绩承诺造成的影响..............................................28 4.2 会计政策选择空间造成的盈余管理.........................................................................30 4.2.1 收入确认中的盈余管理...................................................................................30 4.2.2 应收款项和项目成本处置中的盈余管理.......................................................31 4.2.3 商誉减值确认与重大会计差错更正...............................................................32 4.3 公司治理结构不完善导致的盈余管理.....................................................................35 4.3.1 不合理的股权结构为关联交易中盈余管理创造空间...................................35 4.3.2 董事会及管理高层人员变动过于频繁...........................................................35 4.3.3 董事会的专门委员会未行使相关职能...........................................................36 第五章 公司盈余管理的治理对策.........................................................................................38 5.1 对业绩承诺条件之下的商誉确认和减值进行规范.................................................38 5.2 避免重大会计差错更正的发生.................................................................................39 5.3 规范公司的财务信息披露和内部关联方交易.........................................................40 5.4 加强专门委员会的建设、改善公司治理结构.........................................................41 5.4.1 优化专门委员会组织机构设置.......................................................................41 5.4.2 改善专门委员会信息不对称问题...................................................................42 5.4.3 改变独立董事选配机制...................................................................................42 5.4.4 改善高管激励契约功能...................................................................................43 第六章 结论与展望.................................................................................................................45 6.1A 公司盈余管理问题..................................................................................................45 6.2 盈余管理治理对策.....................................................................................................47 6.3 研究局限与展望.........................................................................................................48